ESSAYS ON LINKAGES BETWEEN CAPITAL FLOWS, LEVERAGE, AND THE REAL ECONOMY by Kwak, Jun Hee HEE
ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation: ESSAYS ON LINKAGES BETWEEN
CAPITAL FLOWS, LEVERAGE,
AND THE REAL ECONOMY
Jun Hee Kwak
Doctor of Philosophy, 2021
Dissertation Directed by: Professor Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan
Department of Economics
Europe experienced a sovereign debt crisis starting in 2010, in which perceived default
risk and interest rates on government bonds soared in many countries, leading to recessions.
This episode was preceded by a steady rise in the ratio of corporate debt to GDP, suggesting
that private sector leverage may be a contributing factor to rising sovereign risk.
In the main essay, I find that corporate debt causally affects sovereign default risk
and show that this corporate-sovereign debt nexus is an important amplification mechanism
driven by externalities that call for macroprudential policies. I run instrumental variable
regressions to estimate a causal relationship running from aggregate corporate leverage to
sovereign spreads. I use the weighted sum of idiosyncratic shocks to top 50 large firms in each
Eurozone country as an instrument for aggregate corporate leverage to rule out potential
reverse causality and omitted variable bias. The regressions suggest that rising corporate
leverage causes sovereign spreads to rise, which confirms the existence of the corporate-
sovereign nexus. To understand the mechanism, I build a model in which both firms and
the government can default. When corporate debt increases, tax revenues are expected to
be lower, as firms stop paying taxes and dividends when they default, which raises sovereign
default risk. This tax revenue channel is supported by empirical evidence. Country-level tax
revenue regressions show that increases in corporate debt-to-GDP ratios reduce future tax
revenue growth. Difference-in-difference regressions using firm-level data suggest that highly-
leveraged firms reduce tax payments more compared to less-leveraged firms in response to the
2008 global financial crisis. Moreover, I analyze an externality that arises from firms’ limited
liability, which is distinct from the pecuniary and aggregate demand externalities. I find
that there exist time-consistent optimal policies that correct the limited liability externality.
A quantitative model calibrated to six Eurozone countries shows that such policies consists
of a low constant debt tax rate together with transfers and investment credits to firms
during the crisis. Implementing these policies alleviates the corporate-sovereign linkage, so
that the number of defaulting firms decreases, and the government has enough fiscal space
to provide transfers to households suffering from low consumption. Furthermore, practical
policies such as either constant or cyclical debt tax schedules can correct overborrowing
externalities. However, a countercyclical debt policy (which raises the debt tax rate during
corporate credit booms) induces more firm defaults during crises, and thus it is less effective
than constant and procyclical debt tax policies. This suggests that policymakers should be
cautious about implementing countercyclical debt tax policies such as countercyclical capital
buffers, and should even consider relaxing regulations when corporate default risk is high.
The second essay (co-authored) documents new facts on the relationship between
sector-level capital flows and sectoral leverage.1 We highlight the interconnections between
1This essay was published in Annual Review of Economoics (Vol.12:833-846, August 2020;
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080218-025901) and reproduced here with permission.
different approaches and argue that harmonization of the macro and micro approaches can
yield a more complete understanding of these effects of capital flows on country-, sector- and
firm/bank-level leverage associated with credit booms and busts.
The third essay (co-authored) uses a historical quasi-experiment in the Ottoman Em-
pire to estimate the causal effect of trade shocks on capital flows.2 We argue that fluctuations
in regional rainfall within the Ottoman Empire capture the exogenous variation in exports
from the Empire to Germany, France, and the U.K., during 1859-1913. Our identification
is based on the following historical facts: First, only surplus production was allowed to be
exported in the Ottoman Empire (provisionistic policy). Second, different products grew
in different regions that were subject to variation in rainfall. Third, Germany, France, and
the U.K. imported these different products. When a given region of the Empire gets more
rainfall than others, the resulting surplus production is exported to countries with higher
ex-ante export shares for those products, and this leads to higher foreign investment by those
countries in the Ottoman Empire. Our findings support theories predicting complementarity
between trade and finance, where causality runs from trade to capital flows.
2This essay was published in Journal of Development Economoics (Vol.147, 102537, November 2020;
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2020.102537) and reproduced here with permission.
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Chapter 1: Corporate and Sovereign Debt: Linkages and Externalities
1.1 Overview
I show that corporate debt accumulation during booms can explain increases in sovereign
risk during stress periods. Using idiosyncratic shocks to large firms as instruments for aggre-
gate corporate leverage, I show that rising corporate leverage during the period 2002-2007
causally increases sovereign spreads in six Eurozone countries during the debt crisis period
of 2008-2012. To explain these findings, I build a dynamic quantitative model in which both
firms and the government can default. Rising corporate debt increases sovereign default
risk, as tax revenues are expected to decrease. Externalities arise because it can be pri-
vately optimal but socially suboptimal for firms to default given their limited liability. The
fact that firms do not take into account the effect of their debt accumulation on aggregate
sovereign spreads is an important externality, rationalizing macroprudential interventions
in corporate debt markets. I propose a set of such optimal debt policies that reduce the
number of defaulting firms, increase fiscal space, and boost household consumption during
financial crises. Both constant and cyclical debt tax schedules can correct overborrowing
externalities. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it is optimal to cut a debt tax rate during
credit booms, as raising the debt tax rate induces more firm defaults.
1.2 Introduction
Eurozone sovereign spreads surged during the European debt crisis of 2010 to 2012,
reflecting sharp increases in the perceived probability of sovereign default. Previous research
1
on sovereign default has identified high sovereign indebtedness as one of the precursors of
sovereign debt crises. However, the average Eurozone government-debt-to-GDP ratio rose
by only 19.7 percentage points from 2000 to 2011, while the non-financial corporate-debt-
to-GDP ratio rose by 41.6 percentage points during the same period. Reinhart and Rogoff
(2009a) show that corporate defaults have also been a predictor of government defaults
or reschedulings in many episodes.1 Consistent with their finding, Eurozone non-financial
corporate interest rate spreads peaked before and during the sovereign debt crisis, as plotted
in Figure 1.1.
The empirical literature on sovereign spreads faces the challenge of establishing causal
mechanisms. Based on the long history of credit cycles across countries, the consensus view
holds that credit booms lead to various forms of financial crises. However, this view arguably
has not been properly supported by causal inference. One of the main empirical difficulties is
that there is likely an omitted variable linking credit booms and financial crises. For instance,
optimism among investors can generate a credit boom and a subsequent correction. In this
case, the cause of the subsequent correction might be sudden changes in investors’ sentiment,
rather than the credit boom itself. A possible remedy to this endogeneity problem is to find
instruments for credit that are unrelated to other macroeconomic shocks, but it is difficult
to find (excludable) instruments for macroeconomic variables.
One of the main contributions of this paper is to establish a causal relationship running
from corporate debt to sovereign default risk during the European debt crisis. I run instru-
mental variable (IV) regressions to show that a rising corporate debt-to-GDP ratio causally
increases sovereign spreads during the pre-crisis period, using a weighted sum of idiosyn-
cratic shocks to large firms as an instrument for aggregate corporate leverage. Gabaix and
Koijen (2020) develop this type of general identification strategy for estimating aggregate
relationships using idiosyncratic shocks as instruments for aggregate variables. An instru-
1Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) report that rapidly rising private indebtedness precedes banking crises, and
that banking crises increase the likelihood of sovereign default, using a long-term historical database which
dates back to the 1800s and covers 70 countries. See also Schularick and Taylor (2012), Drehmann and
Juselius (2012), and many others.
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mental variable regression suggests that a one standard deviation (23%p) increase in the
corporate debt-to-GDP ratio causally increases sovereign spreads by 253 basis points, using
a sample of six Eurozone countries during the period 2002-2012.2 This regression controls
for financial conditions in the banking sector together with country and time fixed effects.
The core identification assumptions in my empirical strategy are that idiosyncratic shocks
to large firms are correlated with aggregate corporate debt (relevance) and that these shocks
affect sovereign spreads only through their impact on corporate debt, after controlling for
country-specific GDP growth and time-varying factors common to all countries (exclusion).
The exclusion condition states that the error term in the sovereign spread regression re-
flects systematic shocks to government solvency, which are not correlated with idiosyncratic
firm-level shocks. Using idiosyncratic shocks to large firms as an instrument addresses poten-
tial reverse causality (e.g., government solvency shocks may spill over to corporate debt) and
omitted variables bias (e.g., both corporate and government debt may be affected by liquidity
shocks). To the best of my knowledge, my paper is the first to present evidence for a causal
linkage between corporate debt and sovereign default risk, combining detailed firm-level bal-
ance sheet data with a new identification technique.3 Also, local projections suggest that
rising corporate leverage has persistent effects on perceived government solvency, increasing
3-year-ahead sovereign spreads.
Next, to explain the link between corporate debt and sovereign default risk, I build
a model in which both firms and the government can default on debt, based on the mod-
els of Jermann and Quadrini (2012) and Arellano (2008). Rising corporate debt increases
sovereign default risk, as government tax revenues are expected to decrease, given that firms
2The maximum increase from the start to the end of period among these countries’ spreads is 883 basis
points, and the average increase calculated in the same way is 320 basis points.
3Several papers estimate the causal link running from other variables (not corporate debt) to sovereign
spreads. For example, Acharya et al. (2014) run regressions of daily European sovereign credit default swap
(CDS) rates on bank CDS rates before, during, and after the governments’ announcements on bank bailouts.
Wang (2020) finds that surprise increases in corporate CDS rates lead to increases in sovereign CDS rates
in emerging markets, using a high-frequency event-study analysis. Bernoth and Herwartz (2019) estimate a
causal linkage between exchange rates and sovereign spreads in emerging market economies during 2004-2016,
using structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) models.
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pay fewer taxes when they default and given that rising firms’ borrowing costs dampen eco-
nomic activity and reduce overall tax revenues including household income taxes. When the
government may not be able to raise enough taxes to finance public expenditure, it may
choose to accumulate debt or repudiate debt to finance this expenditure. This means that
the government has more incentive to default on its debt, and thus sovereign risk increases.
Arellano et al. (2019) also build a model that connects firms and the government via the tax
revenue channel. However, my model differs in that firms choose leverage endogenously and
can default on debt, while firm leverage in their model is exogenously given by the working
capital constraint. Endogenous firm leverage is a key ingredient in my model that enables
assessment of overborrowing externalities, as described below.
To provide empirical evidence on the tax revenue channel, I run a country-level tax
revenue regression, using the weighted sum of idiosyncratic shocks to large firms as an
instrument for corporate leverage, and find that a one standard deviation increase in the
ratio of corporate debt to GDP (23%p) leads on average to a 7.4%p decrease in one-year-
ahead tax revenue growth. Moreover, a difference-in-difference regression using firm-level
data suggests that highly-leveraged firms pay fewer taxes compared to less-leveraged firms
during and after the 2008 global financial crisis, while controlling for interest payments.4
I use my model to perform a normative analysis in which firms do not internalize
the effects of their borrowing on the welfare of households, and the government needs to
intervene in corporate debt markets to correct this negative externality. When firms default,
the economy bears the economic costs of bankruptcies. However, firms do not internalize
these negative spillovers, since their liability is limited in the event of default. In this
environment, firms tend to over-borrow and increase corporate default risk, which is likely
to reduce household consumption and raise the risk of government default. Externalities arise
because it is privately optimal but socially suboptimal for firms to default given their limited
liability. Most papers on optimal macroprudential policies have been silent on externalities
4The ratio of tax payments to value added of highly-leveraged firms drops by around 0.28%p more than
that of less-leveraged firms during this episode, while the average tax payment ratio of the sample is 4.15%.
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due to limited liability. The limited liability externality that I introduce is qualitatively
different from previously identified externalities such as pecuniary and aggregate demand
externalities. The limited liability externality hinges on the corporate law, which is operative
when a firm is a separate legal entity apart from its owners. This means that this type of
externality can arise even if firms are not atomistic, in the sense that they internalize their
effects on aggregate prices, unlike pecuniary and aggregate demand externalities.
I calibrate the model to six Eurozone countries during the period 2000-2012. This
model reproduces the dynamics observed in the data during the period 2007-2017, success-
fully matching the duration and magnitude of both the corporate credit boom-bust cycle
and fluctuations in sovereign spreads and output. Using the model, I uncover a set of time-
consistent optimal policies (a constant debt tax rate and subsidies to firms during the crisis)
that correct the limited liability externality. The welfare gain from these policies is sub-
stantial, equivalent to around a permanent 12.8% increase in consumption. The reason is
that optimal policies mitigate corporate debt cycles and associated firm defaults, leading
to more household consumption and tax revenue. As a result, government interest rates
fall, and the government can finance more subsidies to firms, which again reduces firm de-
faults. This positive feedback loop of optimal policies gives rise to the large welfare gain by
alleviating the causal linkage between corporate debt and government spreads. In reality,
this type of state-contingent optimal policy might not be available to policymakers. Thus,
I explore alternative simple debt policies. I find that both constant and cyclical debt tax
schedules can increase welfare (2.1% and 3.8% increases in permanent consumption, respec-
tively) by correcting overborrowing externalities. However, contrary to conventional wisdom,
the model shows that it is optimal to cut the debt tax rate during credit booms. Intuitively,
the government raises the debt tax rate during corporate credit booms after observing the
current level of aggregate corporate debt, and this backward-looking stance of the simple
countercyclical debt policy leads to more firm defaults during the crisis. Furthermore, in
the presence of firm default risk, it is optimal for the government to cut the debt tax rate
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to reduce firm default risk when corporate leverage is high. This result is in sharp contrast
to existing models based on borrowing constraints (Bianchi, 2011; Bianchi and Mendoza,
2018), as these models typically recommend raising the debt tax rate when the borrowing
constraint is more likely to bind due to high leverage.
Related Literature
I contribute to three strands of research. First, I add to the empirical literature that
has identified key covariates that are highly correlated with sovereign spreads (Longstaff et
al., 2011; Aguiar et al., 2016; Hilscher and Nosbusch, 2010; Bevilaqua et al., 2020). This
literature typically does not attempt to estimate a causal relationship between fundamentals
and spreads. Also, such regressions usually do not include corporate debt as an explanatory
variable, though corporate debt is known to predict financial crises well (e.g., Reinhart and
Rogoff (2011)). An exception that considers corporate debt includes Du and Schreger (2017).
They run spread regressions for emerging economies, using foreign currency corporate debt
borrowed from foreign lenders as an explanatory variable. In contrast, I show that total
corporate debt (denominated in all currencies and borrowed from all lenders) in advanced
economies (the Eurozone) helps to explain increases in sovereign spreads after controlling
for currency risk. Moreover, other variables typically included in existing research, such as
GDP growth and government debt, fail to explain the bulk of variation in sovereign spreads
empirically, as reported in Aguiar et al. (2016). Specifically, the growth rate of output
and the government debt-to-GDP ratio together explain less than 20 percent of sovereign
spread variation (within countries and across time) in emerging economies. In my IV spread
regression for Eurozone countries, including country and year fixed effects, GDP growth and
the government debt-to-GDP ratio together explain about 27 percent of sovereign spread
variation, while the corporate debt-to-GDP ratio accounts for an additional 19 percent of
this variation.
Second, I build a sovereign default model that sheds light on a new causal mechanism.
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The canonical quantitative sovereign default models aim to explain sovereign default events
as resulting from exogenous aggregate shocks to income flows and adjustments in external
government debt (Arellano (2008), Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and other papers that build
on Eaton and Gersovitz (1981a)).5 I contribute to this literature by building a model in
which firms finance investment with internal funds, debt, or equity, and both firms and
the government can default. In my model, endogenous variation in firm leverage generates
time-varying firm default risk, which affects the expected path of dividends and taxes. This
generates time-varying risk in government tax revenue, which is a new channel that helps
to match the crisis dynamics of corporate leverage and sovereign spreads observed in the
data. Wu (2020) builds a similar model in which exchange rate shocks and corresponding
time-varying risk premia are key sources of variation in sovereign spreads, but his model
abstracts from equity issuance and limited liability. Kaas et al. (2020) also build a model
with sovereign and private default risk without modeling physical investment and limited
liability. Their model explains business cycle regularities in emerging economies.
Third, I contribute to the literature on optimal macroprudential policies. The existing
literature justifies the use of macroprudential policies as arising from deviations from the
conditions assumed in the first welfare theorem (see Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Lorenzoni
(2008)). The first welfare theorem states that a competitive equilibrium is Pareto-efficient
under several conditions. One of these conditions is that there should be no externalities
in the economy, in the sense that each person should be able to internalize their effects on
other people via market prices. However, if people are atomistic and do not internalize their
effects on market prices, the competitive equilibrium does not guarantee efficient allocations.
In this environment, people can over-borrow compared to the socially optimal level of debt.
The government can intervene in debt markets to correct externalities and increase social
welfare. Bianchi (2011), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2015), Benigno et al. (2016), Jeanne
and Korinek (2020) and others identify this type of pecuniary externality in various settings
5See Mendoza and Yue (2012), Arellano et al. (2019), Bocola et al. (2019), Rojas (2020), and many others
for recent sovereign default models.
7
and investigate optimal debt policies.6 I introduce a new limited liability externality into
a similar framework and analyze the resulting optimal policies. Wu (2020) also identifies a
novel externality which emerges because firms do not internalize their effects on sovereign
spreads, as sovereign spreads do not enter firms’ budget constraint. His model assumes that
owners do not walk away from their debts when firms go bankrupt. On the other hand, my
model assumes that owners exit the business upon bankruptcy, which creates a fundamental
externality arising from limited liability. Also, unlike Wu (2020), I analyze a set of optimal
policies to correct externalities. Aguiar and Amador (2016) study optimal fiscal policy with
implicit sovereign and private default risk in which the government minimizes tax distortions
arising from financing exogenous public expenditure. I complement their work by introducing
explicit corporate default decisions into the sovereign default model and analyzing optimal
debt policy to address the limited liability externality.
1.3 Empirical Evidence: Corporate-Sovereign Linkage
1.3.1 Data Description
I estimate the impact of corporate leverage on sovereign spreads in the EU. Out of
the 25 EU countries, only 20 have data on the ratio of corporate debt to GDP available
from BIS. Out of these 20 countries, 11 have sovereign interest rate data for 10 year bonds
denominated in euro available from Bloomberg during the period 1999q1–2012q4. I focus on
this period to mitigate potential reverse causality running from sovereign risk to corporate
debt during the post-2012 crisis. I drop Germany since the German rate is used as the
reference rate in measuring the sovereign spread. I also focus on countries that adopted the
euro in 1999 to eliminate currency risk as a source of yield differences relative to the German
6Also, Farhi and Werning (2016), Korinek and Simsek (2016), and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016)
identify aggregate demand externalities in the presence of nominal rigidities that macroprudential policies
can correct. Basu et al. (2020) consider both pecuniary and aggregate demand externalities. See Erten et
al. (Forthcoming) for discussion of various types of externalities that can be corrected by macroprudential
policies.
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government bond. The resulting sample consists of country-quarter observations during the
period 1999q1–2012q4 across nine Eurozone countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain). Summary statistics are presented in Table
1.1 for this sample.
The sovereign spread is measured as the difference between a country’s 10-year gov-
ernment bond rate and the 10-year German government bond rate. Both bond rates are
denominated in euro. Quarterly GDP growth is the log difference of seasonally-and-calendar-
adjusted real GDP (Eurostat). Debt-to-GDP ratios (based on core debt at market value)
for government and non-financial corporates come from BIS total credit statistics.7 These
debt measures include credit from all sources in all currencies. VIX is the implied volatility
of the S&P 500 (CBOE) based on option prices. The literature has identified GDP growth,
the ratio of government debt to GDP, and a global common factor as being important to
explaining sovereign spreads (see Longstaff et al. (2011), Aguiar et al. (2016), Bai et al.
(2019) and others). I choose VIX as the global factor to capture changes in global investors’
risk aversion. Additionally, I use the difference between US 3-month treasury rates and the
3-month LIBOR (TED spread) and the difference between US 10-year and 3-month trea-
sury rates (term spread) as additional controls for global credit conditions. Both spreads
and the VIX are available from FRED (Economic Data by the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis). I also control for country-level banking sector leverage, measured as the ratio
of selected financial assets to total equity, available from OECD.8 Banking sector leverage
is only available at an annual frequency and thus is used only in annual regressions. Tax
revenue is measured as total receipts from taxes and social contributions and comes from
Eurostat. Real tax revenue is calculated as nominal revenue divided by the GDP deflator
(obtained from Eurostat).
For IV regressions, I use the weighted sum of idiosyncratic productivity shocks to the
top 50 largest firms in each country as an instrument for aggregate corporate debt. Thus,
7BIS (2019), Credit to the non-financial sector, https://www.bis.org/statistics/totcredit.htm.
8OECD (2020), Banking sector leverage (indicator). doi: 10.1787/027a0800-en.
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I must restrict my IV regression sample to countries for which I can estimate total factor
productivity in firm-level data (ORBIS-AMADEUS). Summary statistics for the IV regres-
sion sample are shown in Table 1.2. As I also use two years of lagged variables in the IV
regressions, my final IV sample is limited to annual observations from six Eurozone coun-
tries (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Finland, and France) during the period 2002-2012.
The ORBIS-AMADEUS database is compiled by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing
(BvD), where AMADEUS is the European subset of ORBIS. This dataset has detailed an-
nual firm-level information, including balance sheets, income statements, and profit and loss
accounts. The main advantage of this data is that it contains both publicly and privately
held companies, which distinguishes ORBIS from Compustat and Worldscope, which only
contain large listed firms. I refer to Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2019) for details on the construc-
tion of data.9 Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2019) show that the ORBIS-AMADEUS database is
nationally representative, in the sense that aggregated firm-level data covers a considerable
part of total gross output and employment (as compiled by official Bureaus of Statistics).
Furthermore, I compare debt-to-GDP ratios from ORBIS-AMADEUS and BIS in Figure
1.2. I calculate debt-to-value-added ratios from ORBIS-AMADEUS as the sum of debt over
the sum of value added (operating revenue net of material costs) across firms in a given
country. I measure debt as the sum of loans and long-term debt, which represents financial
debt excluding other accounts payable. I find that the time series of the debt-to-GDP ratio
from ORBIS-AMADEUS and BIS track each other well for the six countries on average.
I use data from the ORBIS-AMADEUS database on non-financial sector firms only,
because financial intermediaries such as banks and insurance companies likely have different
decision rules regarding leverage from the non-financial sector. I also exclude the mining and
oil-related sectors, since measurement of idiosyncratic shocks is problematic in these sectors,
given that their revenues depend strongly on aggregate commodity price shocks. For firm-
level regressions, I use a sample covering the period 2004-2012 in the six Eurozone countries
9See Data Appendix for data cleaning.
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used for the aggregate IV regressions (Italy, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, Finland, and France).
I exclude the recession period of 2000 to 2003. I include firms that have missing observations
in some years to account for behavior of defaulting firms. The leverage measure is the ratio of
financial debt to value added (b/y), where value added is operating revenue minus materials
cost. Nominal variables are deflated by a 2-digit sector gross output deflator (EU KLEMS).
To measure firm-level total factor productivity, I implement the Wooldridge (2009) extension
of the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology.10 I closely follow Gopinath et al. (2017a)
for the TFP estimation. Capital is the book value of tangible fixed assets, and labor is
measured as the wage bill, reflecting the quantity and quality of labor.11 Capital is deflated
by a 2-digit sector investment deflator, and labor and materials costs are deflated by the 2-
digit sector gross output deflator (EU KLEMS). All firm-level regression variables measured
with ratios are winsorized at the 3rd and 97th percentiles.
1.3.2 Sovereign Spread OLS Regression
To begin, I estimate the following OLS regression using quarterly observations on
aggregate country-level data:
Gov’t Spreadc,t = βyGDP Growthc,t−1 + βgovGov
′tDebt/GDPc,t−1
+ βcorpCorpDebt/GDPc,t−1 + δc + γt + εc,t (1.1)
where δc and γt are country and quarter fixed effects, respectively.
Table 1.3 presents OLS regression results using the sample of six Eurozone countries
that will be used for IV regressions. In column (1), government spreads are negatively re-
10As I do not observe firm-level prices, this measure of TFP might capture both productivity and demand
shocks. However, as long as these measured shocks are exogenous with respect to sovereign risk, I can use
this measure to construct instruments for my identification strategy.
11Since I use year-on-year variation of productivity rather than its level, investment goods purchases are
largely measured at current prices.
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lated to GDP growth and positively related to government debt. These results suggest that
the government is more likely to default in bad times when it has a large amount of debt. In
column (2), corporate debt is positively related to spreads, suggesting that rising corporate
leverage raises the perceived probability of sovereign default. The within-R2 increases signif-
icantly (from 0.366 to 0.445) after including corporate debt, which suggests that corporate
leverage is an important variable to explain within-country variation in sovereign spreads.
In column (3), adding the log VIX does not change the other coefficients much, and VIX
is not a significant predictor for sovereign spreads. Adding the TED spread or term spread
does not affect the coefficients on corporate debt in columns (4) and (5). The insignificant
coefficients on these variables suggest that global credit conditions as measured by these
variables do not have significant impacts on these Eurozone countries. Adding quarter fixed
effects in columns (6) and (7) yields similar coefficients for corporate leverage. These fixed
effects generate a substantial increase in within-R2. This is consistent with Longstaff et al.
(2011), who find that global common factors explain a large amount of variation in sovereign
spreads. In Table A.1, the same OLS regressions are presented using the larger sample of
nine Eurozone countries during the period 1999q1–2012q4, and results are similar: the co-
efficients on corporate debt are positive and significant at the 1% level in all specifications.
In Table A.2, I run similar regressions for individual Eurozone countries including a linear
time trend, using all available observations for each country. Basic results do not change.
Corporate debt is positively and significantly correlated with sovereign spreads in six of the
nine sample countries (Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Belgium, Finland, and Austria).
In Figure 1.3, I plot regression coefficients estimated by Jordà (2005)-style local pro-
jections, as follows:
Gov’t Spreadc,t+h = βy,hGDP Growthc,t + βgov,hGov
′tDebt/GDPc,t (1.2)
+ βcorp,hCorpDebt/GDPc,t + δc + γt + εc,t+h
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for each horizon h = 0, 1, 2..., where δc and γt are country and time fixed effects.
I find that a one standard deviation increase in the corporate debt-to-GDP ratio has
persistent positive impacts on sovereign spreads (from 30 to 50 basis points) up to 12 quarters
ahead. An increase in GDP growth reduces sovereign spreads up to 6 quarters ahead, while
an increase in the ratio of sovereign debt to GDP raises spreads up to 6 quarters ahead.
1.3.3 Sovereign Spread IV Regression
OLS estimates of βcorp in equation (1.1) might be biased due to correlation between
corporate debt and unobservables that lead to variation in sovereign risk. Consider the
following OLS regression:
Yt = α + βXt−1 + ξt (1.3)
where X is corporate debt, β is the true coefficient on X, and Y is the sovereign spread,
where both X and Y are purged of their correlations with GDP growth, government debt,
and common time-varying factors such as VIX.
Suppose market liquidity W is omitted from the regression. Thus, ξt = γWt−1 + εt
where εt is white noise.














where X̄ = 1/T
∑T
t=1 Xt−1. Notice that
∑T
t=1(Xt−1− X̄)Wt−1 might be positive, since
tighter liquidity will reduce equilibrium corporate debt. The coefficient γ might be negative,
as sovereign risk decreases with more liquidity. This implies that the OLS estimator might
be biased downward, E[β̂OLS] < β.
To estimate the causal relationship running from corporate debt to sovereign spreads, I
use a weighted sum of idiosyncratic productivity shocks to each country’s top 50 largest firms
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(sorted by sales in the previous year) as an instrument for that country’s aggregate corporate
leverage. The application of this type of identification strategy to the spread regressions is
motivated by the fact that large firms drove the aggregate corporate leverage cycle during
this period. Figure 1.4 shows that the top 50 largest non-financial firms in each Eurozone
country on average increased their debt (both relative to value-added and in levels) prior to
2012, while small firms’ debt remained relatively stable. To my knowledge, this finding is
novel to the literature.12 To construct idiosyncratic shocks, I estimate the following firm-
level productivity growth (gi,t) decomposition for each country in the spirit of Gabaix and
Koijen (2020):
gi,t = βsηt + ui,t (1.5)
where gi,t = (zi,t−zi,t−1)/(0.5×(zi,t+zi,t−1)), zi,t is firm-level productivity, ηt is an aggregate
shock, and ui,t is an idiosyncratic shock to firm i at time t.
I assume that (i) the responsiveness (βs) of firm-level productivity growth (gi,t) with
regard to an aggregate shock (ηt) is identical within a 4-digit sector s, and that (ii) aggregate
and idiosyncratic shocks are separable in the growth decomposition. Under this assumption,
regressing firm-level productivity growth on sector×year fixed effects gives residuals (ûi,t)
that are consistent estimators for idiosyncratic shocks (ui,t).
13,14 I use total factor produc-
tivity (TFP) estimated by the Wooldridge (2009) method as a productivity measure. These
12Adrian and Shin (2010a) and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2012a) find that large banks drive the procyclicality
of aggregate bank leverage. Alfaro et al. (2019) find that highly levered large firms in emerging markets are
more vulnerable to exchange rate shocks compared to small firms.
13Yeh (2019) uses U.S. Census Bureau sources that include the universe of employer firms and trade trans-
actions at the firm-destination-year level. He controls for differential responses of firms across destinations to
estimate firm-level idiosyncratic shocks. Gabaix and Koijen (2020) suggest joint estimation of firm-specific
responsiveness (βi), which is a function of firm characteristics, and residuals. I find that this procedure is
not feasible in my firm-level dataset, as it requires fully-balanced firm-year observations. This procedure
would drop a considerable number of observations during the period 2000–2012, which would complicate
the precise estimation of residuals. The assumption that aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks in growth are
separable is consistent with a standard firm dynamics model in which aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks in
levels are multiplicative in the production function.
14Regression (1.5) is estimated using a sample containing only the top 50 largest firms in each 4-digit
sector for a given country. All residuals (growth rate) are winsorized at 20 and -20 percent following Gabaix
(2011)’s calculations of “granular residuals”.
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productivity measures are obtained from the ORBIS-AMADEUS database for firms in the
six sample Eurozone countries, following Gopinath et al. (2017a).
I construct the granular residual Γt as the weighted sum of idiosyncratic shocks to the







where Salesi,c,t−1 is sales of firm i in country c at time t− 1.15
The assumptions needed for identification are as follows: First, idiosyncratic firm-level
productivity shocks are correlated with firm-level leverage. Second, large firms make up a
substantial share of aggregate activity, so that the law of large numbers does not apply and
Γc,t will be relevant for aggregate leverage. Third, idiosyncratic shocks to large firms affect
sovereign spreads only through their effect on corporate debt after controlling for alternative
channels, and thus are uncorrelated with unobservable shocks affecting sovereign spreads.
This will imply exogeneity of the instrument. I expect idiosyncratic firm-level productivity
shocks to firms will be negatively correlated with their leverage following the previous finance
literature (Rajan and Zingales (1995b), Harris and Raviv (1991), Titman and Wessels (1988)
and others). This literature has established that profitability is negatively associated with
leverage, since lower cash on hand implies more need to finance operating costs externally. As
idiosyncratic productivity shocks are positively correlated with profitability, firms’ optimal
financing decisions in response to negative shocks imply a negative within-firm correlation
between leverage and idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Regarding the exclusion restriction,
it is difficult to see how idiosyncratic shocks to large firms would affect sovereign spreads
directly without working through firm-level variables. These idiosyncratic shocks could po-
tentially affect sovereign risk by reducing aggregate output growth as well as increasing
aggregate corporate debt. As I control for aggregate output growth, while instrumenting
for aggregate corporate debt, it is less likely that idiosyncratic shocks to large firms are cor-
15See the Data Appendix for discussion of alternative measures of idiosyncratic shocks.
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related with other systematic unobservable shocks to government solvency. One concern is
that negative shocks to firms could increase their probability of default on bank loans, and
thus increase the probability of the government bailing out these banks. However, this does
not necessarily mean that the instrument is invalid, as this banking channel works through
rising corporate debt and associated corporate default risk, and the IV estimate can be in-
terpreted as the impact of rising corporate debt on sovereign risk via this banking channel
together with the tax revenue channel. Nevertheless, to tease out the tax revenue channel,
I also control for aggregate bank leverage in some IV regressions.
In the IV regression, I use lagged granular residuals (Γc,t−1 and Γc,t−2) as excluded
instruments for the lagged corporate debt to GDP ratio (Corp Debt/GDPc,t−1). I use lagged
values as instruments to better capture the relationship between firm-level productivity and
firm borrowing, as lagged shocks are likely to be important determinants of firms’ current
borrowing decisions. I also include country fixed effects, year fixed effects, aggregate GDP
growth, and government debt as controls in the regression. I run the following annual
regression:
Gov’t Spreadc,t = βyGDP Growthc,t−1 + βgovGovt Debt/GDPc,t−1 (1.7)
+ βcorpCorp Debt/GDPc,t−1 + βbankBank Leveragec,t−1 + δc + γt + εc,t
where I instrument for corporate debt using the granular residuals Γc,t−1 and Γc,t−2. I
add banking sector leverage as an additional control in some subsequent regressions.
Table 1.4 presents IV regression results. In column (1), I reproduce the OLS regression
results from column (7) in Table 1.3 using annual data, in which corporate debt is positively
correlated with sovereign spreads. In column (2), I present IV regression results, which
establish that corporate leverage causally increases sovereign spreads. These effects are both
statistically and economically significant. A one standard deviation increase in the corporate
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debt-to-GDP ratio (23%p) increases sovereign spreads by about 345 basis points, which is
significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level. Notice that the IV estimate
is larger than the OLS estimate, consistent with the idea that the IV regression identifies
variation in corporate leverage that is orthogonal to unobservable shocks to sovereign spreads
that bias OLS estimates of βcorp downward. In column (3), I add bank leverage to the OLS
regression in column (1). The results show that bank leverage is positively correlated with
sovereign spreads, which is consistent with existing findings that the need for government to
bail out financially distressed banks increased government default risk during the Eurozone
debt crisis (see Acharya et al. (2014), Farhi and Tirole (2017), and many others). Column
(4) presents results instrumenting corporate debt, while controlling for bank leverage. The
estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase in the corporate debt-to-GDP ratio
(23%p) increases sovereign spreads by about 253 basis points, and this effect is significant at
the 5% level. The magnitude of the coefficient on corporate debt decreases after controlling
for bank leverage. This suggests that the IV estimate on corporate debt not controlling for
bank leverage includes the impact of the corporate balance sheet channel working through
bank balance sheets.
The first stage regression results reported in panel B of Table 1.4 suggest that the
instruments are negatively correlated with corporate debt. Figure A.4 confirms that the
instrument and corporate debt are negatively correlated, and that this correlation is not
driven by outliers. The first-stage effective F statistic (calculated following Olea and Pflueger
(2013)) reported in column (4) is 5.15. The rule-of-thumb threshold value is 10, above which
instruments are considered as being highly correlated with the instrumented variables. While
the coefficients on instruments are significant at the 5% level, the F statistic suggests that the
instruments might be weak, and thus I conduct weak IV robust inference, as recommended by
Andrews et al. (2019) in the presence of weak instruments. I find that the p-value associated
with these author’s proposed CLR statistic is 0.0628. This test rejects the null hypothesis
that the coefficient on corporate debt is zero at the 10% significance level. The Hansen
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(1982) test of overidentifying restrictions also does not reject the null that instruments are
excludable.
There might be concerns that estimates of equation (1.5) do not identify true idiosyn-
cratic shocks ui,t if firms’ responsiveness (βs) to aggregate shocks (ηt) is firm-specific. To
address this concern, I relax one of the identification assumptions by allowing the response
coefficient (βs) in equation (1.5) to vary over firm size as well as sector. Specifically, I regress
firm-level productivity growth on sector×size×year fixed effects, where size dummies repre-
sent each quintile (q) of firm size. A caveat is that these estimates of idiosyncratic shocks are
more likely to be imprecise, as the number of observations used to estimate the coefficient
βs,q for each sector and size group is smaller. Estimated residuals from this regression are
used to construct alternative granular residuals. Another concern is that the weights for
idiosyncratic shocks might be driving results, rather than idiosyncratic shocks themselves.
Thus, I also construct an alternative granualr residual as a simple average of idiosyncratic
shocks to top 50 firms in each country. I also construct granular residuals using idiosyncratic
shocks to the top 100 firms in each country, to test the robustness of the instrument. Table
A.3 presents IV regression results in which corporate debt is instrumented using the alter-
native measures. The results are robust to using these alternative instruments. In general,
the coefficients on corporate debt are still positive and are mostly statistically and econom-
ically significant with or without bank leverage as a control. The instruments are generally
significantly negatively correlated with corporate debt in the first-stage regressions. Figure
A.3 plots estimated alternative residuals ûi,t (with sector×size×year fixed effects) for each
top 50 firm i in each country in a given year t. There is no clustering of these residuals
indicating a trend, which suggests that the residuals are independent of aggregate shocks, as
implied by the estimation procedure itself. Table A.4 presents similar IV regression results
replacing the ratio of corporate debt to GDP with the ratio of corporate debt to corporate
value added. Results are robust to using this alternative measure of corporate leverage. The
relationship between corporate debt and government spreads remains robust after including
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the ratio of household debt to GDP, as shown in Table A.5.
Next, I calculate the contributions of each explanatory variable to variation in sovereign
spreads, using the IV regression results in column (4) of Table 1.4. First, I obtain pre-
dicted values of corporate debt-to-GDP ratios from the first-stage regression. Second, I
purge sovereign spreads, GDP growth, predicted corporate debt-to-GDP ratios, sovereign
debt-to-GDP ratios, and bank leverage of country- and year-fixed effects. To calculate the
contribution of corporate debt, I multiply purged corporate debt by its coefficient β̂corp and
divide the variance of this multiplied term by the variance of purged sovereign spreads. I
calculate the contributions of sovereign debt, growth, and bank leverage in the same fashion.
Corporate debt accounts for about 19% of variation in sovereign spreads, while government
debt, bank leverage, and GDP growth explain around 20%, 6%, and 7% of this variation,
respectively.
1.3.4 Tax Revenue IV Regression
The model outlined in the next section proposes that corporate risk is linked to
sovereign risk through total tax revenues. Rising corporate default risk implies higher bor-
rowing costs and lower aggregate output. This reduces the general tax base, including not
only corporate taxes but also labor income taxes. To test this mechanism directly, I run the
following annual regression using the same sample of six Eurozone countries:
Tax Revenuec,t = βyGDP Growthc,t−1 + βgovGovt Debt/GDPc,t−1 (1.8)
+ βcorpCorp Debt/GDPc,t−1 + βbankBank Leveragec,t−1 + δc + γt + εc,t
where the dependent variable is now real tax revenue growth in country c at time
t. Table 1.5 presents both OLS and IV results. Column (1) presents OLS results and finds
that corporate debt-to-GDP ratios are negatively correlated with one-year ahead tax revenue
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growth. These results suggest that expected government tax revenue becomes lower with
rising corporate debt. My model below will provide a mechanism to explain this empirical
finding, namely that rising corporate debt implies higher default rates on corporate taxes. In
column (2), the dependent variable is one-year ahead tax revenue growth, and the corporate
debt-to-GDP ratio is instrumented with the granular residuals as in Table 1.4. I find that a
one standard deviation increase in corporate leverage (23%p) leads to a 7.4%p decrease in
one-year ahead tax revenue growth, which is economically significant given that average tax
revenue growth was only around 1% during the sample period. This effect is also statistically
significant at the 1% level. The coefficients on the excluded instruments in the first-stage
regressions are all significant, and the CLR statistics suggest that the IV results are robust
to the presence of weak instruments. The Hansen (1982) test of overidentifying restrictions
again does not reject the null that the granular residual instruments are excludable. In
columns (3) (OLS) and (4) (IV), I additionally control for contemporaneous GDP growth to
tease out the tax revenue channel via pure firm default risk by removing the negative effects
of corporate debt overhang on output. I find that a one standard deviation increase in
corporate leverage (23%p) causes tax revenue growth to decrease by around 6.7%p, and this
coefficient is significant at the 5% level. This suggests that corporate default risk captures
expectations about future developments beyond current fundmentals. Moreover, Table A.6
adds future tax revenue growth in years t and t+1 to the baseline sovereign spread regressions
in Table 1.4. After including tax revenue growth, the impacts of corporate debt on sovereign
spreads are muted, suggesting that future tax revenue is an important channel to explain
the relationship between corporate debt and sovereign spreads.
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1.3.5 Firm-level Tax Revenue Regression
I run the following difference-in-difference regressions using annual firm-level observa-
tions for the same countries as in the previous IV regression:
Tax Paymenti,t = β1HighLevi × Crisist + β2log(zi,t−1) + β3log(ki,t−1) (1.9)
+β4log(1 + bit−1) + β5Interest Paymenti,t + δi + γc,s,t + εi,t
where Tax Paymenti,t is the ratio of firm i’s tax payments to its value-added in year
t. I include firm fixed effects δi and country×sector×year fixed effects γc,s,t. In different
specifications, I replace country×sector×year fixed effects with country- and year-fixed effects
or country×year fixed effects. I use the four-digit sector NACE code to construct sector
dummies. I use a sample covering 2004-2012 to exclude the recession in the early 2000s,
which is likely to include other large exogenous shocks to firms and complicate the quasi-
experiment using the 2008 crisis shock. Figure 1.5 shows that there is a parallel trend in tax
payment rates between high-leverage and low-leverage firms before 2008, which validates the
use of difference-in-difference regressions. I control for key firm-level variables (productivity
z, capital k, and debt b in log levels) that are state variables in typical firm dynamics
models. The Crisist dummy equals 1 in or after 2008 and 0 otherwise. The HighLevi dummy
equals 1 if the firm’s average leverage before 2008 is higher than the aggregate median before
2008, and 0 otherwise. Leverage is measured as the ratio of financial debt to value added.
I include the firm’s ratio of interest payments to value added to control for the effect of
interest tax shields. See Table A.7 for firm summary statistics on this regression sample.
I expect the coefficient on the interaction term HighLevi × Crisist to be negative, meaning
that highly-leveraged firms will decrease their tax payments more than less-leveraged firms
in response to negative shocks from the 2008 global financial crisis. Columns (1)-(3) of Table
1.6 present results without controlling for interest payments, while columns (4)-(6) control
for interest payments. I include country and year fixed effects in columns (1) and (4),
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country×year fixed effects in columns (2) and (5), and country×sector×year fixed effects in
columns (3) and (6). In all specifications, the coefficients on HighLevi×Crisist are negative
and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Following the 2008 crisis, highly-leveraged
firms decrease tax payment rates by around 0.38%p more than less-leveraged firms in the
specification reported in column (3), suggesting that part of the estimated impact in column
(3) reflects the impact of leverage on interest tax shields. This response falls to 0.28%p
when I control for interest payments. In both cases, the effect of the interaction term is
economically significant, given that the average tax payment rate (relative to value-added)
across firms was 4.15% in the regression sample during the period 2004-2012. Also, increases
in the debt level are associated with lower tax payment rates, suggesting that future tax
revenues are expected to be low even during non-crisis periods with higher corporate debt.
Table A.8 further controls for other state variables interacted with time dummies and
shows that the results for leverage are robust.16 Similarly, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2020)
find that highly-leveraged firms tend to invest less in response to the 2008 global financial
shocks, using ORBIS-AMADEUS data matched to banks’ balance sheets (available from
BANKSCOPE and ECB confidential data). Importantly, they show that corporate leverage
is an important variable in accounting for sluggish post-crisis investment even after control-
ling for the bank lending channel using information on firm-bank relationships. This finding
suggests that corporate indebtedness might also explain the behavior of firms’ tax payments
even after controlling for changes in banks’ balance sheets.
16Using an alternative leverage measure such as a debt-to-tangible-fixed-assets ratio does not change the
results.
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1.4 Model, Mechanism, and Identifying Externalities
1.4.1 Competitive Equilibrium
1.4.1.1 Firms










t are firm-specific capital and one-
period non-state-contingent debt, respectively. i refers to firms, and t is time. For notational
simplicity, I omit superscripts i for firm variables unless stated otherwise. As discussed
below, it is not necessary to track firm-specific capital ki and debt bi to infer the dynamics
of aggregate variables, because all firms will choose the same levels of capital and debt. A
firm’s budget constraint is given by
et + bt + it ≤ (1− τ yt )F (zt, kt) + q(zt, kt+1, bt+1)bt+1 (1.10)
where et are dividend payments, and investment is it = kt+1− (1− δ)kt with a depreci-
ation rate δ. q(·) is the schedule of the firm’s debt price, which is determined by risk-neutral
investors factoring in firm default risk. Firms take this schedule as given. τ yt is a corporate
income tax rate, which firms also take as given.
Key aggregate state variables are productivity, capital, corporate and government debt,
and share purchases. I collect these state variables as X = (z, k, b, B, s), which are sufficient
statistics to determine the evolution of all relevant variables in this model. I assume that the
supply of shares s is fixed at 1 for simplicity, which firms and the government internalize.
Pension funds purchase these shares on behalf of households. Let x′ denote the one-period
ahead realization of the variable x. Firms’ objective is to maximize the discounted flow
benefits resulting from dividend payments e, as shown in the following recursive form:
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e ≤ (1− τ y)F (z, k) + (1− δ)k − k′ − b+ q(z, k′, b′)b′ (1.12)
φ(e) = e− κ(e− ē)2 (1.13)
X ′ = Γ(X) (1.14)
Firms take the stochastic discount factor m(·) as given. νd′i is an idiosyncratic firm default
shock (i.i.d. across time and firms) capturing the benefit from defaulting next period, gener-
ated from the cumulative distribution function, Ω(νdi,t+1). This default shock represents the
limited liability of the owners of firms, where owners get the value of νd′i when they decide to
default on their firms’ debt and stop paying dividends to households and taxes to the govern-
ment. Equation (1.13) captures frictions in equity adjustment as in Jermann and Quadrini
(2012), where ē is a steady-state level of dividend payments. Aggregate productivity zt+1 is
drawn from the conditional cumulative distribution function, Π(zt+1|zt). Stochastic variables
belong to compact sets such that νdi,t+1 ∈ [νdmin, νdmax] and zt+1 ∈ [zmin, zmax]. Firms and the
government choose their actions simultaneously, based on the forecast rule for aggregate
state variables given by equation (1.14). Firms choose next period capital kt+1 and debt
bt+1, taking into account their effects on the firm debt price q(zt, kt+1, bt+1) and their default
cutoff ν̄d(kt+1, bt+1;Xt+1) for each state zt+1. The cutoff with regard to the firm default




νdt |V f (kt, bt;Xt) = νdt } (1.15)





1 (default), if νdi,t ≥ ν̄d(kt, bt;Xt)
0 (repay), otherwise
(1.16)
When a firm defaults, creditors take over the firm as new owners and continue business
as usual, issuing new debt and making investment. I assume that the internal funds that
would have been used for dividend payments et, income taxes τ
y
t F (zt, kt), and debt repayment
bt had the firm not defaulted are used to pay bankruptcy costs, implying the following budget
constraint for defaulting firms:
et + τ
y
t F (zt, kt) + bt︸ ︷︷ ︸
bankruptcy costs
+it ≤ F (zt, kt) + q(zt, kt+1, bt+1)bt+1 (1.17)
This budget constraint can be rewritten to be identical to the budget constraint (1.10)
of non-defaulting firms, implying that the new owners of defaulting firms choose the same
bt+1 and kt+1 as non-defaulting firms.
17 For this reason, firm-specific capital ki and debt bi
need not be tracked to infer the dynamics of aggregate variables, and I can omit superscript
i. Bankruptcy costs capture not only direct administrative costs but also broadly defined
macroeconomic costs entailed by bankruptcies.18
I assume that there is no pass-through of sovereign default risk into the corporate sector,
17Gomes et al. (2016) adopt a similar setting for computational tractability.
18See Hotchkiss et al. (2008) for the overview of corporate bankruptcy costs. Benmelech et al. (2018)
and Bernstein et al. (2019) empirically show that there exist spillover costs of bankruptcies affecting local
economies.
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and thus firm values V f (k, b;X) are independent of government debt B. This assumption
implies that firm default decisions and debt prices do not depend on government debt choices,
such that dt = d(zt, kt, bt, ν
d
i,t).
I use λt to denote the Lagrange multiplier on the firm budget constraint (1.12), where
it can be interpreted as the shadow value of marginal funds. Henceforth, I assume that first-
order conditions are neccesary and sufficient and that all allocations are interior, implicitly
imposing regularity assumptions such as concavity, monotonicity, and Inada conditions on
F (·). Also, debt price functions are assumed to be differentiable. The optimality conditions
for dividends, capital, and debt are as follows:
et :: λt = φe(et) (1.18)
kt+1 ::
[






























Equation (1.18) shows that the shadow value of marginal funds must at an optimum
equal the marginal equity adjustment cost, φe(et) = 1 − 2κ(e − ē). The left-hand side
of equation (1.19) represents the marginal cost of investment, incorporating the effect of
additional capital on the firm debt price and the shadow value of current funds λt. The
right-hand side of the same equation captures the expected discounted marginal product of
capital conditional on no firm default, adjusting for the shadow value of future funds λt+1.
Firms choose capital so that the marginal cost equals the marginal benefit. Equation (1.20)
shows that firms choose debt so that the marginal benefit of the additional funds that they
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can raise today equals the marginal cost of expected discounted debt payments conditional
on no firm default, adjusting for the shadow values of funds today and tomorrow.
Risk-neutral lenders’ profit from making a loan to the firm is given by







where µ(zt+1, kt+1, bt+1) =
∫ νdmax
ν̄d(zt+1,kt+1,bt+1)
dΩ(νdi,t+1) is the default probability of the firm in
the next period for each state zt+1, and r is the risk-free rate. The zero-profit condition
πt = 0 pins down the firm debt price q(·).
1.4.1.2 The Government
The government’s objective is to maximize households’ utility taking into account
the costs of government default. For simplicity, the corporate income tax rate τ y is fixed
exogenously and is not a choice variable of the government. The government chooses transfer
payments G and government debt B′ and chooses whether to default D′ as follows:





V g(B′;X ′), V g(0;X ′)− ξ′
〉
(1.22)
subject to the dividend equation (1.12) and
C = s
(
[1− µ(z, k, b)]φ(e) + p
)
− s′p+G (1.23)
G+B ≤ (1− µ(z, k, b))τ yF (z, k) +Q(z, k′, b′, B′)B′ (1.24)
X ′ = Γ(X) (1.25)
p = p(X,X ′) (1.26)
where ξ is an i.i.d. government default cost shock, which is microfounded in standard
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sovereign default models as reputation costs or punishment by creditors. Households hold
shares of firms st which pay dividends net of equity adjustment costs φ(et) and can be sold at
a price pt. Shares issued by defaulting firms pay zero dividends. Gt are lump-sum transfers
(or taxes) to households from the government.19 The fraction of defaulting firms µ(z, k, b)
equals the firm default probability, determined by firms’ optimality conditions, as the law of
large numbers holds with a continuum of firms. In equation (1.24), the government collects
taxes (1 − µ(z, k, b))τ yF (z, k) from non-defaulting firms and issues one-period non-state-
contingent debt B′ at a price Q. The government forecasts aggregate state variables using
equation (1.25). The share price equation (1.26) is determined by the pension funds’ problem
described later.
When the government defaults, its debt obligation becomes zero, B′ = 0, and the
government continues with a value of V g(B′ = 0;X ′) but pays default costs ξ′. The threshold
government default cost shock ξ̄ with regard to government default D at time t is
ξ̄(Bt;Xt) ∈
{
ξt|V g(Bt;Xt) = V g(0;Xt)− ξt} (1.27)
and the corresponding government default decision rule is given by
D(Bt, ξt;Xt) =

1 (default), if ξt ≤ ξ̄(Bt;Xt)
0 (repay), otherwise
(1.28)
19The government could finance a fixed path of final good spending instead of financing transfers. However,
this assumption would generate distortions – due to changes in tax rates needed to finance the exogenous
government expenditure – that the Ramsey planner would need to address. The objective of this paper is to
study optimal policy to address externalities, rather than distortions that arise in a public finance problem
without lump-sum taxes, and hence I abstract from this traditional public finance problem.
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The government debt is priced by risk-neutral competitive lenders as below:









where Π and Ξ are cumulative distributive functions for productivity and government
default costs, respectively.
The associated government spread is
SPRD(zt, kt+1, bt+1, Bt+1) =
1
Q(zt, kt+1, bt+1, Bt+1)
− (1 + r) (1.30)
The government takes into account its effects on the default cutoff ξ̄(Bt;Xt). The
optimality condition for government debt Bt+1 is given by
Bt+1 ::











The left-hand side of equation (1.31) shows the marginal benefit of financing additional
household consumption with the marginal funds raised by government borrowing, accounting
for the impact of government borrowing on its bond price. The right-hand side represents the
expected discounted marginal cost of paying debt and the resulting decreases in households’
future consumption, conditional on no government default. These benefits and costs are
measured in terms of households’ marginal utility u′(C).
1.4.1.3 Pension Funds
Pension funds purchase shares st+1 on behalf of households to maximize the households’
utility, defined as in the government problem, after firms choose their capital kt+1 and debt
bt+1, and the government chooses its debt Bt+1 and expenditure Gt. This pension fund
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problem is given by





V g(B′;X ′), V g(0;X ′)− ξ
〉
(1.32)
subject to the dividend equation (1.12), equity adjustment costs (1.13), and the house-
hold budget constraint (1.23), where k′, b′, B′, G are taken as given by pension funds.20









[1− µ(z′, k′, b′)]φ(e′) + p(X ′, X ′′)
]
dΠ(z′|z)dΞ(ξ′) (1.33)
where m(X,X ′) = β u
′(C′)
u′(C)
is a stochastic discount factor. It can be shown that this
stochastic discount factor is identical to the one found in the firm value function (1.11), in
which firms maximize the shareholders’ net present value of φ(e) + p(X,X ′).
1.4.1.4 Equilibrium
The equity market clears in equilibrium as follows:
st = 1 (1.34)
where each firm issues one unit of shares to households for every period t, and in turn
20Households could instead purchase shares directly, and the main results would not change. The purpose
of having pension funds is to show the case in which the first welfare theorem holds without firm and
government default risk (and without tax distortions), when the social planner’s objective is to maximize
households’ utility after adjusting for government default costs. Pension funds take into account government
default costs on top of households’ utility as the social planner does, which is the reason why pension funds
are required to compare market allocations with social planner’s allocations.
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total share supply is 1 since there is a continuum of firms with unit measure. I define a
recursive competitive equilibrium of the model as follows.






e(X), k′(X), b′(X), d′(X)
}


















q(z, k′, b′), Q(z, k′, b′, B′)
}
and













and laws of motion for aggregate productivity z, firm
default shocks νdi , and the government default cost shocks ξ, such that (a) firms’ policies and
equity value solve (1.11); (b) the government solves (1.22); (c) pension funds solve (1.32);
(d) the equity market clears, s(X) = 1; (e) the stochastic discount factor for firms is given
by the households’ marginal rate of substitution, m(X,X ′) = β u
′(C′)
u′(C)
; (f) the law of large
numbers holds, µ(X) =
∫ νdmax
ν̄d(X)
dΩ(νdi ); and (g) the actual law of motion for the aggregate
variables X is consistent with the forecasting rule (1.14) and stochastic processes for z, νdi ,
and ξ.
1.4.2 Corporate-Sovereign Debt Nexus
Government tax revenue in the next period is given by
TRt+1 = [1− µ(zt+1, kt+1, bt+1)][τ yt+1F (zt+1, kt+1)] (1.35)
Rising corporate debt implies higher firm default risk µt+1 and lower expected tax
revenues Et[TRt+1]. The following proposition states that expected future tax revenue falls
when corporate debt increases today.
Proposition 1. The distribution of tax revenue TRt+1 in an economy with low firm debt
bt+1 first-order stochastically dominates the one in an economy with high firm debt bt+1. This
implies that the realization of tax revenue TRt+1 with higher firm debt bt+1 is lower over the
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entire distribution of subsequent shocks to productivity zt+1.
Proof. See Appendix A
When tax revenue decreases, the government might not be able to finance transfers
that are essential to households. Transfers to households are essential, especially when
the marginal utility of consumption for households is high in bad times. The government
is thus more likely to prioritize transfers to households by defaulting on debt during bad
times. Hence, government default serves as an insurance device to households. Moreover,
households are more likely to have a high marginal utility of consumption when more firms
default, since defaulting firms do not pay dividends and impose bankruptcy costs on the
economy. The following proposition formalizes this risk spillover from the corporate sector
to the government.
Proposition 2. Suppose surviving firms pay non-negative net dividends φ(et) ≥ 0. If firm
debt bt+1 increases, firm default risk µ(zt+1, kt+1, bt+1) (weakly) rises, and the government
debt price Q(zt, kt+1, bt+1, Bt+1) (weakly) decreases (the government spread increases).
Proof. See Appendix B
The causal linkage that rising corporate debt implies higher sovereign risk is reinforced
by overborrowing externalities. I now identify externalities by comparing the market alloca-
tions of the competitive equilibrium with the constrained-efficient allocations.
1.4.3 Constrained Efficiency
1.4.3.1 Constrained Social Planner
I consider a constrained social planner who can choose
{
kt+1, bt+1, et, Bt+1, Dt+1
}
di-
rectly, but who is constrained to allow firms to choose whether to default or not, and faces
the equity adjustment cost (1.13) as well as risk-neutral debt price schedules. The social
planner’s problem is as follows:
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C =[1− µ(z, k, b)]
(
F (z, k) + (1− δ)k − k′ − b+ q(z, k′, b′)b′ − κ(e− ē)2
)
(1.37)
+Q(z, k′, b′, B′)B′ −B
where the fraction of defaulting firms, µ(z, k, b) =
∫ νdmax
ν̄d(Xt)
dΩ(νdi,t), and the firm bond
price, q(z, k′, b′), are determined by (1.15), (1.16) and the associated pricing equation (1.21);
the government bond price Q(z, k′, b′, B′) is determined by government default decisions
according to equations (1.27) and (1.28), and the associated pricing equation (1.29); the
resource constraint (1.37) combines budget constraints of firms (1.12), households (1.23),
and the government (1.24); and the equity market clearing condition is given by s = s′ = 1.





with aggregate productivity zt+1 summarize all allocations in the recursive problem. For
convenience, define firms’ cash on hand before taxes as eSP = F (z, k) + (1− δ)k − k′ − b +




1− ∂q(zt, kt+1, bt+1)
∂kt+1
bt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
private marginal cost of capital
) (
1− µ(zt, kt, bt)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
externality











1− µ(zt+1, kt+1, bt+1)
)(
Fk(zt+1, kt+1) + 1− δ
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
private marginal product of capital without income taxes









private marginal benefit of borrowing
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1− µ(zt+1, kt+1, bt+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸


















where the social planner optimally sets e = ē to minimize equity adjustment costs.
Comparing the social planner’s optimality conditions (1.38) and (1.39) with their market
counterparts (1.19) and (1.20), the externality terms in (1.38) and (1.39) show that firms
do not internalize the effects of their capital and debt choices on the future equilibrium
firm default rate µt+1 and the associated total bankruptcy costs resulting from more firm
defaults given their limited liability. Also, firms do not internalize their effects on bankruptcy
costs of each firm given the current firm default rate µt. The limited liability externality is
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distinct from externalities identified in the previous literature on optimal macroprudential
policy in the sense that the externality terms due to firm default risk do not disappear
even when firms internalize their effects on the firm debt price. In this setting, firm default
serves as a put option for firms, and in turn firms are likely to take more risk than is socially
optimal. In contrast, the pecuniary externality in Bianchi (2011) and related literature exists
because firms do not internalize their effects on asset prices that determine the tightness of
their borrowing constraints. Also, in my model, firms do not internalize their effects on
the government bond price Q, which appear as externality terms in conditions (1.38) and




are not zero. The reason is that Q does not enter the
firms’ budget constraint. Without limited liability, externality terms regarding firm default
rates µt and µt+1 would disappear. Without limited liability and government default risk, all
externality terms would disappear. The government’s optimality condition (1.40) is identical
to condition (1.31) in the competitive equilibrium. The fraction of defaulting firms in the
next period 1− µt+1 is a part of the private marginal product of capital or marginal cost of
borrowing, since firms take into account their default probabilities, which equal 1−µt+1 due
to the law of large numbers.
1.4.4 Optimal Policy
1.4.4.1 Regulated Competitive Equilibrium
Next, I consider a decentralized economy in which debt taxes τ b, transfers to firms T ,
and investment credits τ k can be implemented. The Ramsey planner (or the government)
chooses its policies (τ bt , Tt, τ
k
t ) first, and then firms choose their actions taking policies as
given. The firms’ budget constraint is given by
et = (1− τ yt )F (zt, kt) + (1− δ)kt − (1− τ kt )kt+1 − bt + (q(zt, kt+1, bt+1)− τ bt )bt+1 + Tt
(1.41)
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where the path of the corporate income tax rate τ yt is exogenous and taken as given.
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Firms’ optimality conditions for kt+1 and bt+1 are given by




























The government budget constraint is
Bt +Gt =
(
1− µ(zt, kt, bt)
)
[τ yt F (zt, kt)− τ kt kt+1 + τ bt bt+1 − Tt] +Q(zt, kt+1, bt+1, Bt+1)Bt+1
(1.44)
where firms cannot receive investment credits τ kt kt+1 or transfers Tt if they default on
income taxes τ yt F (zt, kt) and debt taxes τ
b
t bt+1.
By combining (1.41), (1.44), and the household budget constraint (1.23), I get the
associated resource constraint as follows:
Ct = (1− µ(zt, kt, bt))
[
F (zt, kt) + (1− δ)kt − kt+1 − bt + q(zt, kt+1, bt+1)bt+1 − κ(et − ē)2
]
+Q(zt, kt+1, bt+1, Bt+1)Bt+1 −Bt (1.45)
21The corporate income tax rate τyt could also be implemented optimally by a planner. Rather, I assume
that τyt follows a fixed path to consider the case when transfers Tt are flexibly adjusted by the planner, which
belongs to a more realistic set of policies.
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This equation is identical to the resource constraint that the social planner faces. The
following definitions and proposition characterize the Ramsey planner’s policy.











, and government policies
{




t , Bt+1, Dt+1, Gt
}
such that (i) the modified firms’ budget constraint (1.41) and firm optimality conditions
(1.42) and (1.43) are satisfied; (ii) the modified government budget constraint (1.44) is sat-
isfied; and (iii) all remaining conditions defined in the competitive equilibrium (Definition 1)
are satisfied.
Definition 3. The Ramsey problem is to solve the problem (1.22) over the regulated compet-






t , Bt+1, Dt+1, Gt
}











t , Bt+1, Dt+1, Gt
}
such
that the outcome of the Ramsey problem solves the problem of the constrained social planner
(1.36). The implemented set of policies is time-consistent.
Proof. See Appendix C
Notice that the Ramsey planner and the social planner face common constraints, in-
cluding the firm and government debt pricing equations and equity adjustment costs. The













, while the Ramsey planner indirectly chooses the path of these three
variables mainly by adjusting three policy instruments
{




. Thus, it can be shown
that the Ramsey planner solves the social planner’s problem, which leads to Pareto-optimal
allocations under the common constraints. Optimal policies
{





plugging the social planner’s allocations into the optimality conditions ((1.42) and (1.43))
and the firms’ budget constraint (1.41). These are time-consistent policies because the pol-
icy functions are solutions to the recursive equilibrium, which implies that optimal paths
for policies are invariant in every period. These policies are also called Markov stationary
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policies, as the planner does not have the incentive to deviate from policy rules determined
by a Markov perfect equilibrium.22
1.4.5 Discussion of Assumptions
1. I have assumed that there is no pass through of the sovereign debt price Q(·) into the
private capital market, to highlight the key mechanism causally linking corporate debt
to sovereign spreads. This assumption is also consistent with my empirical analysis, in
which I exclude post-crisis observations and use instrumental variables to overcome re-
verse causality running from sovereign spreads to corporate debt. This assumption can
be relaxed by allowing firms to lose access to financial markets when the government
defaults, as in Mendoza and Yue (2012). This setting will generate an endogenous firm
debt price that decreases in government debt, generating endogenous costs of govern-
ment default. These endogenous government default costs will be another externality
that firms do not internalize.
2. I have assumed that νd′i is an i.i.d. firm default shock for computational tractability.
As in D’Erasmo and Boedo (2012), this assumption can be relaxed so that firms com-
pare the continuation value of repayment against the value of liquidating capital and
defaulting. However, relaxing this assumption is not likely to change the results, as
liquidation also serves as a put option for firms and encourages overborrowing.
3. I have assumed that ξ represents the costs of repudiating government debt. While
costs of default can be microfounded, exogenous default costs are commonly used in
the literature to represent default costs associated with reputation, roll-over risk, and
other factors in a reduced-form way (see, for example, Arellano et al. (2020)).
4. I have abstracted from labor income taxes and capital adjustment costs. In the next
22See Bianchi and Mendoza (2018) for more discussions about the properties of both time-consistent
macroprudential policies and time-inconsistent policies under commitment.
38
section, I add labor income tax revenues and firms’ capital adjustment costs to the
quantitative model in a simple way.
1.5 Quantitative Model and Policy Analysis
1.5.1 Additional Ingredients
To better explain the data, I add additional ingredients to the model including capital
adjustment costs, labor income, and debt recovery rates. Capital adjustment costs paid by
firms are given by
Ψ(kt, kt+1) = ψkt




Firms pay the fraction θ of output F (z, k) to households as wages, which are not de-
faultable. The government receives labor income taxes τ lθF (z, k) from households. Investors
get fractions Rf and Rg of defaulted debt from firms and the government, respectively. Also,
for computational tractability, I assume that the firms’ stochastic discount factor is given
by m(X,X ′) = β. This type of assumption on stochastic discount factors is common in the
small open economy literature in that the discount factor is not fully determined by domestic
factors. The productivity process is as follows:
log(zt+1) = µz + ρzlog(zt) + σzut+1 (1.47)
where ut+1 follows a standard normal distribution, and µz =
−σ2z
2(1+ρz)
so that the level of z
equals one on average.
In a similar fashion to Arellano (2008), I assume that investors price government debt
as follows:
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M(zt+1, zt)[1− (1−Rg)D(Bt+1, ξt+1;Xt+1)]dΠ(zt+1|zt)dΞ(ξt+1) (1.48)
where M(zt+1, zt) =
1
1+r
−γvt+1 is a stochastic discount factor, and vt+1 is productivity
growth, log(zt+1)− log(zt). γ is non-negative and represents the sensitivity of the investors’
sentiment to productivity shocks. This assumption implies that debt repayments in relatively
bad states are more valuable to investors than those in good states.
1.5.2 Numerical Solution
I solve the model using value function iteration. Key state variables X = (z, k, b, B) are
discretized so that firms and the government choose their actions out of a finite set of options.
The potential challenge facing this solution method is that the existence of equilibrium is not
guaranteed when two types of players move simultaneously and can only use pure strategies.
To overcome this problem and improve the convergence of the algorithm, I adopt a discrete
choice model with taste shocks such that firms and the government can assign probabilities
to their actions. To be specific, I add taste shocks ε′ associated with the choice of capital
k′, firm debt b′, and firm default d′ to firms’ value functions, and taste shocks ε′ associated
with the choice of government debt B′ to the government’s value function. Firms and the
government choose the probability of taking certain actions out of their choice set before
taste shocks are realized. Realized taste shocks determine the actual actions of firms and
the government. This type of algorithm has recently been formalized by Dvorkin et al.
(forthcoming). See Appendix D for more details.
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1.5.3 Calibration
The model is solved for the competitive equilibrium and calibrated to six European
countries during the period 2000-2012. The six countries are those included in the main
IV spread regression. Table 1.7 presents the parameter values assigned for the quantitative
model. First, I set four structural parameters following the standard literature. The capital
income share α and labor income share θ are set to 0.35 and 0.5, respectively. Households’





where I assume a risk aversion parameter ν of 2. The capital depreciation rate δ is
set to 0.06 at an annual frequency. Following Arellano et al. (2019), corporate and govern-
ment discount factors β and βg are set to 0.98 and 0.90, respectively, as governments are
usually considered less patient than the private sector.23 As firms are more patient than
the government, the overborrowing problem for firms is less severe, and thus welfare gains
from correcting overborrowing externalities are lower with this parameterization. The an-
nual risk-free rate is set to 1.9 percent, which is the average German nominal interest rate
minus the average inflation rate of the six sample countries during 2000-2012. The corporate
income tax rate is set to 32.7 percent, using the average combined income tax rates of the six
sample countries during 2000-2012 (OECD corporate tax statistics database).24 The govern-
ment debt recovery rate Rg is set to 63 percent, based on the average global government debt
haircut ratio (Cruces and Trebesch, 2013), and the corporate debt recovery rate Rf is set to
70 percent, based on the average debt recovery rate for the six sample countries (World Bank
Doing Business database).25 I set the equity issuance cost parameter κ to 0.426 following
23In Panel A of Table 1.10, I redo main exercises using identicial discount factors (β = βg = 0.98). Later,
I explain that main results (including welfare implications of policies) do not change with this alternative
parameterization.
24OECD (2020), Corporate Tax Statistics Database, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/corporate-tax-
statistics-database.htm
25World Bank (2020), Doing Business 2020, https://www.doingbusiness.org/
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Jermann and Quadrini (2012). The volatility of taste shocks is set to 0.001, a sufficiently
small number such that solutions to the model with taste shocks are close to those without
taste shocks. This parameter value is commonly used in the literature (see Dvorkin et al.
(forthcoming)).
As shown in Panel B of Table 1.7, I set the remaining parameters by matching moments
observed in data to those obtained in the model simulation. I set the persistence of the pro-
ductivity process ρz by targeting the autocorrelation of log GDP, where the autocorrelation
is obtained by regressing log real GDP on its own lag (after pooling country-year obser-
vations of the sample six countries and controlling for country fixed effects). Productivity
volatility σz is set to match the standard deviation of the same data on log GDP. I set the
capital adjustment cost parameter φ by targeting the standard deviation of log gross fixed
assets (divided by the GDP deflator) of the six sample countries (after pooling country-year
observations and controlling for country fixed effects). The log GDP series and log gross
fixed assets are initially detrended using the Hamilton (2018) filter. The mean parameter of
the corporate default shock νd is set to target the average corporate spread of Euro area non-
financial corporate bonds during the period 2000-2012, using spread data (Euro area Bund
NFC) obtained from Gilchrist and Mojon (2017). Similarly, the mean and standard devia-
tion of the government default cost ξ are set by targeting the mean and standard deviation
of government spreads for the six sample countries during the period 2000-2012. To better
match the standard deviation of government spreads, I adjust the sensitivity of investors’
sentiment γ.26
Table 1.8 presents moments calculated from model simulations and data. To obtain
model moments, I simulate the model economy for 10,000 periods and take averages of
moments from 1,000 simulations after dropping the first 500 periods and excluding periods
26Aguiar et al. (2016) find that increases in the standard deviation of government spreads are associated
with increases in the average government spread in standard sovereign default models, and it is difficult to
match both the mean and standard deviation without modeling a time-varying risk premium. As shown
by Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012), adding long-duration bonds and asymmetric output costs caused by
government default can solve this puzzle in an endowment economy.
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of government default for each simulation. All targeted moments from the model and data
are close to each other. The table also shows non-targeted moments from the simulations and
data, which are reasonably close to each other. For example, the annual corporate default
rate is 4.4% in the model and 4.1% in the data.27 Also, the government default rate is 1.9% in
the model and 1.5% in data.28 I reproduce the government spread regression using simulated
data, treating variables in the same way as in the actual data. I report the 5th and 95th
percentiles of the model-simulated estimates out of 1,000 simulations in brackets, together
with their median reported above the brackets. The model-implied regression coefficients
qualitatively match the main regression coefficients from column 1 of Table 1.4, confirming
that this model is a good representation of the data generating process.
I quantify the magnitude of overborrowing externalities using the optimality condition
for firm borrowing b′ presented in equation (1.39). I calculate each term in equation (1.50)
(shown below), using the model simulations in the competitive equilibrium as before, and I
obtain the values for each term as the average across simulations. I normalize these values
so that the private marginal benefit and cost of borrowing are 100, respectively. The social
marginal benefit of borrowing is the sum of (i) the private marginal benefit, (ii) the externality
associated with increasing the bankruptcy costs regarding debt issuance of each firm given
the current firm default rate µt (externality A), and (iii) the externality associated with
the falling government debt price (externality B). I find that the social marginal benefit
of borrowing is about 5.1% lower than the private marginal benefit, and that externality
A accounts for about 84% of this difference (=4.3/5.1), while externality B only explains
16%. At the same time, the social marginal cost of borrowing is 2.8% higher than the
private marginal cost, where this difference is due soley to the externality term associated
with the rising future firm default rate µt+1 and the resulting increase in bankruptcy costs
(externality C). These results show that externality terms (A and C) associated with firm
27The annual corporate default rate in the data is measured as the historical global corporate default rate
(speculative-grade) obtained from Moody’s (2020).
28The government default rate in the data is the average default rate of the six sample Eurozone countries
during 1900–2014, calculated using Table 6.4 of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a).
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default drive most of the overborrowing externalities quantitatively, while externality B –
directly associated with the government bond price – does not play a large role. Without
the limited liability associated with the firm default shock νdi , the externality terms A and C
would disappear. Wu (2020) focuses on externality B without allowing for limited liability
of firms.
social marginal benefit of borrowing = 94.9︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂[q(zt, kt+1, bt+1)bt+1]
∂bt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸




externality A = -4.3
+
∂Q(zt, kt+1, bt+1, Bt+1)
∂bt+1
Bt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
externality B = -0.8
= E
〈 social marginal cost of borrowing = 102.8︷ ︸︸ ︷[
β
(
1− µ(zt+1, kt+1, bt+1)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸





externality C = 2.8
]〉
(1.50)
1.5.4 Decision Rules and Government Spread Functions
Figure 1.6 shows the equilibrium decision rules plotted against corporate debt. Firms
choose a higher level of debt bt+1 when they have higher initial debt bt, as firms need to
borrow money to pay off existing debt. Firms choose to reduce the stock of capital kt+1
as they accumulate more debt, because the corporate debt price decreases due to rising
default risk. Firms choose to pay constant dividends net of equity adjustment costs φ(et)
regardless of their debt level, which reflects firms’ dividend-smoothing motive. Firms’ debt
price qt decreases with rising new debt issuance bt+1 due to the increase in firm default risk,
as the probability of default µ(zt, kt, bt) increases with debt bt. The government chooses to
issue more debt Bt+1 when aggregate corporate debt bt increases. The reason is that tax
revenues decrease as more firms default, and the government is induced to finance transfers
to households externally to smooth households’ consumption.
Figure 1.7 presents government default probabilities and the associated government
spread function as a function of the levels of next-period corporate and government debt.
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Panel A shows that the government is more likely to default when next-period government
or corporate debt is higher. The mechanism is as follows: With higher government debt, the
government’s value of defaulting increases, as it can finance a larger amount of transfers to
households to increase households’ consumption by repudiating its debt. Higher corporate
debt increases the fraction of defaulting firms, which in turn reduces government tax revenue,
while households receive fewer dividends from firms. This leads to lower consumption and
gives the government more incentive to repudiate its debt to increase transfers to households.
A higher government default probability is associated with higher government spreads, as
investors need to be compensated for higher government default risk. Thus, as shown in
Panel B, government spreads increase in both government and corporate debt. Interestingly,
the government spread increases at a faster rate in government debt when corporate debt
is higher. This is because households’ consumption is lower when a larger fraction of firms
stop paying taxes and dividends, so that the marginal gain from repudiating debt is higher
for the government. At the same time, the government is willing to pay high interest rates
to finance transfers to households when households are suffering from low consumption, and
the government tends to increase its debt. These forces make the government spread more
sensitive to rising government debt when the corporate debt level is higher.
1.5.5 Optimal Policy, Simple Debt Policies, and Welfare Gains
To explore model dynamics during a sovereign debt crisis, I perform an event study
using the model. Using the solution to the competitive equilibrium, I simulate the economy
for a million periods and drop the first 500 periods. I identify a period t as a sovereign
debt crisis if government spreads at time t increase by more than three standard deviations
of government spreads across all periods. Next, I obtain the paths of variables within each
event window ranging from t− 5 to t + 5 and calculate the deviation of each variable from
its average within each event window. I plot the average of the demeaned variables across
event windows.
45
Figure 1.8 presents simulation results in the absence of macroprudential policy, along-
side their data counterparts. I mark time t with the shaded area, which corresponds to
the year 2012, when the average sovereign spread in the six sample countries peaked. In
the model without macroprudential policy (blue dashed lines), output decreases by about
3% during the crisis, which matches the magnitude of the recession in the data.29 In the
model, investment and consumption drop by around 12% and 8%, respectively. The corpo-
rate debt-to-output ratio increases before the crisis. As a result, corporate spreads increase
by more than 50 basis points, and the fraction of defaulting firms rises by more than 2%p.
As more firms default, bankruptcy costs increase, and firms deleverage sharply, reducing
consumption drastically. Furthermore, corporate income tax revenue decreases, and govern-
ment spreads increase by around 150 basis points. At the same time, the government issues
more debt to finance transfers to households (government expenditure), but the amount of
transfers decreases in equilibrium due to higher government interest rates. This adds to the
reduction in household consumption during the crisis. The sovereign debt crisis is associated
with negative shocks to productivity. These model-simulated time series qualitatively match
their data counterparts, although there are some differences in terms of the timing of shocks
and the magnitude of responses. In the data, consumption does not decrease as much as
implied by the model, possibly because of intervention by the European governments and the
European Central Bank, as evidenced by rising government debt and sustained government
expenditure during and after the crisis. The firm default rate peaks during the 2008-2009
global financial crisis in the data, in response to a large negative shock to total factor produc-
tivity during the same period. In contrast, the model implies that the negative productivity
shock and the corresponding increase in the firm default rate occur in 2012.
Figure 1.9 plots these simulation results for economies with various policies in which
29Output is measured net of bankruptcy and equity adjustment costs, F (zt, kt)−DWt − κ(et − ē)2. The
resource constraint can be written as follows: Ct + It +DWt +κ(et− ē)2 = F (zt, kt)− (1−µt)bt−µtRfbt +
qtbt+1 −Bt +QtBt+1, where It = kt+1 − (1− δ)kt + Ψ(k, k′) is gross investment, DWt = µt(φ(et) + τy(1−
θ)F (zt, kt)+(1−Rf )bt) is deadweight costs due to corporate defaults, and κ(et− ē)2 is the equity adjustment
cost.
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the path of productivity and the timing of the crises are identical to the previous economy
without policy. To study optimal policy in the presence of corporate-sovereign linkages,
I solve for a set of time-consistent optimal policies as described in section 1.4.4, using the
same parameters of the quantitative model used for the competitive equilibrium. The bottom
panels of Figure 1.9 present the set of implemented optimal policies as red solid lines. It
is optimal for the government to impose a low constant tax rate on debt, which is around
0.13% of new firm debt issuance. The government subsidizes firms during the crisis by
reducing their lump-sum taxes relative to output by about 0.3%p. The government also
subsidizes firm investment during the crisis. Intuitively, the government uses the constant
debt tax rate to incentivize firms to reduce debt, correcting the over-borrowing externalities
due to the limited liability of firms. At the same time, it implements lump-sum taxes and
investment credits to reduce firm default risk in bad times and to increase tax revenue buffers
in good times, in preparation for future negative shocks. With this set of optimal policies,
output decreases only about 2% during the crisis, compared to a 3% decrease in the economy
without policy. Moreover, investment and consumption do not collapse as much as in the
economy without policy. The reason is that, as the government subsidizes firms by reducing
lump-sum taxes and increasing investment credits, firms’ financing needs decrease, and firm
default risk decreases. This translates into smoothed paths of corporate debt and income
tax revenue. As the government has enough tax revenue to finance transfers to households,
it has less incentive to default. Hence, government spreads do not respond much during the
crisis, and the government has more than enough room to provide transfers to households
and implement its set of optimal policies. Again, these policies reduce firm defaults. This
positive feedback loop reinforces the effectiveness of optimal policy in smoothing out the
path of consumption and increasing welfare.
I calculate welfare gains from implementing this set of optimal policies. To be specific,
I compute the permanent increase in consumption ω0 that households would require as
compensation when they move to the economy without policy from the one with optimal
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where household consumption is CNP and COP in the economy without and with opti-
mal policy, respectively. I simulate the economy 100,000 times for 200 periods, dropping the
first 100 periods. I compute the average welfare gain ω0 from these simulations. Table 1.9
presents the welfare gain from this optimal policy and associated business cycle statistics. I
find that the average welfare gain from implementing optimal policy is substantial (a 12.8%
increase in permanent consumption), because optimal policy alleviates the risk spillover from
corporate debt to government spreads with a positive feedback loop as described above. We
can see that the mean of consumption with optimal policy is higher than its counterpart
without optimal policy, while the standard deviation of consumption falls substantially af-
ter implementing this optimal policy. Importantly, these results are not driven by direct
bankruptcy costs, which are only about 2.2% of output on average in the simulations, but
rather are driven by corporate credit cycles and the amplification mechanism through the
corporate-sovereign linkage.30
Although optimal policy improves welfare dramatically, this type of policy is arguably
not realistic, in the sense that the government may not be able to assess the economic
conditions so precisely as to be able to implement state-contingent optimal policies, or such
policies may not be politically viable. For this reason, I consider two types of simple debt
policies: (i) a constant debt tax and (ii) a cyclical debt tax rate. When imposing a constant
debt tax rate τ̄ b, the government does not change the debt tax rate over the credit cycle.
30The ratio of total direct bankruptcy costs to output are calculated as the average of µt(φ(et) + τ
y(1 −
θ)F (zt, kt) + (1 − Rf )bt)/F (zt, kt) across simulations. Average bankruptcy costs associated with the tax
revenue channel, τy(1 − θ)F (zt, kt)/F (zt, kt), are about 0.7%, while average bankruptcy costs for dividend
cuts (φ(et)/F (zt, kt)) and direct debt repudiation ((1−Rf )bt)/F (zt, kt)) are about 0.3% and 1.2%, respec-
tively. In Panel B of Table 1.10, I assume that only half of the corporate income tax revenue is defaultable
so that direct bankruptcy costs are lower than the baseline parameterization. In this case, the welfare gain
from optimal policy does not fall much relative to the baseline (from 12.8% to 12.2%), suggesting that direct
bankruptcy costs are not the first-order part of this large welfare gain.
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In contrast, with the cyclical debt tax, the government adjusts the debt tax rate τ bt when
the current corporate debt-to-output ratio bt/Yt deviates from a target leverage ratio b̄/Ȳ ,
as shown in equation (1.52) below:
τ bt = max[τ̄
b + βτ (bt/Yt − b̄/Ȳ ), 0] (1.52)
where the debt tax rate τ bt is always non-negative. I assume that the government
cannot collect debt taxes from defaulting firms.31
Panel A of Figure 1.10 plots average welfare gains from imposing different constant
debt tax rates τ̄ b ranging from 0% to 20%, setting the slope βτ to zero. These welfare gains
are obtained in the same way as when considering optimal policy, and each average welfare
gain is calculated by repeating simulation exercises across different debt tax rates. Panel A
shows that, as the constant debt tax rate increases, the welfare gain increases and reaches
a maximum of 2.1% with a debt tax rate of 6%. After reaching the peak, the welfare gain
decreases monotonically in the debt tax rate and eventually becomes negative. Intuitively,
raising the debt tax rate corrects overborrowing externalities, but at the same time increases
firm default risk. Given that a constant debt tax rate τ̄ b of roughly 6% gives the maximum
welfare gain, I calculate welfare gains for different debt tax rule slopes βτ ranging from -1.5 to
1.5, while I set τ̄ b = 6%. I set the target leverage b̄/Ȳ to 0.91, which is the average corporate
leverage ratio across simulations in the regulated equilibrium with a constant debt tax rate
of 6%. The best debt tax slope βτ is roughly -1.0, which gives the maximum welfare gain
of 3.8%. This suggests that the optimal debt tax rate should fall during corporate credit
booms to reduce firm default risk. Surprisingly, welfare decreases when the slope of debt
tax rule is positive. As the government implements a more countercyclical debt tax rate,
the welfare gain decreases. The reason is that firms face higher default risk, as they have
to pay higher debt taxes and run out of cash during credit booms, while the government
31The government could regulate the individual firms’ planned corporate debt issuance bt+1 using micro-
prudential measures, but in practice the government can regulate firms based only on current aggregate debt
bt when it comes to macroprudential policies.
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collects more debt tax revenue than is optimal. At a deeper level, the problem is that (i)
the countercyclical debt tax raises the debt tax rate based on the current corporate debt bt,
which is out-of-date information compared to planned debt issuance bt+1,
32 and (ii) this type
of policy is not sophisticated enough to replicate the state contingency of optimal policies,
under which the government subsidizes firms during the crisis.
Table 1.9 again shows welfare gains from the best constant debt tax rate and the best
cyclical debt tax rate along with associated business cycle statistics. We can see that both
debt policies reduce volatilities of consumption compared to the case without macropruden-
tial policy. The ratios of corporate debt to output are higher with debt policies, as firm
default rates are higher, and output is lower due to debt tax burdens. However, by collect-
ing debt taxes, the government can reduce its spread and default frequency. This allows
the government to better finance transfers to households, which contributes to reductions in
volatilites of consumption. Notice that the best cyclical debt tax rule can achieve higher tax
revenue despite a slightly higher firm default rate compared to the best constant debt tax.
The reason is that lowering debt tax rate during credit booms effectively subsidizes firms and
smooths out the variation in firm default rates. Figure 1.9 again presents dynamics during
the crisis implied by simple debt policies. The evolutions of variables in the economy with
the best cyclical debt tax rule (τ̄ b = 6%, βτ = −1) are presented as black solid lines with
yellow circles, while its counterparts with the best constant debt tax rule (τ̄ b = 6%, βτ = 0)
are shown as green dashed lines. Compared to the constant debt tax, the cyclical debt tax
induces fewer increases in defaulting firms, resulting in a larger welfare gain of 3.8%. To sum
up, the welfare gain from the optimal policy is the largest (12.8%), which is followed by the
cyclical debt tax (3.8%) and the constant debt tax (2.1%).
Table 1.10 shows that the welfare rank between optimal policy, the constant debt
32I find that raising a debt tax rate based on the planned firm debt issuance bt+1 gives larger welfare gains
than raising a debt tax rate based on the current firm debt bt, but smaller welfare gains than imposing a
constant debt tax rate. Levying debt taxes based on bt+1 is close to microprudential policy in the sense
that planned debt choice bt+1 can be regulated immediately and that regulated firms internalize the effect
of their individual debt choice on a debt tax rate.
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tax, and the cyclical debt tax is robust to alternative parameterizations. In Panel A, I
assume that corporate and government discount factors are identical (β = βg = 0.98) and
calculate the welfare gain and business cycle statistics in the economy with optimal policy.
The welfare gain becomes larger compared to the baseline case, since inefficiency arisng
from heterogeneous discount factors disappears with identical discount factors. Compared
to the parameterization with heterogeneous discount factors (baseline), the government is
more patient in borrowing with the assumption of identical discount factors. This leads to
a subtantially low ratio of corporate debt to output (57%) with optimal policy, compared to
its counterpart (86%) with no macroprudential policy.33 This result confirms that optimal
policy addresses firms’ overborrowing externalities. On the other hand, welfare implications
of different policies do not change: optimal policy gives the maximum welfare gain, followed
by the cyclical and constant debt tax. This result applies to alternative parameterizations
in Panels B and C, in which I assume that firms cannot default on the half of their income
and that investors are risk neutral, respectively.
To better understand the nature of the cyclical debt tax rule, consider the following













expected appreciation of marginal funds
(1.53)
When corporate leverage and corporate default risk increases, the marginal funds that
can be borrowed decrease, and the value of marginal funds is likely to increase, implying that
the planner should cut the debt tax rate to reduce firm default risk. Notice that the debt
tax rate still should be positive to correct the overborrowing externality under reasonable
parameterizations. Confirming this intuition, Panel B of Figure 1.10 shows that the welfare
33In the baseline simulation of Table 1.9, the ratio of corporate debt to output is higher for optimal policy
relative to no policy, since the government is less patient than firms.
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gain increases as the planner cuts the debt tax rate more aggressively during corporate credit
booms. In contrast, models with a borrowing constraint (based on a pecuniary externality)
typically show that the planner should raise the debt tax rate when corporate leverage
increases, and the borrowing constraint is more likely to bind. The reason is that these models
abstract from firm defaults and associated bankruptcy costs, and the planner therefore faces
smaller costs when raising the debt tax rate, compared to my model with firm bankruptcy
costs.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I find that corporate debt causally affects sovereign default risk and show
that this corporate-sovereign debt nexus is an important amplification mechanism, driven by
externalities that call for macroprudential policies. I run instrumental variable regressions
to estimate a causal relationship running from aggregate corporate leverage to sovereign
spreads. I use the weighted sum of idiosyncratic shocks to the top 50 largest firms in each
Eurozone country as an instrument for aggregate corporate leverage to rule out potential
reverse causality and omitted variable bias. The regressions suggest that rising corporate
leverage causes sovereign spreads to rise, which confirms the existence of the corporate-
sovereign nexus. To understand the mechanism, I build a model in which both firms and the
government can default. When corporate debt increases, tax revenues are expected to be
lower, as firms stop paying taxes and dividends when they default, and this raises sovereign
default risk. This tax revenue channel is supported by empirical evidence. Country-level tax
revenue regressions show that increases in corporate debt-to-GDP ratios reduce future tax
revenue growth. Difference-in-difference regressions using firm-level data suggest that highly-
leveraged firms reduce tax payments more compared to less-leveraged firms in response to
the 2008 global financial crisis. Moreover, I analyze externalities that arise from firms’
limited liability, which are distinct from the pecuniary and aggregate demand externalities
analyzed by previous literature. I find that there exist time-consistent optimal policies that
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correct the limited liability externality. A quantitative model calibrated to six Eurozone
countries shows that such policies consist of a low constant debt tax rate together with
transfers and investment credits to firms during crises. Implementing these policies alleviates
the corporate-sovereign linkage, so that the number of defaulting firms decreases, and the
government has enough fiscal space to provide transfers to households suffering from low
consumption. Furthermore, practical policies such as either constant or cyclical debt tax
schedules can correct overborrowing externalities. However, a countercyclical debt policy
(which raises the debt tax rate during corporate credit booms) induces more firm defaults
during crises, and thus it is less effective than constant and procyclical debt tax policies. This
suggests that policymakers should be cautious about implementing countercyclical debt tax
policies such as countercyclical capital buffers, and should even consider relaxing regulations
when corporate default risk is high.
Taxes on total corporate debt have not been given much attention by policymakers
or researchers, as previous research on macroprudential policy typically discusses currency
and maturity mismatch in debt (in either the corporate or banking sector) and associated
bank regulations. My results suggest that it is important to regulate total corporate leverage
when firms’ liability is limited. Moreover, it would be useful to study the consequences of
limited liability and the implied optimal mix of macroprudential policies and capital controls
in future research.
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Chapter 2: Capital Flows and Leverage
2.1 Overview
This chapter surveys the literature on capital flows and leverage. We summarize results
from existing papers and document new facts. The empirical literature takes both a macro
and a micro approach. The macro approach focuses on aggregate data both over time
and in the cross-section of countries and documents a positive correlation between total
capital flows, build-ups in terms of the external and domestic debt-to-GDP ratios, and
financial crises. The micro approach uses granular data and focuses on leverage at the
firm- and bank-level and associates this leverage with country-level capital flows and related
exchange rate movements. We document new facts from a hybrid approach that focuses on
the relationship between sector-level capital flows and sectoral leverage. We highlight the
interconnections between different approaches and argue that harmonization of the macro
and micro approaches can yield a more complete understanding of the effect of capital flows
on country-level, sector-level and firm/bank-level leverage associated with credit booms and
busts.
2.2 Introduction
International capital flows have nontrivial consequences for macro and micro economic
outcomes. There is a large empirical literature that studies both the determinants and
effects of capital flows. This literature utilizes cross-country and time-series panel data,
making use of both “between” country and “within” country variation. The former source
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of variation compares countries to each other, averaging the data over decades and focusing
on the long-run causes and effects of capital flows, while the latter source of variation keeps
average differences across countries fixed using country-fixed effects, and uses yearly or even
quarterly changes in variables for identification.
In general, this literature recognizes that the most important determinant of capital
flows is the institutional quality of countries in the long run. When yearly or quarterly
variation is used, macroeconomic policies turn out to be more important than institutional
quality, as the latter changes slowly over time. The consensus view is that countries with
higher levels of institutional quality have lower risk of expropriation, are more productive,
and have more stable macroeconomic policies. Hence, foreign investors can get a higher
return from investing in these countries, which have lower probabilities of default. This
literature also finds that strong fundamentals in terms of GDP growth attract capital flows.
External factors, such as US interest rates, oil prices, and global financial conditions, are
also important determinants of capital flows, especially in the short run. Connecting the
effects of fundamentals and external factors, Kalemli-Özcan (2019) shows that capital flows
in and out of countries with higher levels of default risk are more sensitive to changes in US
interest rates.1 On the effects of capital flows, the literature tends to find a strong association
between capital flows, GDP volatility and financial crises. In terms of growth benefits, only
certain forms of capital flows, such as foreign direct investment (FDI), seems to bring growth
to host countries.
This literature mostly focuses on net capital flows, that is the current account. Re-
cently, Forbes and Warnock (2012) and Fratzscher (2012) studied total gross flows and show
the importance of global risk factors for gross capital flows for the period after 1995. Obstfeld
and Taylor (2005) argue that gross flows provide risk sharing and should not be considered
from the perspective of efficient allocations of capital that is associated with current account
1See, among others, Alfaro et al. (2008), Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b),
Aguiar and Amador (2011), Alfaro et al. (2014), Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013), Calvo et al. (1996), Calvo
(1998), Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012).
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deficits and surpluses. In general, current account deficits are associated with large gross
inflows, especially for emerging markets. Several papers argue that credit booms and cap-
ital inflows go hand in hand, leading to debt build-ups and high leverage in the receiving
economies. This process often ends with a financial crisis and a long de-leveraging process.
Even without capital flows, credit growth is important to understanding financial crises, as
shown by Jordà et al. (2013).
For open economies, a credit boom can be financed by capital flows that can manifest as
higher leverage in the banking sector or in the corporate and government sectors. Gourinchas
and Obstfeld (2012), using data from advanced and emerging markets during 1973–2010,
show that the most important predictors of financial crises are an increase in leverage, credit
growth and a sharp appreciation of the currency. Similarly, Borio and Disyatat (2011)
study the relationship between leverage in the banking sector, cross border capital flows and
the exchange rate. The recent work by Bruno and Shin (2015a,b) provides a model and
supporting evidence that can connect these findings. Their work links global banks’ leverage
to global push factors that are related to capital flows. Their argument is that when global
financial conditions are easy (due to expansionary monetary policy in the US, for example),
global banks’ leverage goes up due to a relaxation in their value-at-risk constraint, and
this process is associated with an increase in cross-border banking flows. An alternative
model by Gabaix and Maggiori (2015) focuses on the risk-bearing capacity of global financial
intermediaries.
In order to understand the relationship between capital flows and leverage, we have to
understand the effects of global push factors on capital flows. As shown by Rey (2013), a
global financial cycle (GFC), which involves synchronized surges and retrenchments in gross
capital flows, as well as booms and busts in risky asset prices and leverage is an important
phenomenon to understand in terms of its effects on domestic credit creation and leverage.
The GFC has a strong common component across countries that comoves with the VIX.2
2This VIX is a forward-looking volatility index of the Chicago Board Options Exchange. It measures the
market’s expectation of 30-day volatility and is constructed using the volatilities implied by a wide range of
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The VIX is related to monetary policy in the US and global changes in risk aversion and
uncertainty (Bekaert et al. (2013); Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2019); and Bruno and Shin
(2015b)). In association with these findings, many researchers show that the VIX has an
important role in pushing capital flows, especially into emerging markets (See Forbes and
Warnock (2012), Cerutti et al. (2019b), Fratzscher et al. (2016), Miranda-Agrippino and
Rey (2019), Cerutti et al. (2019a), and Giovanni et al. (2017)). However, this literature also
underlines the cyclicality in the relationship between VIX and capital flows (See Avdjiev et
al. (2018), Avdjiev et al. (2020), and Giovanni et al. (2017)). Kalemli-Özcan (2019) shows
that changes in US monetary policy affect capital flows in and out of emerging markets more
than for advanced economies, since capital flows of emerging markets are more risk-sensitive,
and US policy affects the risk sentiments of global investors.
The theoretical work by Bruno and Shin (2015a) argues that global banks’ US dollar
lending increases during the boom phase of the GFC due to abundant liquidity in US dollar
funding markets. An appreciating domestic exchange rate as a result of capital inflows
then allows domestic banks and firms with currency mismatch on their balance sheet to
take on more leverage and to increase the share of foreign currency debt (e.g., Bruno and
Shin, 2015b). The model by Coimbra and Rey (2017) points to the importance of bank
heterogeneity in leverage in such a mechanism, whereas the models by Bruno and Shin
(2015a,b) consider the aggregate leverage of the banking sector. Kalemli-Özcan et al. (2018b)
show that domestic firms increase their leverage during exchange rate appreciations and
decrease it during depreciations. As shown by Kalemli-Özcan (2019), this relationship is
stronger in countries with higher foreign currency debt, while this relationship disappears in
countries with a lower level of foreign currency debt. Fluctuations in VIX affect firm leverage
in all countries, regardless of the extent of foreign currency debt.
The model of Coimbra and Rey (2017) shows that financial cycles are due to heteroge-
neous intermediaries whose credit growth is driven in part by lower funding costs, especially
S&P 500 index options.
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for the more leveraged intermediaries. Coimbra and Rey (2015) test the implications of their
model using bank-level data from several countries and show that the negative relationship
between funding costs and credit growth is stronger when the banking system is skewed,
in the sense that larger banks have high leverage. Avdjiev et al. (2020), using confidential
bank-level data from several countries, show that heterogeneity in cross-border liabilities of
domestic banks is the key to understanding the transmission of global financial conditions.
Giovanni et al. (2017), using detailed bank-firm-loan-level data from Turkey, show that lower
funding costs for banks pass through as lower borrowing costs for firms, leading to a credit
boom. This process is mainly driven by large banks with access to international funding
markets.
In the next section, we summarize findings from the literatures that use macro and
micro data in detail. Section 2.4 documents new facts from a hybrid approach that focuses
on sector-level capital inflows and leverage. Section 2.5 states the conclusions of the survey.
2.3 Literature
2.3.1 Macro Approach: Countries
Figure 2.1 shows the importance of the VIX as a global push factor in determining
total capital inflows both into advanced and emerging market economies. This figure is
reproduced from Avdjiev et al. (2018) and uses a sample of 25 advanced and 35 emerging
market economies. Given our focus on leverage, we examine debt inflows. The VIX is plotted
on an inverted scale.
It is clear that the VIX and capital (debt) flows move together. Notice the importance
of private debt inflows in driving the dynamics of the relationship between total debt inflows
and the VIX. The decline in total debt inflows is smaller than the decline in private debt
inflows when the VIX rises. This means that public debt inflows move in the opposite
direction of private inflows and help to smooth out the decline in total inflows, especially in
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emerging markets.
This figure is informative, since it indicates that the leverage of different sectors might
change differentially over time as a response to global and country shocks, and that it may
not be straightforward to detect the relationship between leverage and total capital flows in
the aggregate data.
The global factor VIX is clearly important, but we should consider the role of external
factors together with countries’ own fundamentals. Avdjiev et al. (2018) construct a new
data set for gross capital flows during 1996–2014 for a large set of countries at a quarterly
frequency, decomposing debt inflows and outflows by borrower and lender type: banks,
corporates, and sovereigns. They run regressions of both total capital inflows and capital
inflows by sector on the VIX and countries’ own GDP growth. These regressions show that
banking flows are important for the comovement of capital inflows and outflows. These
regressions also show that capital inflows move procyclically with domestic GDP growth,
and that this procyclicality is driven by both banking inflows and corporate inflows. This
means that, when countries grow fast, their banking sectors and corporate sectors borrow
more externally, while foreign investors leave these sectors during recessions. These results
hold for both advanced countries and emerging markets.
2.3.2 Micro Approach: Firms and Banks
Several papers in the literature focus on bank- and firm-level data and try to connect
leverage at this granular level to capital flows. It is important to have an understanding
of the stylized facts on bank and firm leverage that can be generalized to more than one
country before establishing the connection of leverage to capital flows.
Kalemli-Özcan et al. (2012b) show that leverage is heterogeneous across banks and
varies a great deal over time. For nonfinancial firms, leverage at the firm level, although
heterogeneous in the cross-section of firms, does not move as much over time as bank-
level leverage. These authors show that there was an increase in leverage for “investment
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banks” prior to the 2008–2009 crisis not only in the US but also in other countries. They
also show a procyclical leverage ratio for “investment banks” in other countries, as shown
by Adrian and Shin (2008) for US investment banks. In addition, Kalemli-Özcan et al.
(2012b) show that leverage is also procyclical for large commercial banks in many countries.
Although there have been theoretical papers that aim at understanding the endogenous
leverage process (Farhi and Tirole (2012); Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008); Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2008)), the literature until recently lacked evidence on the behavior of leverage of
banks and non-financial firms based on internationally comparable data. The exception is
the seminal work of Rajan and Zingales (1995a), who focus on the comparison of firm-level
leverage across G7 countries using data on listed firms.
Kalemli-Özcan et al. (2012b) utilize the most comprehensive and comparable world-
wide dataset covering banks and non-financial firms, namely, ORBIS from Bureau van Dijk
Electronic Publishing (BvD). They use data from 2000–2010, which covers listed, private,
large, and small non-financial firms, financial firms, and banks. In studying leverage and
capital flows, it is important to use micro data because aggregate country-level data may
mask micro-level patterns. Adrian and Shin (2008, 2009, 2010b) and He et al. (2010) inves-
tigate US commercial banks and investment banks mainly using aggregate sectoral Flow of
Funds data from the Federal Reserve. Such sectoral data may be driven by the largest banks,
and it is also important to know how typical investment and commercial banks behave. In
fact, the key finding that large banks are more leveraged from Kalemli-Özcan et al. (2012b)
supports models such as Coimbra and Rey (2017), as mentioned in the introduction.
2.3.2.1 Funding Cost Channel
What about the relationship between leverage of large banks and capital flows? There
are papers that have emphasized the role of financial intermediaries in channeling capital
flows into leverage in both the financial and non-financial private sectors. Cetorelli and
Goldberg (2012) use bank-level data to study the role of global banks in transmitting shocks
60
to capital flows related to changes in liquidity conditions across borders. Using Mexican loan-
level data, Morais et al. (2019) find that, under easy global liquidity conditions, the supply
of credit of foreign banks to Mexican firms increases. Such transactions would register in the
balance of payments as a capital flow from a foreign country to the Mexican banking sector.
Bräuning and Ivashina (2020) show that cross-border syndicated bank loans increase when
monetary conditions in the US are related.
Using confidential loan-level data on the universe of loans combined with firm- and
bank-level data from Turkey, Giovanni et al. (2017) and Baskaya et al. (2017) show a direct
link between banking inflows, bank leverage, corporate leverage, and credit booms. They
show that increased capital inflows into Turkey lead to rising leverage in the corporate sector
and a credit boom via bank intermediation of these capital inflows. However, this credit boom
is created by a subset of banks that have a high level of non-core liabilities. A high level of a
bank’s non-core liability ratio means that this bank has more access to international funding,
since most non-core liabilities are non-domestic-deposits that are externally funded. Baskaya
et al. (2017) show that banks’ non-core liabilities move in tandem with banking sector inflows.
The key intuition behind these patterns is the pass-through of variation in the cost of
funds. Large banks that fund themselves cheaply in international markets pass through this
low cost of funding as a lower cost of borrowing to corporates. Figure 2.2 below, repro-
duced from Giovanni et al. (2017), shows the relationship between Turkish firms’ borrowing
costs and the VIX. This relationship gets stronger during low VIX periods associated with
Quantitative Easing (QE) policies of the US Federal Reserve. The figure plots the “time ef-
fects” on loan rates (nominal and real) in the sense that the authors plot the average interest
rate on the average loan at each date, after purging each loan’s interest rate of the effects
of determinants such as loan amount, maturity, risk, currency and so forth. The aim is to
solely focus on the time pattern of borrowing costs at a very granular level and to see if this
time pattern is associated with the global push factor, VIX. They find that this is the case.
Some papers link firm-level leverage to capital flows and other aggregate outcomes.
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Gopinath et al. (2017b) links corporate leverage and credit growth to capital flows and to
misallocation of capital that leads to a decline in aggregate productivity. They show that
countries in Southern Europe experienced low productivity growth alongside declining real
interest rates during 1999–2008 due to capital inflows from Northern Europe. They argue
that capital inflows from North to South Europe led to the misallocation of this capital
across firms, which gave rise to lower aggregate productivity. They show that firms with
higher net worth got more capital, regardless of whether they were more productive. They
develop a model with size-dependent financial frictions that is consistent with firm leverage
being a function of firm size in the data. They provide evidence consistent with their model
from six European countries.
Kalemli-Özcan et al. (2018a) also focus on firm-level leverage, but they link it to
declining aggregate investment in Europe in the aftermath of the 2008–2009 crisis. They
show that declining firm-level and aggregate investment can be explained by higher firm-
level leverage, increased debt service associated with this leverage, and firm relationships with
weak banks that led to a decrease in credit supply. Banks were important to the transmission
of capital flows, since Northern European banks expanded their credit supply to Southern
European banks, which in turn were exposed to Southern European governments’ debt. This
deadly embrace created a doom loop between firms, banks, and sovereigns across Europe
linked by capital flows.
2.3.2.2 Balance Sheet Channel
One dimension of bank- and firm-level leverage is borrowing/lending in local versus
foreign currency. As argued in the introduction, the model of Bruno and Shin (2015a)
explicitly predicts higher leverage for banks and firms when there is currency mismatch on
their balance sheets as a result of the movements in the exchange rate that are linked to
capital flows.
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Kalemli-Özcan et al. (2018b) directly test the Bruno and Shin (2015a) model using
firm-level data. Using firm-level data from private and public firms in ten Asian emerging
markets during 2002–2015, these authors show that firms with higher foreign currency debt,
prior to exchange rate appreciation, increased their relative leverage after appreciations.
Kalemli-Özcan et al. (2016) show that these balance sheet currency mismatch effects can
be detrimental on the downside, when the credit boom turns into a bust with associated
liquidity shortages. Using firm-level data from six Latin American countries, they show that
if currency crises are accompanied by banking crises, domestic exporters holding unhedged
foreign currency debt decrease investment, while foreign exporters with better access to
credit increase investment despite their unhedged foreign currency debt. There is no such
effect if the crisis is a pure currency crisis.
2.4 New Facts From a Hybrid Approach: Sectors
In this section, we undertake an exercise that is a hybrid between micro and macro
approaches. This approach establishes a direct link between capital inflows into the banking
sector and rising leverage in the corporate sector. We use data from Avdjiev et al. (2018).
Note that the previous literature could not undertake such an exercise for a large set of
countries over a long period since capital flows data by sector are very limited at the quarterly
frequency. Avdjiev et al. (2018) build a new sector-level capital flow dataset that expands
the existing data frontier significantly in terms of country and time coverage. See Avdjiev
et al. (2018) for details.
Domestic banks play an important role in channeling funds from foreign lenders into
domestic non-bank firms. Figure 2.3 presents an example of how domestic banks inter-
mediate funds and how the balance sheets of the domestic bank and its counterparties are
adjusted. If foreign lenders increase loans to a domestic bank, the domestic bank’s external
liabilities increase. If the domestic bank’s external assets do not change, its external leverage
(defined as the ratio of external liabilities to external assets) increases, and this implies that
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its domestic assets should increase to restore the balance sheet identity. The increase in the
bank’s domestic assets means that the domestic bank increases loans to the domestic non-
banking sector (non-financial firms and households), and in turn, the domestic non-banking
sector’s debt increases.
First, we show empirical evidence that domestic banks’ external leverage has increased
since 2000 in emerging market economies (EMEs). Figure 2.4 panel (b) shows that bank
debt inflows are positively correlated with bank external leverage (the ratio of external
liabilities to assets) in EMEs. This finding indicates that domestic banks’ external assets
do not change much following bank debt inflows, and hence their domestic assets should
increase.3 As a result, the banking sector in EMEs mainly uses inflows of funds from abroad
to make loans to the domestic sector instead of acquiring assets held by the external sector.
Panel (a) of the same figure shows that this is not the case in advanced economies (AEs).
Second, domestic banks in EMEs grant more loans to the domestic non-banking sector
following inflows of external funds from abroad, as shown in panel (b) of Figure 2.5. As
before, this is not the case for AEs, as shown in panel (a). This is a new and important
finding which points towards a hidden financial stability risk: for emerging markets, capital
flows into the banking sector can substantially increase domestic vulnerabilities. However, as
shown in Figure 2.9 in the appendix, capital flows into the corporate sector do not increase
the corporate sector’s external leverage, suggesting that corporates that can borrow directly
in international markets (mostly large multinationals) increase their external assets at the
same time. These sector-level results are also consistent with the firm-bank-level results in
Giovanni et al. (2017).
Next, to further support our results, we show firm-level evidence on the effects of bank
inflows on firm leverage. In Table 2.1, we regress firm-level leverage on sectoral inflows
using the ORBIS database that covers 43 countries. We run regressions for different country
groups as follows:
3Figure 2.8 in the appendix illustrates that rising external leverage in EMEs is driven by increasing
external liabilities.
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Leveragei,c,t = β1BankInflowsc,t + β2CorporateInflowsc,t + β3PublicInflowsc,t
+γi + δc + εi,c,t
Leverage is measured as the ratio of financial debt (loans and debt instruments) to total
assets for each firm i in country c and year t; γi and δc are firm and country fixed effects,
respectively. Note that the ratio of financial debt to assets is usually considered to be a
better measure of firm vulnerability than other leverage measures.4
We find that the ratio of financial debt to assets is positively correlated with bank
inflows in (i) EMEs, (ii) countries with a high foreign currency (FX) debt share, and (iii)
countries with managed floats. These results suggest that domestic banks channel funds
obtained abroad into domestic firms in these country groups and that these firms are more
vulnerable to subsequent sudden stops in capital inflows, as they build up leverage signif-
icantly during the credit boom via the domestic bank lending channel. The table shows
that there is no significant positive effect of direct capital flows into the corporate sector
and the government sector on firm leverage. If anything, higher direct capital flows into the
corporate sector decrease firm leverage in countries with free floats.
Finally, we investigate the currency composition of domestic banks’ liabilities and assets
to assess the vulnerability of these banks’ balance sheets to exchange rate shocks. Given that
domestic banks play a pivotal role in channeling funds from foreign lenders to the domestic
non-banking sector, currency mismatch in these domestic intermediary balance sheets poses
a great risk to the financial system of a country. In Figure 2.6, we calculate the share of
foreign currency liabilities as the sum of the liabilities in foreign currency across countries
divided by total liabilities. We also calculate the share of foreign currency assets in the
same fashion. Foreign currency shares in both liabilities and assets have gradually declined
4For example, BIS includes debt securities and loans in its main credit indicator (core debt in total credit
statistics) but excludes other liabilities such as pension, trade credit, or other accounts receivable/payable.
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over time, but they look fairly stable. In fact, from these figures, it does not seem that
there is a currency mismatch issue for banks’ balance sheets in AEs and EMEs. If anything,
the mismatch would go in the opposite direction, in that assets in foreign currency exceed
liabilities in foreign currency.
Figure 2.7 panel (b) shows that a 1%p increase in the domestic currency appreciation
rate is associated with a 0.84%p increase in bank external leverage (and similarly a depre-
ciation will be associated with de-leveraging) across emerging market economies during the
pre-crisis period 2000–2007. This cross-country correlation is significant, with a t-statistic of
-3.48. However, notice that causality can go the other way around, in that more borrowing
by domestic banks from overseas can lead to an appreciation of the domestic currency. We
do not find the same pattern during the post-crisis period 2009–2014. Also, we do not find
this pattern in advanced economies during pre- and post-crisis periods.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper surveys the literature on capital flows and leverage. We summarize results
from existing papers and document some new facts. The literature takes both a macro and
a micro approach. The macro approach focuses on aggregate country-level data over time
and in the cross-section and documents a positive correlation between total capital inflows,
build-ups of external and domestic debt, and financial crises associated with de-leveraging.
The micro approach uses granular data, focuses on leverage at the firm- and bank-level and
associates this leverage with aggregate country-level capital inflows.
The key messages from these approaches are as follows. At the macro level, boom
periods for countries that are associated with domestic credit growth, and hence leverage,
are also associated with increased capital inflows, especially for emerging markets. These
episodes often end with financial crises. At the micro level, non-financial firm leverage is
not as cyclical as bank leverage, where bank-level leverage moves in tandem with global
push factors, most notably the VIX index, which is a measure of global uncertainty and risk
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aversion. The connection between bank-level leverage and the cyclicality of this leverage
as a function of the VIX can be explained by the association between the VIX and capital
inflows. When the VIX is low, capital flows from advanced economies into the banking
sectors of many emerging countries, and bank-level leverage increases. There is important
heterogeneity in the behavior of bank-level leverage, however, in that not all banks increase
their leverage when global liquidity conditions are easy (low VIX). Only large banks and
banks that fund themselves in the international markets end up with higher leverage during
such periods. Firm-level leverage is connected to bank-level leverage and capital inflows via
increases in bank credit supply to non-financial firms.
We document some new facts from a hybrid approach that focuses on the relationship
between sector-level capital inflows and sectoral leverage. We show that capital flows into
the domestic banking sector of a given country are associated with increased leverage in the
same country’s corporate sector. This result is strong for emerging markets but weaker for
advanced countries.
The bottom line of this survey is that countries’ own domestic banks are central to
the relationship between capital inflows and leverage. This is not to say global banks are
not important. They are, because in open economies that are financially integrated with the
rest of the world, domestic banks fund themselves mostly through global banks using the
interbank market. However, understanding the importance of the domestic banking sector
in the transmission of capital flows has an important policy implication. Macro-prudential
authorities in open economies that aim at financial stability should start with their own
domestic banking sector.
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Chapter 3: Does Trade Cause Capital to Flow? Evidence from Historical
Rainfall
3.1 Overview
We use a historical quasi-experiment to estimate the causal effect of trade on capital
flows. We argue that fluctuations in regional rainfall within the Ottoman Empire capture the
exogenous variation in exports from the Empire to Germany, France, and the U.K., during
the period of 1859–1913. The identification is based on the following historical facts: First,
only surplus production was allowed to be exported from the Empire (provisionistic policy).
Second, different products grown in different regions were subject to variation in regional
rainfall. Third, different bundles of products were exported to Germany, France, and the
U.K. by the Empire. Using the export-bundle-weighted regional rainfall as an instrument for
Ottoman exports to each country, our instrumental variable regression suggests the following:
When a given region of the Empire received more rainfall than others, the resulting surplus
production was exported more to countries that historically imported more of those products,
and this leads to higher foreign investment by those countries in the Empire. Our findings
support theories predicting complementarity between trade and finance, in which causality
runs from trade to capital flows.
3.2 Introduction
Theory predicts an ambiguous relationship between trade and financial flows. Mundell
(1957) shows that trade and capital flows are substitutes as an increase in trade integra-
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tion reduces the incentive for capital to flow. Formalized by the Heckscher-Ohlin-Mundell
paradigm, in a two-goods, two-factors framework, free trade leads to factor price equaliza-
tion, and so there is no need for international capital mobility. Other papers modify this
framework by adding technological differences (Kemp, 1966; Jones, 1967) and/or production
uncertainty (Helpman and Razin, 1978), and these papers show that trade and factor flows
can be complements with causality running from international capital to trade flows.
The recent theoretical models incorporating financial frictions advocate another view.
It is not only that there is the complementarity between trade and capital flows but also
the causality runs from trade to capital flows (Antràs and Caballero, 2009). In this paper, a
historical quasi-experimental setting was used to identify the causal effect of trade on capital
flows in a dynamic framework. It is argued that fluctuations in regional rainfall within the
Ottoman Empire capture the exogenous variation in exports from the Empire to Germany,
France, and the U.K., during the period of 1859–1913. The identification is based on the
following historical facts: First, only surplus production was allowed to be exported from
the Empire (provisionistic policy). Second, different products grown in different regions were
subject to variation in regional rainfall. Third, different bundles of products were exported to
Germany, France, and the U.K. by the Empire. Using the export-bundle-weighted regional
rainfall as an instrument for Ottoman exports to each country, our instrumental variable
regression suggests the following: When a given region of the Empire received more rainfall
than others, the resulting surplus production was exported more to countries with higher
ex-ante export shares of those products, and this leads to higher foreign investment by those
countries in the Empire. The empirical results show that higher trade integration leads to
higher capital inflows to the capital-scarce country.
We illustrate a plausible mechanism for this cause-effect relationship based on the theo-
retical model of Antràs and Caballero (2009) in the historical context of the Ottoman Empire
during the late 18th and early 19th centuries. The Empire was a financially-underdeveloped
country exporting agricultural goods, while Germany, France and the U.K. were financially-
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developed countries exporting manufactured goods. This trade pattern was consistent with
the fact that the manufacturing sector was more capital-intensive than the agricultural sector,
and Germany, France and the U.K. were financially-developed enough to finance investment
in capital. The Empire was less financially-developed than Germany, France and the U.K.,
and the Empire allocated their resources mainly in the agricultural sector, which contributed
to an increase in output and a decrease in prices of agricultural goods. With trade integra-
tion, the Empire could take advantage of the low prices of its agricultural goods (comparative
advantage) and increase export revenues. As a result, the return to capital in the Ottoman
agricultural sector increased, and Germany, France and the U.K. had more incentive to in-
vest in industries that were complementary to the agricultural sector of the Empire. In fact,
railroads constituted 33 percent of the foreign direct investment from Europe in the Empire
as of 1888, and the construction of railroads reduced transportation costs of crops. Thus,
the trade integration attracted capital flows from Germany, France and the U.K. into the
Empire, as the return to capital in the Ottoman agricultural sector rose due to increases in
export revenues in this sector.
During the late 18th and early 19th centuries, similar to other countries in that era, the
Ottoman economy was closely determined by the political and administrative environment.
The leading concern of the Ottoman policy was the adequate provisioning of food for the
army, palace, and urban areas. This emphasis on “provisioning” created an important
distinction between imports and exports. Imports were encouraged since they added to
the available goods in the urban markets. Exports, on the other hand, were permitted
only once the requirements of the domestic economy were met (See Genc (1994) and Inalcik
(1994)).1 During 1880-1913, 90% of the labor force was employed in the agricultural sector,
while industrial production constituted only 10% of Ottoman GDP (Altug et al., 2008).
As a result, during our sample period, the Empire was an importer of manufactured goods
1Pamuk and Williamson (2011) argue that these provisionistic views paved the way for the Ottoman de-
industrialization process that had been completed around 1880. They also argue that the Ottoman Empire
specialized in agriculture and became a net importer of manufactured goods. This is what is predicted by
the model of Antràs and Caballero (2009).
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and exporter of surplus agricultural goods. Given the dependency on widely-used furrow
irrigation systems, weather—rainfall variation—was an exogenous factor that determined
exports since surplus production varied with the regional variation in rainfall in the Ottoman
Empire.2
Our identification methodology can be summarized as follows. The Ottoman Empire
only exported agricultural goods, namely cotton, wheat, grapes, corn, barley, olives, raisins,
nuts, and figs. These goods grow in different regions of the Empire, and hence, depending
on regional variation in the rainfall, there is surplus production in a given region and thus
in a given group of goods. We will group goods as grains and orchards. We use this broad
category rather than the narrow one since we know that the specialization of regions in
crops by this broad category stays more or less the same in the last 200 years, based on
the maps provided by the State Institute of Statistics (SIS) historical and contemporaneous
yearbooks. We know the regions where these goods were grown, and we combine this infor-
mation with historical rainfall data that vary by region and by time to obtain good groups
specific surplus production. Different regions of the Empire specialize in different types of
good groups. While some consist of cultivated land and grow various grains, others con-
sist of non-cultivated orchard land and grow primarily fruits and vegetables. Hence, within
the Empire, differences in rainfall ensure that Ottoman grain and orchard products were
affected differently in different years. Ottoman trading partners were historically purchas-
ing very different export bundles from the Empire: while some were mainly buying grains,
others were interested in olives and grapes. Therefore, if we interact the time-varying grain
and orchard production shocks, caused by the time variation in rainfall, with the country-
specific export bundles, we obtain rainfall-based time-varying country-specific instruments
for Ottoman exports into France, Germany, and the U.K.
We obtain unique yearly panel data for the period 1859–1913 that covers trade and
private financial flows between France, Germany, the U.K., and the Ottoman Empire. As
2The development of irrigation systems occurred in Turkey only at the end of the 20th century (Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2009).
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a measure of private capital inflows, we use foreign direct investment (FDI) of these three
source countries into the Empire. For trade flows, we use exports from the Empire into
France, Germany, and the U.K. Hence, trade flows are outflows from the Empire, and finan-
cial flows are inflows to the Empire. The predominantly uni-directional capital flows were
typical for the first wave of globalization when the industrialized North was investing in the
agricultural South. It is important to notice that our data set covers all major Ottoman
Empire investors – as of 1914, FDI from France, Germany, and the U.K. constituted 96% of
total foreign direct investment into the Empire (Geyikdagi, 2011). A simple OLS regression
of FDI in the Empire on exports from the Empire to France, Germany, and the U.K., using
country fixed effects for the investor countries, dummies for important events like default,
and time fixed effects on the medium-term cycle, produces a positive coefficient. This result
is the panel version of the cross-sectional findings in the literature. The advantage of the
panel data is that we can use country fixed effects and hence control for the unobserved in-
vestor country heterogeneity in foreign investment. Nevertheless, these OLS estimates suffer
from reverse causality, therefore we run a 2SLS regression instrumenting bilateral trade with
our instrument described above and verifying that our results are causal; that is, trade flows
causally determine foreign investment. Our first stage predicts that a deviation of 10 percent
in rainfall from the mean (which approximately corresponds to one standard deviation in
rainfall from the mean) resulted in a 5 percent increase in Ottoman exports.3 Our second
stage regressions deliver an effect of a 3 percent increase in FDI as a result of a 5 percent
increase in exports.
Our instrument is similar to the instrument developed by Nunn and Qian (2014) who
identify the causal effects of US food aid on the conflict in recipient countries. They instru-
ment US food aid with the interaction of US wheat production and cross-sectional variation
in a country’s tendency to receive any US food aid. Our instrument is year-on-year regional
rainfall variation weighted by the country-specific export bundles, which allows our instru-
3See also Dell et al. (2009, 2012) who focus on the effect of weather changes (temperature and precipita-
tion) on GDP and exports and find large estimates in the case of exports.
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ment to vary across years and countries. This type of identification strategy follows the
logic of the difference-in-differences estimator. Conceptually, our reduced-form estimates
measure the difference in a change in foreign investment from a country importing grain
and a change in foreign investment from a country importing orchard in years following an
increase in rainfall for grain-growing regions.
There is an extensive literature that uses weather shocks as an instrument for growth in
GDP in agricultural economies without well-developed irrigation systems that rely on rain.4
Our identification strategy is based on temporary fluctuations in agricultural production
caused by year-to-year changes in regional rainfall around the “permanent” component of
rainfall which might affect long-run production and trade patterns.5 This strategy is relevant
for our case since we want rainfall to affect capital flows only through exports in the short
run. For this strategy to be valid, there should not be any significant autocorrelation in
precipitations, which is indeed the case as shown in Figure 3.9. Short-run fluctuations in
rainfall create temporary variation in the size of surplus production, which in turn creates
variation in exports. Our strategy of using short-run fluctuations allows us to avoid the
effects of permanent rainfall differences on permanent incomes, which might also affect capital
flows.6 The length of our time series allows us not only to exploit time-series variation and
control for unobserved heterogeneity using country fixed effects but also makes it possible
to include country-specific trends that will account for any increasing/trending investment
by Northern countries into the Ottoman Empire due to certain trade/war treaties.
We measure historical rainfall based on the “tree-ring” methodology. This methodology
recovers the level of rainfall during a growing season based on the width of the tree rings in
4This literature goes back to Paxson (1992), who used weather variability to measure the response of
savings to temporary income fluctuations. See Schlenker and Roberts (2006), and Deschênes and Greenstone
(2007) who focus on U.S. agricultural production. See Donaldson (2018) estimates for the India.
5Miguel et al. (2004) use yearly changes in rainfall to identify the effect of temporary growth on the
likelihood of civil conflict in Africa.
6Temporary fluctuations in income will affect savings only, resulting in net capital outflows, according to
the standard models. During the course of the 19th century, capital flows were one way from the center to
the periphery countries, as argued by Obstfeld and Taylor (2005), and hence capital outflows were essentially
zero. The authors argue that this is either because periphery countries were full colonies or they were not
integrated fully into the world markets to invest their savings.
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a given year. During droughts, rings are narrower, while extensive moisture results in wider
rings. To check the validity of the tree-ring methodology, we compared our rainfall data
constructed from tree-rings to real-time historical rain data. The real-time historical data
comes from the Ottoman Archives but only for a few regions. The correlation between the
real-time data and our data is 0.495 for the overlapping regions and significant at 5%. We
use data that we obtain using the tree-ring methodology for our analysis since this data is
available for all the regions of the Empire during the entire period we are interested in.
A valid threat to the identification is the possibility of a third variable driving both
Ottoman exports to North and North’s investment in the Empire. Our instrumental variable
strategy will be able to deal with this issue as long as the omitted variable is not correlated
with the instrument. To advance on this, in light of the model of Antràs and Caballero
(2009), regressions control for Ottoman GDP per capita, which can capture a large part
of the variation in the marginal product of capital, the return to capital, and thus capital
inflows into the Empire. Additionally, we use country-specific time trends together with
other controls. We also condition our results on the direct negative effect of 1876 Ottoman
default. As a result of default both trade and financial flows can go down regardless of
the temporary shocks to trade caused by rainfall (Rose and Spiegel, 2004). We have also
created a dummy to control the effect of the establishment of the Ottoman Public Debt
Administration (OPDA) in 1881. The OPDA was established after the debt restructuring
negotiations for the purpose of paying the creditors. If more trade induces more financial
flows since trade serves as an implicit guarantee for the creditors, once an institution is
established to pay the creditors (OPDA), there might be less need for trade (See Wright
(2004), Mitchener and Weidenmier (2005), Rose and Spiegel (2004), Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981b)). Our results are robust to all these tests.
The empirical literature tries to identify whether or not trade and finance are com-
plements or substitutes though the endogeneity issue is hard to solve. Most papers adopt
the gravity approach focusing on the cross-sectional relationship and document a positive
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correlation between the two, such as Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2008), and Portes and Rey (2005). Taylor and Wilson (2006) use a similar cross-sectional
framework and instrument trade with distance to solve the endogeneity problem, obtaining
a positive effect of instrumented-trade on capital flows. However, Guiso et al. (2009), Portes
and Rey (2005), and Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007) show that distance determines both
trade in assets and trade in goods since distance also captures information asymmetries that
are important determinants of capital flows. Our contribution to this literature is to use
a unique historical setting to identify the causal relationship running from trade to capital
flows, using country-specific export-bundle weighted regional rainfall as an instrument for
trade.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the historical context and
introduces the data. Section 3 discusses the descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the
empirical specification, the results, and the robustness analysis. Section 5 concludes.
3.3 Historical Context and Data
The Ottoman Empire stood at the crossroads of civilizations, stretching from the
Balkans to Egypt for six centuries prior to World War I. Given the coverage of our data
from 1859–1913, this paper focuses on the borders of the Empire from 1830 until World
War I, as shown in Figure 3.1. These borders include northern Greece, Syria, Iraq, and
present-day Turkey but exclude Egypt and Libya.
In light of the new evidence from the archives, historians no longer think that the
Ottoman Empire was in a state of a permanent decline since the 16th century. It is now
realized that the Ottoman state was flexible and pragmatic and was able to adapt to the
changing environment. Although the 17th century was a period of crisis, the 18th century
witnessed an expansion of trade and an increase in production. The Empire was shrinking
starting in the middle of the 18th century due to territorial losses, but at the same time,
during most of the 19th century, the Empire became more linked to Europe via commercial
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and financial networks. The provisioning of the capital city, armed forces and urban areas,
taxation, support, regulation of long-distance trade, and the maintenance of a steady supply
of money were among the main policy concerns of the state. Hence, the government con-
stantly intervened in economic affairs. The Ottoman Empire is not unique in this respect,
as the pursuit of similar policy goals is thought to have led to the emergence of powerful
nation states in Europe and Asia (Tilly, 1975).
During our sample period, the world economy had witnessed an enormous expansion
of trade between the center and periphery countries. Thanks to the Industrial Revolution,
European countries became exporters of manufactured goods. These countries were selling
their manufactured products to the third world (periphery) countries, while at the same time
buying primary products and raw materials from them.
Among the periphery countries, China and the Ottoman Empire had a unique place
since they had a strong central bureaucracy and their governments had the upper hand in
the struggle between the bureaucracy and the interest-groups such as merchants and export-
oriented landlords (Genc, 1987; Inalcik and Quataert, 1994). These countries were also never
colonized. In the case of the Ottoman Empire, the sultans and state officials were aware
of the critical role played by merchants. Long-distance trade was very important for the
provisioning of the Empire. Foreign merchants were especially welcome since they brought
goods that were not available in Ottoman lands, and they were granted various privileges and
concessions at the expense of domestic merchants. Historians argue that this is the primary
reason why mercantilist ideas never took root in Ottoman lands. While the ideas of domestic
merchants and producers were influential in the development of mercantilism in Europe, the
priorities of the central bureaucracy dominated economic thought in the Ottoman Empire.
The policy priority was such that only surplus agricultural production could be ex-
ported abroad after the army, palace and the urban markets were satiated. This provi-
sionistic policy created a difference in the attitude of sultans towards foreign and domestic
merchants, and hence between imports and exports (Genc, 1987; Inalcik and Quataert, 1994).
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Trade between the Ottoman Empire and the European countries increased 15-fold between
1820–1914. However, given the provisionistic policy, the share of Ottoman exports in total
production did not exceed 6 to 8 percent and – in agricultural production – 12 to 15 percent
until 1910 (Pamuk, 1987). By 1910, 25 percent of agricultural production was exported,
whereas 80 percent of manufactured goods were imported.
The 19th century was characterized by one-way capital flows from center European
countries to periphery third world countries. Our data covers such one-way private capital
flows (FDI) from France, Germany, and the U.K. into the Ottoman Empire during 1859–1913
period. These three countries were responsible for practically all FDI inflows over that period.
For example, right before World War I, all other countries combined contributed only 4% of
total FDI. We also have data on exports from the Ottoman Empire into France, Germany,
and the U.K. and imports of the Ottoman Empire from these three center countries. Both
sets of data come from Pamuk (2003) and Pamuk (1987), and they are expressed in British
pound sterling. Figure 3.2 shows the total Ottoman exports and imports during our sample
period, using data from Pamuk (1987). There was an eight-fold increase in imports and a
quadrupling of exports, a pattern that led to the accumulation of foreign debt.
The expansion of trade between the center and periphery countries was followed by
investment of European powers into the third world. It was not only the case that European
governments lent money to the periphery governments, but in addition private foreign money
flowed into the periphery countries.7 Some of this investment was in the form of foreign direct
investment (FDI) to finance infrastructure such as railroads, with the aim to expand trade
even more. Foreign investment was not solely concentrated on infrastructure. As of 1888,
while 33 percent of total foreign investment from Europe in the Ottoman Empire was in
railroads, 31 percent was in banking, 9 percent was in utilities, 8 percent in commerce, 12
percent was in industry, and 5 percent was in mining, as shown in Pamuk (1987). Foreign
investment in the agricultural sector remained limited until the end of World War I.
7Ottoman government bond issues and major purchasers over 1854-1914 are listed in Pamuk (1987) on
page 74, Table 4.4
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The top panel of Figure 3.3 shows private investment (FDI) from the U.K., France,
and Germany into the Empire. Overall, France was the biggest investor followed by the
U.K. and Germany. German investment did not start until after the signing of the strategic
German-Ottoman partnership, which also marks the start of the construction of the Berlin-
Baghdad railroad in 1885. The bottom panel of the same figure shows the country by country
decomposition of exports from the previous figure. Again, exports into Germany, in general,
are low compared to the U.K. and France, and only slightly increased during the last three
decades of our sample period, coinciding with the increased FDI from Germany. Similar to
exports and imports in the previous figure, there is a stark decline after 1876 in FDI, up
to 60 percent, and then a recovery. This is also true for Ottoman exports by destination
country as shown in the bottom panel. Both declines follow the default of the Ottoman
Empire on its external debt in 1876.
In the course of the 19th century, the Ottomans undertook many reforms to modernize
the economy. They needed foreign capital not only to finance this modernization effort but
also to keep their growing fiscal deficit under control given the increased cost of Russian and
Balkan wars. The Ottomans borrowed heavily from Europe during the 1850s and 1860s.
This did not prevent the financial crisis of 1873 and the subsequent default in 1876 on the
sovereign debt. As of 1876, the outstanding debt was 200 million pounds sterling, and debt
servicing was taking up half of the budget (Pamuk, 1987). After negotiations, the Ottoman
Public Debt Administration (OPDA) was established in 1881 to exercise European control
over Ottoman finances and to ensure debt payments. The outstanding debt was reduced
to half of its value in nominal terms during the debt restructuring negotiations (Blaisdell,
1929). The OPDA helped to repair the lost reputation of the Ottomans, and hence the
Ottoman state gained renewed access to the international capital markets.
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3.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics. The longest series for capital inflows is for
the U.K., where data is available for the entire sample of 55 years. The magnitude of British
investment flows into the Empire, however, was the smallest and constituted on average
0.39 million pounds sterling versus 1.04 and 0.77 million pounds for France and Germany,
respectively. We can also see from Table 3.1 that Britain was the biggest trading partner of
the Ottoman Empire and purchased, on average, 4.6 million sterling worth of the Empire’s
exports, while selling about 7.6 million sterling worth of imports, on average. The smallest
trade was between the Empire and Germany – only 0.4 million sterling worth of goods were
exported into Germany, and 1.1 million sterling was imported by Germany. Unlike the U.K.
and Germany, France was the only country (out of three) which had purchased more than it
sold, with Ottoman exports into France being 3.8 million and Ottoman imports from France
being 2.5 million sterling, respectively. Overall, the Empire was running a current account
deficit against all these three countries in total, during our sample period.
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of France, Germany, and the U.K. comes from
Mitchell (1988). Mitchell (1992) and Maddison (1995) also provide some GDP numbers for
Turkey. However, we use the GDP data for the Ottoman Empire that comes from Clemens
and Williamson (2004), which is based on Pamuk’s GDP estimates.8 All the GDP data
is expressed in local currencies, which we have converted into British sterling using the
“Gold Standard” exchange rates (see Table 3.11). During our sample period, 1 sterling
corresponded to a fixed 7.3224 grams of fine gold, and thus we implicitly measure all the
“monetary” variables in gold. As shown in Table 3.1, the Ottoman Empire was roughly 10
times poorer, per capita, than the European countries.
Population numbers for the Ottoman Empire come from Behar (1996), while the data
8Those sources, however, provide comparable GDP estimates as well as relative ratios. For example,
while Maddison’s UK and Turkey per capita GDP estimates for 1913, expressed in 1990 International Geary-
Khamis dollars, are 4,921 and 1,213, Clemens and Williamson estimates, expressed in British Sterling, are
52 and 10.
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on the population of France, Germany, and the U.K. comes from Maddison (1995). Table 3.1
shows that at the beginning of the sample in 1859, France was the largest country among
those three, with a population of over 37 million. The smallest was Great Britain with
about 29 million in population. During 1859–1913, France, Germany, and Great Britain
experienced drastic differences in population growth rates. By 1913, Germany’s population
had increased by 85 percent, and it approached WWI with more than 65 million people. The
population of France and the U.K. in the middle of 1913 was 41 and 46 million, respectively.
We impute data on FDI and exports to maximize the sample size in regression analysis.9
However, we use both raw and imputed data, and the main regression results are based on
raw data. Table 3.1 shows statistics for regression variables including both raw and imputed
data. Summary statistics between raw and imputed data are close to each other. For each
source country, Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show imputed data for FDI-to-GDP ratios and export-
to-GDP ratios, respectively, together with raw data.
3.5 OLS Analysis
3.5.1 Empirical Specification




= αi + λt + αit+ βlog
EXPORTSit
GDPit
+ γWt + εit (3.1)
where αi indicates country dummies, and λt indicates either time dummies or event dummies.
Time dummies consist of a series of dummy variables that equal 1 for five consecutive years
9We impute missing data on FDI-to-GDP ratios, using the regression of log FDI-to-GDP ratios on log
Ottoman government-debt-flow-to-GDP ratios with country fixed effects and country-specific time trends.
This regression explains substantial variation in historical FDI-to-GDP ratios with an R-squared of 0.4114.
We also impute missing data on Export-to-GDP ratios, using the regression of log Export-to-GDP ratios on
log GDP per capita of each source country and log Ottoman GDP per capita with country fixed effects and
country-specific time trends. This regression gives an R-squared of 0.8405. Remaining missing values are
interpolated using the average of the values in years t− 1 and t+ 1. If the value in t+ 1 is not feasible, the
value in t+ 2 is used. When the value in t− 1 is missing, we fill the value in t with the value in t+ 1.
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without overlapping. Using event dummies, we control for specific events such as a dummy
for the creation of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (OPDA) in 1881, and other
dummies characterizing the effect of Empire’s default on the foreign debt in 1876, and the
Resettlement of the debt in 1903. αit controls for country-specific trends.
10 The left-hand
side variable is gross FDI inflows from the source countries i, which are France, Germany,
and the U.K., into the Ottoman Empire; Exports are Ottoman exports into these countries.
Both FDI and Exports are normalized by the GDP of each source country GDPit. A control
variable Wt is the Empire’s contemporaneous GDP per capita.
3.5.2 OLS Results
We report results from the OLS estimation of equation (1) without time dummies in
Table 3.2.11 Our result in column 1 is strong given our sample size of 87 observations for
raw data.12 In column 2, we use imputed data for FDI-to-GDP ratios and export-to-GDP
ratios, and the log export-to-GDP ratio is contemporaneous with the log FDI-to-GDP ratio.
In column 3, we use imputed data for FDI-to-GDP ratio and export-to-GDP ratio, and the
log export-to-GDP ratio is lagged. In all of the specifications, coefficients of exports turn
out to be positive and significant. The results are also economically significant, in which a
10 percent increase in exports is associated with a 2.1-3.1 percent increase in FDI flows.
In Table 3.3, we first present results with time dummies and then replace them with
dummies for important events such as default while also allowing for country-specific time
trends.13 To estimate the effect of the Ottoman Empire’s default in 1876, we introduce
10Country-specific trends are included as the interaction term (αit) between country dummies αi and time
trend t.
11We use Driscoll and Kraay (1998a) standard errors with the lag length 3, which is robust to heteroskedas-
ticity and clustering on year and kernel-robust to common correlated disturbances.
12Even though the raw dataset contains 122 FDI observations (for all three countries combined) and 105
Exports observations, for some years, one of the variables is missing while the other is not. As a result, we
end up with only 87 complete FDI-Exports pairs, which constitutes the effective sample size.
13When we include year fixed effects, the coefficients of exports become insignificant. This is because
we have only three countries (trading partners) in panel data, which gives insufficient within-year variation
across countries. Event dummies explained in this paragraph (Default, OPDA, and Resettlement) are not
collinear with other controls such as country-specific time trends. These event dummies will be collinear
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a “Default” dummy, which equals 0 before 1876 and 1 thereafter. As was expected, by
defaulting on its foreign debt, the Ottoman Empire discouraged further investment, reducing
capital flows into the country. In 1881, the Ottoman government decided to take action
toward repayment of the debt, and it established a European-controlled organization, called
the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (OPDA), designed to collect taxes, which then
were turned over to creditors. We take this event into account by introducing an “OPDA”
time dummy, which is equal to 0 before 1881 and 1 after that. In 1903, the creditors
voluntarily restructured the remaining debt of the Ottoman Empire, partially reducing its
size. We capture that effect by yet another time dummy, “Resettlement,” which equals 1
after 1903. All the dummies appear to have expected signs. We also control for GDP per
capita of the Ottoman Empire to partial out the effect of exports on FDI via exporter’s
income channel. This variable does not seem to have an impact, and hence we do not report
those results.14
To understand structural breaks in the relationship over time, we re-estimate our base-




) = αi + βjlog(
EXPORTSit
GDPit
) + γWt + εit, t ∈ j (3.2)
where j refers to each 5-year period during the sample period 1885-1913 (the last
period has only 4 years), and αi indicates country dummies. The left-hand side variable is
gross FDI inflows (raw data) from the source countries i, which are France, Germany, and
the U.K., into the Ottoman Empire; Exports are Ottoman exports into these countries (raw
data). Both FDI and exports are normalized by the GDP of each source country GDPit.
A control variable Wt is the Empire’s contemporaneous GDP per capita in logs. In Table
with year fixed effects, but we do not have year fixed effects in our regressions.
14For robustness, we also normalize FDI and exports by the population of source countries instead of their
GDP. Note that there is no point in normalizing by the Ottoman GDP and population since that will be a
common factor among the three source countries and be absorbed by the constant term. When we normalize
by the population of the source country, the results are very similar in magnitude to those described and are
available upon request.
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3.4, we find that Ottoman exports and FDI inflows into the Ottoman Empire are positively
associated during the periods 1885-1889, 1900-1904, and 1910-1913, and these correlations
are significant at a 1 percent level. Although correlations during some periods are not
significant due to the small sample size, these regression results suggest that there is no
evident structural break in the relationship between exports and FDI.
Furthermore, we perform a placebo test to show that bilateral trade matters in ex-
plaining bilateral FDI. In Table 3.5 column 2, we switch all three trading partners and rerun
the baseline regression of column 1. We find that exports do not explain FDI after switch-
ing trading partners, which suggests that bilateral trade matters for bilateral FDI. Also,
we investigate whether coefficients in our regressions capture the correlation between FDI
and unobserved common time-varying factors. To do this, we construct a measure for the
time-varying factor that can capture competition amongst source countries, which leads to
the boom-bust cycle in capital flows. We measure this cycle in capital flows (FDI cycle)
facing a country i in year t as the average of log FDI-to-GDP ratios of other countries in
year t excluding country i. Table 3.6 reproduces the baseline regression in column 1 and
adds an FDI cycle to the regression in column 2. We find that the FDI cycle is positively
correlated with FDI of each source country only at a 15 percent significance level. Impor-
tantly, the coefficient on exports is still significant at a 5 percent level, and the magnitude
of this coefficient rarely decreases (from 0.35 to 0.34) after adding the FDI cycle.
3.5.3 Dynamic Responses
To investigate dynamic responses of FDI to exports, we run regressions by local pro-










γjWit−j + εit+h (3.3)
where αi indicates country dummies, and αit controls for country-specific trends. The
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left-hand side variable is interpolated gross FDI inflows from the source countries i, which
are France, Germany, and the U.K., into the Ottoman Empire in time t + h; Exports are
interpolated Ottoman exports into these countries in time t. Both FDI and Exports are
normalized by the GDP of each source country. The set of control variables Wit includes
FDI-to-GDP ratios, export-to-GDP ratios, and the Empire’s GDP per capita (which does
not vary across countries), and all of them are included up to past three years.
We find that a rise in exports has persistently significant effects on FDI up to a 3-year
ahead horizon at a 5 percent significance level. We collect estimates βh in Figure 3.6. On
impact, a 1 percent increase shock from the export-to-GDP ratio is associated with a 0.18
percent increase in the FDI-to-GDP ratio. After three years, the FDI-to-GDP ratio increases
by 0.20 percent in response to the same shock.
3.6 IV Analysis
3.6.1 Rainfall, Agricultural Production, and Trade
In this section, we lay out our argument on the linkage between trade, production,
and weather conditions, specifically the regional variation in the amount of rainfall within
the Ottoman Empire. We explain in detail how the composition of exports into the U.K.,
France, and Germany, as well as specialization of the Empire’s regions in different types of
crops, allows us to construct the instrument.
The first step is to highlight the dependency between the level of exports and produc-
tion. Excessive output in one particular year leads to a surplus of goods that were available
for sale in and out of the country, causing exports to increase. This line of thought mainly
comes from the “provisionistic” nature of the Empire’s policy. As the government policy at
those times was aimed to primarily satisfy the needs of the Ottoman army, the supply of
exports was determined not only by the prices but also by the yield in that particular year.
If the yield was low, it had to go first towards satisfying the army needs; if there remained
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any excess over this amount, it could be traded abroad.
As discussed in Pamuk and Williamson (2011), by the beginning of the second half of
the 19th century, the de-industrialization of the Ottoman Empire was practically complete.
Labor and other resources were pulled out of the industry, and agricultural production
constituted the biggest part of the Ottoman Empire’s GDP. Altug et al. (2008) state that
“Mechanization of agriculture began [only] in the 1950s, making nature one of the most
important determinants of people’s well-being at those times,” and Quataert (1994) adds that
“Mechanized factory output was and remained relatively insignificant in the 19th century
when compared with domestic and handicraft production.”
Agricultural goods made up a significant share of Ottoman exports. Therefore, the
amount of rainfall was an important determinant of both domestic production and trade.
Indeed, Donaldson (2018) for the case of India during 1861–1930 shows that “a one standard
deviation increase in rainfall causes a 27 percent increase in agricultural productivity,” thus
affecting both quantity and quality of crops. For the case of grapes – one of the most
important exports – Hellman (2004) gives an estimated 98 mm of water use per month to
maximize the quantity and quality of crops. This estimate is obtained for the most efficient
modern drip irrigation system; for the furrow irrigation that historically was used in the
Ottoman Empire, ideal water usage doubles to 196 mm. Another important agricultural
product of the Empire was cotton. There is substantial evidence that “water deficit during
critical growth stages can significantly reduce cotton yields” (Steger et al., 1998; Grimes
et al., 1970). For example, in the time of emergence (typically, in October) cotton fields
require about 60 mm of monthly water usage. Water requirements increase during the next
5 months, reaching 255 mm a month in late February. Again, one of the main determinants of
the yield of dryland (unirrigated) cotton is regular and predictable rainfall. Similar patterns
hold for other important agricultural export goods of the Ottoman Empire such as corn,
grain, and olives. Agricultural production was critically dependent on rainfall during the
sample period, given that the development of irrigation systems occurred in Turkey only
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at the end of the 20th century (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,
2009), which is outside the time frame we consider in this paper.
Measuring the effect of rainfall on various types of crops produced, including grain,
grape, olives, cotton, and others, is possible since the rainfall data is available on a region
by region basis, and different regions specialized in different crops. The area of modern-day
Turkey amounts to 300,948 square miles, which equals 779,452 square kilometers. 265,931
square kilometers (a little more than one third) of those lands are used for agricultural
purposes (Prime Ministry Republic of Turkey and Turkish Statistical Institute, 2005). In
the past, a higher fraction of the land was used for agricultural production, plus there was
more land under the Ottoman Empire’s boundaries. We will focus on the regions that
constitute today’s modern Turkey and assume the specialization of regions in crops stays
more or less the same in the last 200 years. This assumption is based on the maps provided
by the State Institute of Statistics (SIS) historical and contemporaneous yearbooks for grain
and orchard production. Hence, we aggregate the products to groups such as “grains” and
“orchards” and focus on bigger geographical regions than cities.
Let us explain this in detail. Turkey consists of 80 administrative provinces, 12 sta-
tistical regions (SRE) and 7 geographical regions. The first 4 of the 7 geographical regions
have the names of the seas which are adjacent to them. Those regions are Black Sea Re-
gion, Marmara Region, Aegean Region, and Mediterranean Region. The other 3 regions are
named according to their location in the Anatolia: Central Anatolia Region, Eastern Ana-
tolia Region, Southeastern Anatolia Region. In every region, agricultural land is typically
split into two parts. The first part is cultivated field land. These cultivated lands are used
to grow various types of grain (corn, wheat, barley, rye, etc.), as well as cotton and tobacco.
The second type is the area of fruit trees, olive trees, vineyards, vegetable gardens, and
an area reserved for tea plantations. For consistency, we call the first type of land “grain”
land, and the second type “orchard” land. As shown in Table 3.7, the share of “grain” land
varies from 35 percent in the East Black Sea region to as high as 99 percent in North East
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Anatolia. These shares of “grain” and “orchard” lands remained roughly the same in the
last 200 years.
Let us work out an example. Assume there is extensive rain in the Aegean region and
abnormally dry weather in the Mediterranean region. We can conclude that first, this event
would have a negligible effect on total “grain” production in the country. Indeed, if we look
at Table 3.7, we can see that the area of positively affected “grain” land in the Aegean region
equals 2, 187 thousand hectares, and it is fairly close to the negatively affected “grain” area in
the Mediterranean region, which equals 2, 132 million hectares. Second, we expect the whole
country’s output of “orchard” products to increase. The reason is that the “orchard” land
in the Aegean region is much bigger than that in the Mediterranean region (828 thousand
hectares versus 490 thousand hectares). This simple thought experiment will constitute a
basis for the construction of our instrument.
The historical precipitation dataset we employ in this study is assembled based on the
“tree-ring” methodology – a technique proposed by A. E. Douglass in the 20th century. This
methodology recovers relatively precisely the level of rainfall during a growing season in each
particular year based on the width of age rings, where each ring corresponds to a certain
year. During droughts, rings are typically narrower, while extensive moisture results in wide
rings. This data is not real-time historical data in the sense that it was not collected in the
past, but instead is being reconstructed nowadays.15
Analyzing tree-ring sites location maps in each study (the maps are available in the
original studies), we are able to tie precipitation data series to different statistical regions
(SRE), which are listed in Figure 3.7. Historical precipitation time series for North-West
and South-Central regions of Turkey (TR8 and TR5) were constructed by Akkemik et al.
(2007) and Akkemik and Aras (2007) respectively, and the time span of those series exceeds
300 years. North-West study area – Kastamonu-Pinarbasi and its vicinity – was located on
15As a robustness check, we compare reconstructed precipitation data to “true” historical data from the
Ottoman Archives. Unfortunately, archival data only covers limited regions. The correlation between the
two datasets for the overlapping regions is 0.495.
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the southern side of the Kure Mountains. This corresponds to TR8 statistical region. The
South-Central sampling area was located in the upper and northern part of the Western
Taurus Mountains in proximity to Konya and corresponds to TR5 region. Griggs et al.
(2007) dataset covers North Aegean (TR2), specifically, North-East Greece and North-West
Turkey and goes back by 900 years. The authors reconstruct (May-June) precipitation based
on analysis of oak tree rings. North-West Turkey under consideration corresponded to TR2
statistical region. Touchan et al. (2003) build the dataset which reconstructs Southwestern
Turkey (TR3) Spring (May-June) precipitations. Their data starts in 1776, and the sites
were located in the TR3 statistical region. Finally, Touchan et al. (2007) is an extensive
reconstruction of precipitations in the Eastern-Mediterranean Region for the last 600 years.
This study covers not only Turkey but also other countries in the region. The majority of
sites located in Turkey are concentrated in TR3 and the West half of TR6.
The rainfall variable constructed from tree-ring methodology might capture overall
conditions that affect plant growth. The reason is that measured tree-ring growth in a given
year will be higher when temperature or timing of rainfall was ideal. We believe that the
rainfall instrument is still valid and relevant, as long as plant growth conditions are exogenous
to capital flows and affect exports given the provisionistic policy of the Ottoman Empire.
To identify whether there was unusually rainy weather or unusually dry weather in a
region j (j = 1..J), and hence whether there was a shock to productivity, we proceed as
follows. First, we measure the percentage deviation of yearly precipitation rjt in a region j
during year t from their average values over the period under consideration (1859–1913):









where t indexes years, and T , the sample length, is 55, and drjt measures the deviation
from the average. Positive values of this statistic would indicate that in a year t region j
experienced a large amount of rainfall, which most likely would have resulted in high yield.
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Having this index and knowing the distribution of land between the “grain” and “orchard”
land in each region allow us to construct a variable, which reflects the country-wide “grain”
and “orchard” production shocks as a result of a unique rain map over the Ottoman Empire
in year t. Let Lj be the agricultural area of region j. It is split into two parts: “grain” land
Lgj and “orchard” land L
o




j . We can define Sj as the share of “grain” land





Then the country-wide output shock to “grain” production P gt and the output shock to the
“orchard” production P ot in year t would be the average of the regional shocks, weighted by
























j=1(1− Sj)Lj × drjt∑J
j=1(1− Sj)Lj
(3.7)
This set of indices is used to model the deviations in the production of both types of
agricultural outputs as a function of the amount and location of rainfall in Turkey, under
the assumption that both types of crops are similarly affected by rainfall.16 This gives us
the time-series variation in our instrument.
The best way to illustrate this formula is to go over an example. Suppose, we know
that some year t was especially rainy. Specifically, the percentage deviation from the usual
level of precipitations was 10 percent for the West Marmara region, 20 percent for Aegean,
and 6 percent for West Anatolia. All other regions experienced usual level of rainfall. What
can we say about the deviations of grain and orchard production from their average values?
16We do a robustness check for different sensitivities of crop production with regard to rainfall in Table 3.10.
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The answer depends on the size of a region Lj and its agricultural specialization Sj. The
values of Lj and Sj come from Table 3.7, and they are equal to {1,736; 0.87}, {3,010; 0.73}
and {4,221; 0.96} for the West Marmara, Aegean, and West Anatolia regions, respectively.
To find country-wide shocks to the production of “grain” and “orchard,” we need to use Eq.




3.60 × 10−2 and P ot = 0.10×226+0.20×828+0.06×1713,526 = 5.63 × 10
−2. These numbers mean that in
year t production of grain has experienced a positive shock of about 4 percent, while the
production of the orchard has experienced a positive shock of about 6 percent. Different
rain patterns from year to year cause the time variation of production.
Our next step is to introduce cross-sectional variation (meaning between the Empire
and the various Northern trading partners) to our instrument. We are able to do this
by relying on the fact that the composition of exports differs for Germany, France, and
the U.K. Pamuk and Williamson (2011) argue that the Ottoman Empire, while importing
manufactures, specialized in the export of primary products. As is evident from Table 3.8, at
the beginning of the sample, agricultural products constituted about 70 percent of exports to
both Germany and the U.K. For France, this share makes up only 26 percent. We speculate
that the reason is that, unlike Germany and the U.K., France used to purchase high volumes
of raw silk. Its share constantly made up more than 30 percent of France imports, falling to
18.3 percent only in 1880–1882, right after the default (Pamuk, 2003).
The differences in export bundles allow us to obtain cross-sectional variation of our







m) represent the decomposition of exports of country m into “grain,” “orchard,”
and “other” according to Table 3.8. It is important that we use initial values (first year in
our sample) for these export bundles and do not allow them to vary over time. Hence, these
initial export shares can be thought of as structural demand for the Empire’s products by
the Northern countries.
We construct the variable “Rainfall,” Rmt, which reflects export-share-weighted plant
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productivity shocks for trading country m in year t, and thus this variable is able to instru-










where as usual, “g” and “o” denote “grain” and “orchard” production, respectively, and the
values of shocks to outputs P gt and P
o
t are defined according to Eq. (3.6) and Eq. (3.7).
3.6.2 IV Results and Threats to Identification
The top panel of Table 3.9 shows the two-stage least square (2SLS) results and the bot-
tom panel reports the coefficient on rainfall from the corresponding first-stage regression.17
We can see that exports are indeed a significant determinant of FDI. This is true when we
do not have event dummies (column 1) and when we include event dummies (column 2). In
column 2, the coefficient on exports is larger than the OLS counterpart and significant at
a 1 percent level. This result shows that the OLS estimates are biased downward, possibly
because omitted factors (such as regulations on financial flows) – that increase FDI into
the Ottoman Empire – are negatively correlated with Ottoman exports. This also suggests
that substitutability between FDI and exports might exist in which the causal relationship
runs from FDI to exports. Heckscher-Ohlin-Mundell paradigm can explain this finding in
that goods need not be traded to achieve factor price equalization when capital flows into a
country.
The first-stage regressions show that rainfall is a significant determinant of exports, in
which the first-stage F statistic exceeds the rule-of-thumb threshold level of 10. The value
of the coefficient is around 0.46, suggesting that an increase in the rainfall index by about
10 percent (which corresponds to one standard deviation in rainfall from the mean) leads to
a 5 percent increase in Ottoman exports. This rise in exports, in turn, causes a 3 percent
increase in capital inflows, on average. Figure 3.8 shows the partial plot for column 2 of
17For all of 2SLS regressions, we use raw data on exports and FDI.
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the first-stage regression, and it is clear that the strong first-stage correlation is not driven
by outliers. Moreover, we take a formal test of the exclusion restriction, using the Hansen’s
overidentifying restriction test. Hansen’s J statistics do not reject the null hypothesis that
instruments are excludable, which provides suggestive evidence that the rainfall instrument
is valid.
In columns 3 and 4, we rerun regressions using the sample in which all observations
start in 1885 to alleviate concerns about missing observations before 1885.18 In column 3
without the “Resettlement” event dummy, we lose some significance due to the small sample
size, but the coefficient is still positive and significant at a 10 percent level. In column 4 with
the “Resettlement” event dummy, we have a positive causal relationship, which is significant
at a 1 percent level.
Guided by the model of Antràs and Caballero (2009), we validate the exclusion restric-
tion that rainfall affects FDI only via the export channel. This means that rainfall is not
associated with FDI or unobserved factors that determine FDI, once we control for exports
and include our other control variables. In their model, differences in the returns to capital
in the agricultural sector between the Ottoman Empire (δH) and each source country i (δFi )
drive capital flows. When the return to capital in the Ottoman Empire is greater than the
one in source countries, capital flows from source countries to the Ottoman Empire. There-
fore, we can think of capital inflows into the Ottoman Empire as an increasing function of
δH − δFi , for simplicity. Also, δH is determined by the Ottoman variables: the marginal
product of capital and export revenues per unit p(1 − τ) — in which p is the unit price of
exporting goods, and τ is trade costs — together with structural parameters such as the
preference for goods and the degree of financial development. Thus, from the perspective of
the Ottoman Empire, we can characterize capital flows as a function of the marginal product
of capital and export revenues of the Ottoman Empire given constant structural parameters.
Regressions include country dummies αi to control for differences in structural parameters
18In the full regression sample using raw data on exports and FDI, observations from France start in 1878;
the U.K. in 1871; and Germany in 1885.
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in δFi across countries i.
In 2SLS regressions, rainfall generates exogenous variation in trade frictions τ and is
correlated with export revenues, given the provisionistic nature of the Ottoman policy. If
rainfall was not enough in a given year, and in turn, the production of agricultural goods
might have dropped below the threshold, the Ottoman government banned exports (the trade
cost was at a maximum level, τ = 1). If the level of production was above the threshold,
the trade cost τ would decrease as production increased (rainfall increased), given that a
smaller portion of total production is allocated to the Ottoman government and that τ is a
unit cost associated with trade frictions.
The main threat to the exclusion test is that rainfall can affect capital flows via the
marginal product of capital rather than export revenues. We argue that we can control for the
marginal product of capital by including GDP per capita of the Ottoman Empire. Suppose
production Y is given by ZKαL(1−α) in which Z is aggregate productivity, K is capital, and L
is labor. Then, the marginal product of capital is ∂Y/∂K = αZ(K/L)(α−1). We can rewrite
the marginal product of capital as (αY/K) = (αY/N)×(N/L)×(L/K) = α(Y/N)×1/(K/N)
in which N is population. We can control for the part of the marginal product of capital
using GDP per capita Y/N . In addition, there is no compelling reason that aggregate capital
per capita K/N is systematically correlated with year-on-year variation in country-specific
region-weighted rainfall after controlling for trends. Thus, as we include GDP per capita in
our regressions, we can control for the bulk of the variation in the marginal product of capital
and alleviate the threat to the exclusion restriction. Nevertheless, given the limitation on
data, we cannot fully control for unobserved factors that are correlated with our instrument
and can affect FDI.
In addition, we use country-specific time trends to account for secular time-varying
factors of source countries. Furthermore, using event dummies, we control for events that
could drive our causal estimates. Ottoman default in 1876 could lead both trade and financial
flows to go down (Rose and Spiegel, 2004). We also include a dummy to control the effect
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of the establishment of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (OPDA) in 1881. The
OPDA could increase financial flows, while reducing trade (Wright (2004), Mitchener and
Weidenmier (2005), Rose and Spiegel (2004), Eaton and Gersovitz (1981b)).
Moreover, we do a robustness check for the rainfall instrument and find that our IV
results are robust to alternative weights for grain and orchard in rainfall variables. In Table
3.10, we reproduce IV regression results in columns 1 and 2, which are without and with event
dummies, respectively. Then, we reconstruct a rainfall variable (Rmt = θ
g
m0ω




such that sensitivities for grain ωg and orchard ωo are 1.5 and 0.5, and we replace the baseline
rainfall variable with the reconstructed rainfall variable in columns 3 and 4. Columns 5 and
6 present results with another rainfall variable such that sensitivities for grain and orchard









such that export shares of grain θgm0 are increased by 20% and export shares of orchard θ
o
m0
are decreased by 20% for all source countries m. Again, we replace the baseline rainfall
variable with the reconstructed rainfall variable in columns 7 and 8. Columns 9 and 10
show results with another rainfall variable such that θgm0 are decreased by 20% and θ
o
m0 are
increased by 20% for all source countries m. We find that coefficients in the first and the
second stage regressions rarely change across columns and that reconstructed instruments
are still relevant (all first-stage F statistics exceed 10).
3.7 Conclusion
This paper investigates the causal effect of trade on financial flows using a historical
quasi-natural experiment from the Ottoman Empire. We use fluctuations in regional rainfall
within the Ottoman Empire to capture the exogenous variation in exports from the Empire
to Germany, France, and the U.K., during 1859–1913. The provisionistic policy of the
Ottoman Empire provides the basis for our identification. This policy dictates that only
surplus production was allowed to be exported. Since different products grow in different
sub-regions of the empire, there will be differences in the surplus production based on the
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differences in regional variation in rainfall. The trading partners of the Empire, namely,
France, Germany, and the U.K., have different demands and hence import different products.
As a result, we can link regional variation in rainfall to exogenous cross-sectional variation
in exports over time to these three countries.
When a given region of the Empire gets more rainfall than others, the resulting surplus
production is exported to countries with higher ex-ante export shares for those products,
and this leads to higher investment by those countries in the Ottoman Empire. We find that
a one standard deviation increase in rainfall from the mean leads to a 5 percent increase in
Ottoman exports, which in turn causes a 3 percent increase in capital inflows, on average.
This result holds also after accounting for the negative effect of the Ottoman 1876 default
on foreign investment and trade. Our findings are supportive of trade theories predicting
the complementarity between trade and capital flows as a result of causality running from
exports to foreign direct investment.
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Tables
Tables of Chapter 1
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max NObservations
Panel A. 9 Eurozone Countries
Sovereign Spread (%p) 0.68 1.47 -0.10 11.39 489
GDP Growth (%) 0.35 0.99 -7.09 4.90 489
Sovereign Debt/GDP (%) 74 27 24 137 489
Corporate Debt/GDP (%) 107 30 52 227 489
Panel B. Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland
Sovereign Spread (%p) 1.21 2.10 -0.10 11.39 210
GDP Growth (%) 0.27 1.12 -3.86 4.90 210
Sovereign Debt/GDP (%) 75 31 24 131 210
Corporate Debt/GDP (%) 103 40 52 227 210
Panel C. Belgium, Finland, France, Austria, Netherlands
Sovereign Spread (%p) 0.29 0.34 -0.05 2.53 279
GDP Growth (%) 0.41 0.87 -7.09 3.30 279
Sovereign Debt/GDP (%) 72 24 29 137 279
Corporate Debt/GDP (%) 109 21 73 163 279
Notes: This table summarizes statistics for observations in nine Eurozone countries (Italy, Spain,
Portugal, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Austria, and Netherlands) during the period 1999q1-
2012q4. Quarter-on-quarter GDP growth is measured as a log difference.
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics: Spread Regression Sample (1999q1-2012q4)
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Mean Std. Dev. Min Max NObservation
Sovereign Spread (%p) 0.89 1.68 0.00 9.05 60
GDP Growth (%) 0.86 2.59 -8.63 5.06 60
Sovereign Debt/GDP (%) 80 29 32 125 60
Corporate Debt/GDP (%) 107 23 59 152 60
Bank Leverage (%) 16 7 5 46 60
Granular Residuals (Γ, %) 0.03 0.32 -0.86 0.93 60
Tax Revenue Growth (%) 1.04 3.89 -10.99 6.56 60
Notes: This table summarizes statistics for observations in Italy, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Fin-
land, and France during the period 2002–2012. Observations during the period 2000-2005 from
Portugal are dropped due to insufficient firm-level observations used to calculate the granular
residuals (weighted sum of idiosyncratic shocks to top 50 large firms) in each country. As the IV
regression uses lagged variables up to two years back as explanatory variables using the sample
ranging from 2000 to 2012, the final observations used in regressions run from 2002 to 2012 for
Italy, Spain, Belgium, Finland, and France (55 observations) and from 2008 to 2012 for Portugal
(5 observations).
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics: IV Regression
Dependent Variable: Sovereign Spreadc,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GDP Growthc,t−1 -0.45** -0.28* -0.35** -0.29 -0.30* -0.48** -0.43**
(0.19) (0.16) (0.16) (0.20) (0.16) (0.23) (0.19)
Sovereign Debt/GDPc,t−1 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.04** 0.06***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Corporate Debt/GDPc,t−1 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.05***







Within R2 0.3659 0.4448 0.4474 0.4429 0.4488 0.4774 0.5180
NObservations 248 248 248 248 248 248 248
Country Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Quarter Fixed Effects no no no no no yes yes
Notes: Driscoll and Kraay (1998b) standard errors (robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering on
date and kernel-robust to common correlated disturbances) with a lag length of 4 quarters are in
parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The regression
sample is quarterly and covers the same countries as in annual IV regressions (Italy, Spain, Portugal,
Belgium, Finland, and France) over the period 2002q1–2012q4.
Table 1.3: OLS Sovereign Spread Regression with six Eurozone Countries
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Bank Control
OLS IV OLS IV
A. Second-Stage Regression
Dependent Variable: Sovereign Spreadc,t
Corporate Debt/GDPc,t−1 0.03** 0.15** 0.04*** 0.11**
(0.01) (0.06) (0.02) (0.05)
Sovereign Debt/GDPc,t−1 0.03 0.10** 0.04* 0.08**
(0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03)
GDP Growthc,t−1 -0.23** -0.08 -0.25** -0.19**
(0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.09)
Bank Leveragec,t−1 0.07*** 0.09***
(0.01) (0.02)
B. First-Stage Regression
Dependent Variable: Corporate Debt/GDPc,t−1
Granular Residualc,t−1 n/a -5.10** n/a -5.86**
(2.37) (2.32)
Granular Residualc,t−2 n/a -3.88* n/a -4.67**
(2.18) (2.00)
Adjusted R2 0.6547 0.4800 0.6833 0.6275
NObservation 60 60 60 60
Country Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes
Time Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes
Hansen J (p-value) n/a 0.5528 n/a 0.3880
First-stage F eff n/a 3.43 n/a 5.15
CLR (p-value, H0 : βcorp = 0) n/a 0.0250 n/a 0.0628
Notes: Annual sovereign spreads are regressed on lagged explanatory variables over the period 2002–
2012. In instrumental variable (IV) regressions, excluded instruments for corporate debt are 1 and 2
years lagged granular residuals, which are based on idiosyncratic total factor productivity shocks to large
firms estimated by the method of Wooldridge (2009). The granular residual is a weighted sum of id-
iosyncratic shocks to top 50 firms in each country c, using lagged Domar weights (salesi,c,t−1/GDPc,t−1)
for a given firm i. Idiosyncratic shocks are residuals from the regression of firm-level productivity on
4-digit sector×year fixed effects. In column 2, lagged GDP growth, the lagged government debt to
GDP ratio, country fixed effects, and year fixed effects are included in both the first and second stage
regressions. Lagged bank leverage is added to the first and second stage regressions in column 4. The
Hansen (1982) J statistic tests the null that instruments are excludable. The first-stage effective F
statistic of Olea and Pflueger (2013) tests the null that the excluded instruments are not relevant. The
p-value for CLR statistic (Andrews et al. (2019)) is reported to test the null hypothesis that the coeffi-
cient on corporate debt in the second stage regression is zero. This test is robust to weak instruments.
Robust standard errors (calculated using the 2-step GMM method and robust to arbitrary clusters
for IV regressions) are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
Table 1.4: IV Spread Regression
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV OLS IV
A. Second-Stage Regression
Dependent Variable: Tax Revenue Growthc,t Tax Revenue Growthc,t
Corporate Debt/GDPc,t−1 -0.22*** -0.32*** -0.20*** -0.29**
(0.07) (0.12) (0.07) (0.12)
Sovereign Debt/GDPc,t−1 -0.08 -0.14* -0.08 -0.12
(0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08)
GDP Growthc,t 0.43* 0.34
(0.26) (0.30)
GDP Growthc,t−1 0.39* 0.26 0.28 0.18
(0.21) (0.22) (0.19) (0.21)
Bank Leveragec,t−1 -0.05 -0.08 0.05 -0.07
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
B. First-Stage Regression
Dependent Variable: Corporate Debt/GDPc,t−1
Granular Residualc,t−1 n/a -5.86** n/a -5.30**
(2.32) (2.32)
Granular Residualc,t−2 n/a -4.67** n/a -4.49**
(2.00) (2.05)
Adjusted R2 0.6247 0.5928 0.6356 0.6106
NObservation 60 60 60 60
Country Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes
Time Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes
Hansen J (p-value) n/a 0.2373 n/a 0.1511
First-stage F eff n/a 5.15 n/a 4.25
CLR (p-value, H0 : βcorp = 0) n/a 0.0879 n/a 0.1936
Notes: Annual real tax revenue growth is regressed on lagged explanatory variables over the period 2000–
2012. In instrumental variable (IV) regressions, excluded instruments for corporate debt are 1 and 2 years
lagged granular residuals, which are based on idiosyncratic total factor productivity shocks to large firms
estimated by the method of Wooldridge (2009). The granular residual is a weighted sum of idiosyncratic
shocks to top 50 firms in each country c, using lagged Domar weights (salesi,c,t−1/GDPc,t−1) for a given firm
i. Idiosyncratic shocks are residuals from the regression of firm-level productivity on 4-digit sector×year fixed
effects. In column 2, lagged GDP growth, the lagged government debt to GDP ratio, country fixed effects,
and year fixed effects are included in both the first and second stage regressions. Lagged bank leverage is
added to the first and second stage regressions in column 4. The Hansen (1982) J statistic tests the null
that instruments are excludable. The first-stage effective F statistic of Olea and Pflueger (2013) tests the
null that the excluded instruments are not relevant. The p-value for CLR statistic (Andrews et al. (2019))
is reported to test the null hypothesis that the coefficient on corporate debt in the second stage regression
is zero. This test is robust to weak instruments. Robust standard errors (calculated using the 2-step GMM
method and robust to arbitrary clusters for IV regressions) are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 1.5: Tax Revenue Regression
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Tax Paymenti,t
HighLevi × Crisist -0.39*** -0.39*** -0.38*** -0.30*** -0.30*** -0.28***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
log(zi,t−1) 1.56*** 1.56*** 1.47*** 1.53*** 1.53*** 1.45***
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14)
log(ki,t−1) -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.17*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.14***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
log(bi,t−1) -0.02** -0.02** -0.02** -0.00 -0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Interest Paymenti,t -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.19***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
NObservation 35,187 35,187 34,463 35,187 35,187 34,463
R2 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65
Firm Fixed Effects (FE) yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country and Year FE yes n/a n/a yes n/a n/a
Country×Year FE no yes n/a no yes n/a
Country×Sector×Year FE no no yes no no yes
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the 4-digit sector level. ***, **, * denote
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. z is total factor productivity estimated by the
Wooldridge (2009) method. k is tangible fixed assets. b is the sum of loans and long-term debt. Leverage
is measured as a debt-to-value-added ratio (b/y), where value added y is measured as operating revenue
minus materials cost. Interest payments are measured as the ratio of interest paid to value added. The
Crisist dummy equals 1 in or after 2008 and 0 otherwise. The HighLevi dummy equals 1 if average
leverage before 2008 of a given firm is higher than the aggregate median before 2008 and 0 otherwise.
The regression sample covers the period 2004–2012 in six Eurozone countries (Italy, Portugal, Spain,
Belgium, Finland, and France).
Table 1.6: Firm Tax Payment Regression
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Panel A. Parameters set independently
interpretation symbol value source
capital income share α 0.35
standard literature
labor income share θ 0.50
risk aversion ν 2
capital depreciation rate δ 0.06
corporate discount factor β 0.98
Arellano et al. (2019)
government discount factor βg 0.90
risk-free rate r 0.019 average German real interest rate
corporate income tax rate τ y 0.327 average corporate income tax rate
government debt recovery rate Rg 0.63 Cruces and Trebesch (2013)
corporate debt recovery rate Rf 0.70 World Bank Doing Business Database
equity issuance cost κ 0.426 Jermann and Quadrini (2012)
volatility of taste shocks σε 0.001 Dvorkin et al. (forthcoming)
Panel B. Parameters set by simulation
interpretation symbol value target (6 European countries)
productivity persistence ρz 0.85 autocorrelation of log GDP
productivity volatility σz 0.015 std. dev. of log GDP
capital adjustment cost ψ 28 std. dev. of log fixed assets
corporate default value µνd 0.011 average corporate spread
average government default cost µξ 0.35 average government spread
government default cost volatility σξ 0.1 std. dev. of government spread
sensitivity of investor sentiment γ 1.7 std. dev. of government spread
Table 1.7: Parameterization
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Panel A. Targeted Moments Model Data
autocorrelation of log GDP 0.454 0.470
std. dev. of log GDP 0.025 0.026
std. dev. of log fixed assets 0.024 0.024
average corporate spread 136 bp 139 bp
average government spread 79 bp 74 bp
std. dev. of government spread 108 bp 107 bp
Panel B. Non-targeted Moments Model Data
corporate default rate (%) 4.4 4.1
government default rate (%) 1.9 1.5
std. dev. of corporate spread 79 bp 60 bp
average corporate debt to GDP ratio 0.86 1.03
average government debt to GDP ratio 1.02 0.79
Government Spread Regression Coefficients:
corporate debt/GDP 0.017 0.03
[0.015 0.018] (0.01)
government debt/GDP 0.021 0.03
[0.019 0.023] (0.02)
GDP Growth -0.121 -0.23
[-0.124 -0.117] (0.12)
Notes: For the model-smiulated regression, 5th and 95th percentiles of estimates out of 1,000
simulations are in brackets together with their median above the brackets. For the empirical
regression, robust standard errors are in parentheses together with estimates above the parenthe-
ses.
Table 1.8: Moments from Model and Data
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No Policy Optimal Policy Best Constant Debt Tax Best Cyclical Debt Tax
Welfare Gain (%) - 12.8 2.1 3.8
Mean(Consumption) 0.812 0.867 0.811 0.821
Std.Dev.(Consumption) 0.200 0.074 0.169 0.157
Corporate Debt/Output (%) 86 107 91 93
Firm Default Rate (%) 4.4 0.0 7.0 7.3
Tax Revenue 0.350 0.356 0.406 0.413
Government Spread (bp) 78 35 66 60
Government Default Frequency 0.020 0.009 0.017 0.016
Notes: For each welfare gain, a permanent increase in consumption by implementing optimal policy and
different debt policies is calculated. For each policy, the average welfare gains from 100,000 simulations of
200 periods after dropping first 100 periods for each simulation are presented. For optimal policy, I calculate
the welfare gain from the optimal constant debt tax with lump-sum taxes and investment credits. For debt
tax policies, the debt tax rate is given by τ bt = max[τ̄
b + βτ (bt/Yt − b̄/Ȳ ), 0]. The target corporate leverage
ratio b̄/Ȳ is set to 0.91. For the best constant debt tax, βτ is set to zero. For the best cyclical debt tax, τ̄
b
is set to 6%, and the debt tax slope βτ is set to -1. Other business cycle statistics are calculated using the
average of 100,000 statistics from the same simulated series.
Table 1.9: Model Simulation: Welfare Gains and Statistics
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No Policy Optimal Policy Constant Debt Tax Cyclical Debt Tax
A. Identical Discount Factor (β = βg = 0.98)
Welfare Gain (%) - 18.8 2.0 4.1
Mean(Consumption) 0.805 0.913 0.806 0.818
Std.Dev.(Consumption) 0.199 0.135 0.175 0.161
Corporate Debt/Output (%) 86 57 91 93
Firm Default Rate (%) 4.4 0.0 7.0 7.3
Tax Revenue 0.350 0.384 0.406 0.413
Government Spread (bp) 3 2 2 2
Govt Default Frequency 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
B. Small Defaultable Tax (ζ = 0.5)
Welfare Gain (%) - 12.2 2.3 4.1
Mean(Consumption) 0.815 0.867 0.816 0.827
Std.Dev.(Consumption) 0.197 0.072 0.167 0.156
Corporate Debt/Output (%) 86 107 91 93
Firm Default Rate (%) 4.4 0.0 7.0 7.3
Tax Revenue 0.354 0.360 0.406 0.413
Government Spread (bp) 74 34 63 57
Govt Default Frequency 0.019 0.009 0.017 0.015
C. Zero Investor’s Sentiment (γ = 0)
Welfare Gain (%) - 12.8 2.0 3.7
Mean(Consumption) 0.811 0.867 0.810 0.821
Std.Dev.(Consumption) 0.197 0.069 0.168 0.155
Corporate Debt/Output (%) 86 107 91 93
Firm Default Rate (%) 4.4 0.0 7.0 7.3
Tax Revenue 0.350 0.356 0.406 0.413
Government Spread (bp) 75 34 65 58
Govt Default Frequency 0.020 0.009 0.017 0.016
Notes: This table presents average statistics from 100,000 simulations of 200 periods after dropping first
100 periods for each simulation. Welfare gains are calculated as the averages of a permanent increase in
consumption from implementing different debt policies across simulations. The debt tax rate is given by
τ bt = max[τ̄
b+βτ (bt/Yt− b̄/Ȳ ), 0]. The target corporate leverage ratio b̄/Ȳ is set to 0.91. The constant debt
tax rate τ̄ b is 6% (βτ is set to zero), For the cyclical debt tax rate, τ̄
b is set to 6%, and the debt tax slope βτ
is set to -1. In each panel, I change only one parameter relative to the baseline parameterization. In Panel
A, I assume that corporate and government discount factors are identical. Panel B shows the case when only
the half of the corporate income tax is defaultable, that is, firms cannot default on the fraction ζ = 0.5 of
their income tax, and the government receives non-defaultable corporate income tax from defaulting firms.
In Panel C, investors are assumed to be risk neutral.
Table 1.10: Model Sensitivity
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Dependent Variable: Financial Debt to Total Assets Ratio
Advanced Emerging Market High FX debt Low FX debt Managed Float Free Float
Economies Economies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bank Inflows/GDP(c,t) 0.02 0.24*** 0.16** 0.00 0.22*** -0.02
(0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.09)
Corporate Inflows/GDP(c,t) -0.12 0.04 0.08 -0.10 0.09* -0.20**
(0.07) (0.03) (0.05) (0.11) (0.05) (0.10)
Public Inflows/GDP(c,t) 0.04 -0.07 0.05 0.02 -0.07 0.18
(0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07) (0.19)
Adjusted R2 0.8685 0.7583 0.7621 0.8829 0.7634 0.8680
Number of Observations 22,352 631,593 605,705 17,078 611,365 4,163
Number of Countries 22 17 15 15 23 6
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Firm-
year two-way clustered standard errors are in parentheses. We run the following regression:
Leveragei,c,t = β1BankInflowsc,t+β2CorporateInflowsc,t+β3PublicInflowsc,t+γi+δc+εi,c,t,
in which leverage is measured as financial debt (loans and debt instruments which is proxied by
items “loans” and “longtermdebt”) to assets ratio or each firm i in a given country c and year
t. Leverage is winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. γi and δc are firm and country fixed effects,
respectively. We include country-specific aggregate sectoral debt inflows as explanatory variables.
Country’s foreign currency (FX) debt share (obtained from Kalemli-Özcan et al. (2018b)) is
considered to be high if average FX debt share in the non-financial corporate sector of that
country during the sample period is above the median among all countries and low otherwise.
Using Ilzetzki et al. (2017)’s exchange regime classification, we classify a country as a managed
float if the classification code is 2 or 3 and a free float if the code is 4, 5, or 6.
Table 2.1: Firm Leverage Regression
Measure (Stocks) Counterparty Sector Currency Type Sample Period
Cross-border claims of reporting banks
All sectors All currencies 1996-2014
All sectors Foreign currency 1996-2014
Cross-border liabilities of reporting banks
All sectors All currencies 1996-2014
All sectors Foreign currency 1996-2014
Table 2.2: BIS Data List
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Variable # of Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
France
GDP 55 1137.10 272.21 706.34 1965.43
FDI 41 1.04 1.54 0.04 9.23
Imports from France 40 2.49 4.84 1.58 3.56
Exports into France 40 3.77 0.59 2.32 4.92
Population 55 39.47 1.26 37.24 41.46
UK
GDP 55 1401.04 405.29 761.00 2354.00
FDI 55 0.39 0.43 0.03 2.12
Imports from the UK 40 7.62 1.47 3.43 9.93
Exports into the UK 40 4.58 1.00 2.49 6.34
Population 55 36.63 5.18 28.66 45.64
Germany
GDP 55 1259.98 633.49 431.60 2782.56
FDI 26 0.77 0.76 0.09 3.40
Imports from Germany 40 1.11 1.39 0.02 4.66
Exports into Germany 40 0.43 0.51 0.00 1.46
Population 55 47.50 8.69 35.63 65.05
Ottoman Empire
GDP 49 153.27 36.70 73.97 208.64
Population 55 16.54 3.10 10.17 21.89
Regression Variables (Pooled Panel Sample)
FDI/GDP (raw) 122 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.008
FDI/GDP (imputed) 165 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.009
Exports/GDP (raw) 105 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.005
Exports/GDP (imputed) 165 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.009
Source GDP per capita 165 30.43 8.479 12.11 51.57
Host GDP per capita 147 8.825 1.424 5.128 10.89
Rainfall 165 -0.024 0.141 -0.716 0.268
Notes: For France, the U.K., Germany, and the Ottoman Empire, all variables except population are
measured in millions of British Sterling. The population is measured in million people. Imports and Exports
are the Ottoman Empire Imports and Exports. FDI denotes Private Capital Inflows from source countries
(France, Germany and the U.K.) into the Ottoman Empire during 1859–1913. Data comes from Pamuk
(1987), Table A3.3. Exports and Imports are values of goods exported from and imported into the Ottoman
Empire with three trading partners (France, Germany and the U.K.) over 1859–1913, from Pamuk (2003)
Table 7.5 and Pamuk (1987) Table 2.3, with values converted from Turkish Golden Lira into British sterlings
using Gold Standard exchange rates from Table 3.11. GDP of each of source country comes from Mitchell
(1992) Table J1. The table includes data on GDP for France and the U.K. and the NNP data for Germany.
NNP figures for Germany were converted into GDP following the procedure described in Maddison (1992).
Ottoman GDP data comes from Clemens and Williamson (2004) dataset. Population figures for the Ottoman
Empire are from Behar (1996). The data on population of France, Germany, and the U.K. comes from the
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Contemp. Raw Contemp. Imputed Lag. Imputed
log(Exports/GDP) 0.31** 0.27*** 0.21**
(0.13) (0.08) (0.09)
Adjusted R2 0.2875 0.4655 0.4450
Number of Observations 87 147 144
Country Dummies yes yes yes
Time Dummies no no no
Country-specific Trends yes yes yes
Controls GDP p.c. GDP p.c. GDP p.c.
Notes: Exports and FDI are normalized by the GDP of each source country (France, Germany, and
the UK). In column 1, we use raw data for FDI-to-GDP ratios and export-to-GDP ratios, and log Ex-
ports/GDP is contemporaneous with log FDI/GDP. In column 2, we use imputed data for FDI-to-GDP
ratios and export-to-GDP ratios, and log Exports/GDP is contemporaneous with log FDI/GDP. In col-
umn 3, we use imputed data for FDI-to-GDP ratio and export-to-GDP ratio, and log Exports/GDP
is lagged. Time dummies consist of a series of dummy variables that equal 1 for five consecutive years
without overlapping. Country dummies, country-specific trends, and the log of the Ottoman GDP per
capita are included as controls. The log of the Ottoman GDP per capita is contemporaneous with log
FDI/GDP in columns 1 and 2 and lagged in column 3. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and
10% levels, respectively. Driscoll and Kraay (1998a) standard errors (robust to heteroskedasticity and
clustering on years and kernel-robust to common correlated disturbances with the lag length 3) are in
parentheses.
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Adjusted R2 0.5184 0.4954 0.3247
Number of Observations 147 147 87
Country Dummies yes yes yes
Time Dummies yes no no
Country-specific Trends yes yes yes
Controls GDP p.c. GDP p.c. GDP p.c.
Notes: Exports and FDI are normalized by the GDP of each source country (France, Germany, and the
UK). In columns 1 and 2, we use imputed data for FDI-to-GDP ratios and export-to-GDP ratios, and
log Exports/GDP is contemporaneous with log FDI/GDP. In column 3, we use raw data for FDI-to-
GDP ratios and export-to-GDP ratios, and log Exports/GDP is contemporaneous with log FDI/GDP.
Time dummies consist of a series of dummy variables that equal 1 for five consecutive years without
overlapping, which are included in column 1. In columns 2 and 3, we include event dummies: Default,
OPDA, and Resettlement. Default is a time dummy variable which equals 1 after the default of the
Ottoman Empire in 1876. OPDA is a time dummy variable which equals 1 after the establishment of
the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (OPDA) in 1881. Resettlement is a time dummy variable
which equals 1 after 1903 when the Ottoman external debt decreased significantly after negotiations
with creditors. Country dummies, country-specific trends, and the log of the Ottoman GDP per capita
are included as controls. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels. Driscoll and
Kraay (1998a) standard errors (robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering on years and kernel-robust
to common correlated disturbances with the lag length 3) are in parentheses.
Table 3.3: Ottoman Exports and FDI Inflows with Time or Event Dummies
108
Dependent Variable: log(FDI/GDP)it
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample Period: 1885-1889 1890-1894 1895-1899 1900-1904 1905-1909 1910-1913
log(Exports/GDP)it 0.25*** -0.76 -1.67 0.89*** 0.84 2.35***
(0.08) (0.50) (1.18) (0.00) (1.08) (0.43)
Adjusted R2 0.0622 0.5922 0.2327 0.9568 0.1841 0.7806
Number of Observations 12 15 15 6 15 12
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls GDP p.c. GDP p.c. GDP p.c. GDP p.c. GDP p.c. GDP p.c.
Notes: We use raw data for FDI-to-GDP ratios and export-to-GDP ratios, and log Exports/GDP is contem-
poraneous with log FDI/GDP. Country dummies and the log of the Ottoman GDP per capita are included
as controls. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. Driscoll and Kraay
(1998a) standard errors (robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering on years and kernel-robust to common
correlated disturbances with the lag length 2) are in parentheses.







Adjusted R2 0.3247 0.3078
Number of Observations 87 87
Country Dummies yes yes
Event Dummies yes yes
Country-specific Trends yes yes
Controls GDP p.c. GDP p.c.
Notes: Exports and FDI are normalized by the GDP of each source country (France, Germany, and
the UK). We use raw data for FDI-to-GDP ratios and export-to-GDP ratios, and log Exports/GDP is
contemporaneous with log FDI/GDP. In column 1, we reproduce the baseline regression in Table 3.3
column 3, and countries which send capital into the Ottoman Empire are also the countries to which
the Ottoman Empire exports. In column 2, we switch trading partners. FDI from France is matched
to exports into the UK, the UK is matched to Germany, and Germany is matched to France. Using
event dummies, we control for specific events such as a dummy for the creation of the Ottoman Public
Debt Administration (OPDA) in 1881, and other dummies characterizing the effect of Empire’s default
on the foreign debt in 1876, and the Resettlement of the debt in 1903. Country and event dummies,
country-specific trends, and the log of the Ottoman GDP per capita are included as controls. ***, **,
and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. Driscoll and Kraay (1998a) standard
errors (robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering on years and kernel-robust to common correlated
disturbances with the lag length 3) are in parentheses.









Adjusted R2 0.3247 0.4431
Number of Observations 87 69
Country Dummies yes yes
Event Dummies yes yes
Country-specific Trends yes yes
Controls GDP p.c. GDP p.c.
Notes: Exports and FDI are normalized by the GDP of each source country (France, Germany, and
the UK). We use raw data for FDI-to-GDP ratios and export-to-GDP ratios, and log Exports/GDP is
contemporaneous with log FDI/GDP. In column 1, we reproduce the baseline regression in Table 3.3
column 3. In column 2, we add an FDI cycle variable for country i in year t, which is calculated as
the average of log FDI-to-GDP ratios of other countries in year t, excluding country i. Using event
dummies, we control for specific events such as a dummy for the creation of the Ottoman Public Debt
Administration (OPDA) in 1881, and other dummies characterizing the effect of Empire’s default on
the foreign debt in 1876, and the Resettlement of the debt in 1903. Country and event dummies,
country-specific trends, and the log of the Ottoman GDP per capita are included as controls. ***, **,
and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels. Driscoll and Kraay (1998a) standard errors (robust
to heteroskedasticity and clustering on years and kernel-robust to common correlated disturbances with
the lag length 3) are in parentheses.
Table 3.6: A Test of FDI cycle
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Agricultural Land by SRE, thousand Hectare
Total Cultivated Non Share of
Region Land Field Cultivated Cultivated Land
Area Area in Total Land
Lj “Grain Land” “Orchard Land” Sj
(percent)
Istanbul (TR1) 83 76 7 92
Marmara
West Marmara (TR2) 1,736 1,510 226 87
East Marmara (TR4) 1,564 1,226 338 78
Aegean (TR3) 3,010 2,187 828 73
Mediterranean (TR6) 2,623 2,132 490 81
Black Sea
West Black Sea (TR8) 2,251 1,996 256 87
East Black Sea (TR9) 736 259 476 35
Anatolia
West Anatolia (TR5) 4,221 4,050 171 96
Central Anatolia (TR7) 4,003 3,872 131 97
North East Anatolia (TRA) 1,461 1,443 18 99
Central East Anatolia (TRB) 1,451 1,328 123 92
South East Anatolia (TRC) 3,453 3,992 461 87
Total 26,593 23,066 3,526 87
Notes: The data comes from Prime Ministry Republic of Turkey and Turkish Statistical Institute (2005)
Table 11.11 on page 177. “Grain” produce include corn, wheat, barley, and rye. Also, we included cotton
into this category, because cotton is typically rotated with the grain. “Orchard” produce include grape, fig,
unspecified fruits and vegetables, vine, olive oil, acorn, hazelnuts, and peanuts. “Other” produce include
animal products such as sheep, goat and lamb wool, leather, silk, and several minor categories.
Table 3.7: Agricultural Land of Turkey by Statistical Region (SRE)
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Decomposition of Exports, percent
France U.K. Germany
Grain produce 16.9 44.8 41.4
Orchard produce 9.2 21.0 31.4
Other 73.9 34.2 27.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: “Grain” produce include corn, wheat, barley, and rye.
Also, we included cotton into this category, because cotton is typ-
ically rotated with the grain. “Orchard” produce include grape,
fig, unspecified fruits and vegetables, vine, olive oil, acorn, hazel-
nuts, and peanuts. “Other” produce include animal products
such as sheep, goat and lamb wool, leather, silk, and several minor
categories. Export shares data comes from Pamuk (2003), page
62, Table 7.2. For the UK and France, the percentage shares are
the averages over 1860-1862; for Germany, we take averages over
1880-82. This way, for all three countries, we are using the initial
export shares that correspond to the beginnings of the respective
samples.
Table 3.8: Ottoman Decomposition of Exports
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A. Second Stage Regression
Full Sample Starting in 1885
Dependent Variable: log(FDI/GDP)it
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Exports/GDP)it 0.33** 0.57*** 0.31* 0.60***
(0.13) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17)
B. First Stage Regression
Dependent Variable: log(Exports/GDP)it
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rainfallit 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.37** 0.37**
(0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16)
Adjusted R2 0.2696 0.2796 0.2911 0.3303
Number of Observations 73 73 66 66
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes
Event Dummies no yes no yes
Country-specific Trends yes yes yes yes
First-stage F 13.34 11.20 14.13 12.51
F (p-value)† 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Hansen J (p-value)†† 0.1927 0.2482 0.1695 0.2903
Controls GDP p.c. GDP p.c. GDP p.c. GDP p.c.
Notes: We use raw data for FDI-to-GDP ratios and export-to-GDP ratios, and log Exports/GDP is con-
temporaneous with log FDI/GDP. Event dummies are “Default,” “OPDA,” and “Resettlement.” Default is
a time dummy variable which equals 1 after the default of the Ottoman Empire in 1876. OPDA is a time
dummy variable which equals 1 after the establishment of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (OPDA)
in 1881. Resettlement is a time dummy variable which equals 1 after 1903 when the Ottoman external debt
decreased significantly after negotiations with creditors. Country dummies, country-specific trends, and the
log of the Ottoman GDP per capita are included as controls. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1, 5,
and 10% levels, respectively. Driscoll and Kraay (1998a) standard errors (robust to heteroskedasticity and
clustering on years and kernel-robust to common correlated disturbances with the lag length 3) are in paren-
theses. Adjusted R2 is calculated for second stage regressions. † This p-value – which is associated with the
Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016) first-stage F test – is used to test the null that instruments are weak. ††
This p-value – which is associated with Hansen’s overidentifying test – is used to test the null that instruments
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j=1 log(Exports/GDP)it−j+ωlog(GDP per capita)t+αi+λt+αit+εit
where αi indicates country dummies; λt indicates event dummies; αit refers to country-specific trends. We
use a full regression sample in columns 1 and 2 (observations from France start in 1878; the U.K. in 1871;
and Germany in 1885.), while we use the sample starting in 1885 in columns 3 and 4.
Table 3.9: Ottoman Exports and FDI Inflows (2SLS)
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A. Second Stage Regression
Dependent Variable: log(FDI/GDP)it
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)







log(Exports/GDP)it 0.33** 0.57*** 0.33** 0.57*** 0.33** 0.57*** 0.33** 0.57*** 0.33** 0.57***
(0.13) (0.18) (0.13) (0.18) (0.14) (0.18) (0.13) (0.18) (0.14) (0.18)
B. First Stage Regression
Dependent Variable: log(Exports/GDP)it
Rainfallit 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.56*** 0.56*** 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.49*** 0.49***
(0.17) (0.17) (0.14) (0.14) (0.21) (0.21) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) (0.18)
Adjusted R2 0.2696 0.2796 0.2696 0.2797 0.2698 0.2798 0.2696 0.2796 0.2697 0.2796
Number of Observations 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Event Dummies no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes
Country-specific Trends yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
First-stage F 13.34 11.20 12.92 10.87 13.82 11.59 13.16 11.06 13.52 11.35
F (p-value)† 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Hansen J (p-value)†† 0.1927 0.2482 0.2007 0.2346 0.1857 0.2717 0.1960 0.2420 0.1896 0.2560
Notes: We use raw data for FDI-to-GDP ratios and export-to-GDP ratios, and log Exports/GDP is con-
temporaneous with log FDI/GDP. Event dummies are “Default,” “OPDA,” and “Resettlement.” Default
is a time dummy variable which equals 1 after the default of the Ottoman Empire in 1876. OPDA is
a time dummy variable which equals 1 after the establishment of the Ottoman Public Debt Administra-
tion (OPDA) in 1881. Resettlement is a time dummy variable which equals 1 after 1903 when the Ottoman
external debt decreased significantly after negotiations with creditors. Country and event dummies, country-
specific trends, and the log of the Ottoman GDP per capita are included as controls. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels. Driscoll and Kraay (1998a) standard errors (robust to heteroskedasticity
and clustering on years and kernel-robust to common correlated disturbances with the lag length 3) are in
parentheses. Adjusted R2 is calculated for second stage regressions. † This p-value – which is associated
with the Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016) first-stage F test – is used to test the null that instruments
are weak. †† This p-value – which is associated with Hansen’s overidentifying test – is used to test the








t ) is calculated as the
weighted sum of rainfall shocks to grain P gt and orchard P
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m0 for each source country m. Contemporaneous rainfall and two lagged
variables of each of rainfall and log(Exports/GDP) are used as instruments. The first stage regression is
as follows: log(Exports/GDP)it = βRainfallit + γj
∑2
j=1 Rainfallit−j + δj
∑2
j=1 log(Exports/GDP)it−j +
ωlog(GDP per capita)it + αi + λt + αit + εit where αi indicates country dummies; λt indicates event dum-
mies; αit refers to country-specific trends. We reproduce IV regression results from Table 3.9 in columns
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g and orchard ωo are 1.5 and 0.5, and we
replace the baseline rainfall variable with the reconstructed rainfall variable in columns 3 and 4. Columns 5
and 6 present results with another rainfall variable such that sensitivities for grain and orchard are 0.5 and








t ) such that export shares
of grain θgm0 are increased by 20% and export shares of orchard θ
o
m0 are decreased by 20% for all countries
m, and we replace the baseline rainfall variable with the reconstructed rainfall variable in columns 7 and 8.
Columns 9 and 10 show results with another rainfall variable such that θgm0 are decreased by 20% and θ
o
m0
are increased by 20% for all countries m.
Table 3.10: Ottoman Exports and FDI Inflows (2SLS) with Alternative Instruments
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Country France United Germany Ottoman
Kingdom Empire
Currency Franc Pound Mark Gold Lira
Sterling
Adopted 04/07/1803 05/01/1821 12/04/1871 01/05/1844
Abandoned 08/05/1914 08/06/1914 08/04/1914 08/03/1914
Grams of Fine Gold 0.2903 7.3224 0.3584 6.6152
Sterling Exchange Rate 25.2215 1.0000 20.4290 1.1069
Dollar Exchange Rate 5.1827 0.2055 4.1979 0.2275
Notes: These data come from Global Financial Data, and available for download at
http://www.globalfinancialdata.com/gh/GHC XRates.xls
Table 3.11: Gold Standard Exchange Rates
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Appendix Tables
Dependent Variable: Sovereign Spreadc,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GDP Growthc,t−1 -0.28*** -0.15* -0.13 -0.14 -0.15* -0.17* -0.13
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Sovereign Debt/GDPc,t−1 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Corporate Debt/GDPc,t−1 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02***







Within R2 0.4150 0.4853 0.4850 0.4844 0.4844 0.5191 0.5435
NObservations 489 489 489 489 489 489 489
Country Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Quarter Fixed Effect no no no no no yes yes
Notes: Driscoll and Kraay (1998b) standard errors (robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering on
date and kernel-robust to common correlated disturbances) with a lag length of 4 quarters are in
parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The regres-
sion sample consists of observations for nine Eurozone countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) during the period 1999q1–2012q4.
Table A.1: OLS Sovereign Spread Regression with nine Eurozone Countries
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Dependent Variable: Sovereign Spreadc,t
IT ES PT IE BE FI FR AT NL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
GDP Growtht−1 -0.30 -1.16*** -0.78 -0.13*** -0.13** -0.04*** -0.16*** -0.11** -0.08***
(0.23) (0.43) (0.48) (0.05) (0.06) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
Sovereign Debt/GDPt−1 -0.00 0.05*** 0.02 0.03** -0.00 -0.00 0.01** 0.00 0.01***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Corporate Debt/GDPt−1 0.03 0.04** 0.07*** 0.02* 0.02*** 0.01*** -0.01 0.03** -0.01***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
NObservations 79 94 80 67 80 80 80 79 80
Trend yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of 4 quarters are in parentheses. ***, **, *
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Regressions use all available data for
each country. IT: Italy, ES: Spain, PT: Portugal, IE: Ireland, BE: Belgium, FI: Finland, FR: France,
AT: Austria, NL: Netherland.
Table A.2: Country-by-country Spread Regression
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Baseline Bank Control
OLS IV IV IV OLS IV IV IV
(Size) (Weight) (T100) (Size) (Weight) (T100)
A. Second-Stage Regression
Dependent Variable: Sovereign Spreadc,t
Corporate Debt/GDPc,t−1 0.03** 0.11** 0.10 0.14** 0.04*** 0.07* 0.10* 0.11**
(0.01) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05)
Sovereign Debt/GDPc,t−1 0.03 0.08** 0.07 0.10** 0.04* 0.05* 0.08* 0.08**
(0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
GDP Growthc,t−1 -0.23** -0.12 -0.15 -0.09 -0.25** -0.22** -0.20* -0.18**
(0.12) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
Bank Leveragec,t−1 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.09***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
B. First-Stage Regression
Dependent Variable: Corporate Debt/GDPc,t−1
Granular Residualc,t−1 n/a -5.50** -0.73 -4.84** n/a -6.47** -0.67 -5.43**
(2.69) (0.47) (2.29) (2.62) (0.49) (2.28)
Granular Residualc,t−2 n/a -4.25* -0.96** -3.31 n/a -5.30** -0.95** -3.81*
(2.45) (0.41) (2.09) (2.17) (0.41) (1.95)
Adj. R-squared 0.6547 0.5765 0.5930 0.4887 0.6833 0.6737 0.6308 0.6232
Number of Observations 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Country Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
First-stage F n/a 2.89 3.26 3.18 n/a 4.69 2.96 4.33
Hansen J (p-value) n/a 0.5674 0.5165 0.5922 n/a 0.3460 0.3846 0.4638
CLR (p-value, H0 : βcorp = 0) n/a 0.0919 0.1640 0.0337 n/a 0.2289 0.1435 0.0706
Notes: Annual sovereign spreads are regressed on lagged explanatory variables over the period 2002–2012.
In instrumental variable (IV) regressions, excluded instruments for corporate debt are 1 and 2 years lagged
granular residuals, which are based on idiosyncratic total factor productivity shocks to large firms estimated
by the method of Wooldridge (2009). The granular residual for IV (Size) is a weighted sum of idiosyncratic
shocks to top 50 firms in each country c, using lagged Domar weights (salesi,c,t−1/GDPc,t−1) for a given
firm i. Idiosyncratic shocks are residuals from the regression of firm-level productivity on sector×size×year
fixed effects, in which sector dummies represent 4-digit sectors, and size dummies are quintiles determined
by sales of each firm. The granular residual for IV (Weight) is a simple average of idiosyncratic shocks to
top 50 firms in each country c, using residuals from the regression of firm-level productivity on sector×year
fixed effects. The granular residual for IV (T100) is a weighted sum of idiosyncratic shocks to top 100 firms
in each country c, using lagged Domar weights and residuals from the regression of firm-level productivity
on sector×year fixed effects. In IV regressions, lagged GDP growth, the lagged government debt to GDP
ratio, country fixed effects, and year fixed effects are included in both the first and second stage regressions.
Lagged bank leverage is added to the first and second stage regressions in columns 5-8. The Hansen (1982)
J statistic tests the null that instruments are excludable. The first-stage effective F statistic of Olea and
Pflueger (2013) tests the null that the excluded instruments are not relevant. The p-value for CLR statistic
(Andrews et al. (2019)) is reported to test the null hypothesis that the coefficient on corporate debt in the
second stage regression is zero. This test is robust to weak instruments. Robust standard errors (calculated
using the 2-step GMM method and robust to arbitrary clusters for IV regressions) are in parentheses. ***,
**, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table A.3: Spread Regression with Alternative Instruments
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline IV Alternative IV
A. Second-Stage Regression
Dependent Variable: Sovereign Spreadc,t
Corporate Debt/Corporate Value Addedc,t−1 0.07** 0.06** 0.06** 0.04*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Sovereign Debt/GDPc,t−1 0.10** 0.08** 0.08** 0.06*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
GDP Growthc,t−1 -0.11 -0.19* -0.14 -0.22**
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
Bank Leveragec,t−1 0.07*** 0.07***
(0.02) (0.01)
B. First-Stage Regression
Dependent Variable: Corporate Debt/Corp Value Addedc,t−1
Granular Residualc,t−1 -9.65** -10.37** -10.50** -11.44**
(4.21) (4.34) (4.55) (4.62)
Granular Residualc,t−2 -7.78** -8.53** -8.32* -9.34**
(3.83) (3.79) (4.18) (3.98)
Adjusted R2 0.4594 0.5590 0.5512 0.6296
NObservation 60 60 60 60
Country Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes
Time Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes
Hansen J (p-value) 0.5137 0.4003 0.5528 0.3813
First-stage F eff 4.10 4.68 3.58 4.39
CLR (p-value, H0 : βcorp = 0) 0.0230 0.0618 0.0831 0.2154
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) present instrumental variable regression results of Table 1.4, using al-
ternative corporate leverage (the ratio of non-financial corporations total debt (BIS) to non-financial
corporations value added (Eurostat)). Columns (3) and (4) present similar regression results of Table
A.3 IV (Size), using alternative corporate leverage. Robust standard errors (calculated using the 2-step
GMM method and robust to arbitrary clusters) are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table A.4: Spread Regression with Alternative Corporate Leverage
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline IV Alternative IV
A. Second-Stage Regression
Dependent Variable: Sovereign Spreadc,t
Corporate Debt/GDPc,t−1 0.12*** 0.08*** 0.12** 0.07**
(0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03)
Sovereign Debt/GDPc,t−1 0.07** 0.05** 0.07* 0.04*
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
GDP Growthc,t−1 -0.24** -0.31*** -0.22** -0.28**
(0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11)
Bank Leveragec,t−1 0.08*** 0.08***
(0.02) (0.02)
Household Debt/GDPc,t−1 -0.16*** -0.12*** -0.16** -0.10**
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
B. First-Stage Regression
Dependent Variable: Corporate Debt/GDPc,t−1
Granular Residualc,t−1 -5.30** -6.14*** -4.75* -5.74**
(2.32) (2.05) (2.77) (2.49)
Granular Residualc,t−2 -5.34** -6.24*** -4.63* -5.71***
(2.31) (1.59) (2.64) (2.01)
Adjusted R2 0.6556 0.7155 0.6637 0.7174
NObservation 60 60 60 60
Country Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes
Time Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes
Hansen J (p-value) 0.3195 0.1743 0.3642 0.1491
First-stage F eff 4.61 9.99 2.43 5.21
CLR (p-value, H0 : βcorp = 0) 0.0309 0.1117 0.1152 0.4602
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) present instrumental variable regression results of Table 1.4, adding the
ratio of household total debt to GDP (BIS). Columns (3) and (4) present similar regression results of
Table A.3 IV (Size), adding the same household leverage. Robust standard errors (calculated using the
2-step GMM method and robust to arbitrary clusters) are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table A.5: Spread Regression with Household Debt
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Sovereign Spreadc,t
Corporate Debt/GDPc,t−1 0.03** 0.02 -0.01 0.04*** 0.03* -0.00
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Government Debt/GDPc,t−1 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.04* 0.04* -0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
GDP Growthc,t−1 -0.23** -0.21* -0.03 -0.25** -0.23** -0.03
(0.12) (0.11) (0.05) (0.11) (0.11) (0.05)
Tax Revenue Growthc,t -0.06 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02
(0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03)
Tax Revenue Growthc,t+1 -0.10 -0.09
(0.07) (0.07)
Bank Leveragec,t−1 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.05**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
Adjusted R2 0.6547 0.6542 0.5797 0.6833 0.6806 0.5834
NObservations 60 60 54 60 60 54
Country Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: Columns (1) and (4) present OLS regression results of Table 1.4. Columns (2), (3), (5), and (6)
present similar regression results, adding real tax revenue growth in years t and t+ 1. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Using Driscoll and Kraay (1998b) standard errors gives similar results.
Table A.6: Spread Regression: Importance of the Tax Revenue Channel
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Nobs
Tax Payment / Value Added (%) 4.15 3.79 0.00 12.76 35,187
Log(TFP) 5.24 1.01 0.80 10.45 35,187
Log(Tangible Fixed Assets) 13.20 2.01 2.20 20.98 35,187
Log(Debt) 10.39 6.20 0.00 22.40 35,187
High Leverage Dummy 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 35,187
Interest Payment / Value Added (%) 2.48 3.91 0.00 19.38 35,187
Notes: Total factor productivity (TFP) is estimated by the Wooldridge (2009) method. Debt is the
sum of loans and long-term debt. The HighLevi dummy equals 1 if average leverage before 2008
of a given firm is higher than the aggregate median before 2008 and 0 otherwise. Firm leverage is
measured as the ratio of debt to value added. Value added is measured as operating revenue minus
materials cost. The sample covers the period 2004–2012 in six Eurozone countries (Italy, Portugal,
Spain, Belgium, Finland, and France).
Table A.7: Summary Statistics: Firm-level Regression Sample
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Tax Paymenti,t
HighLevi × Crisist -0.54*** -0.54*** -0.51*** -0.41*** -0.41*** -0.37***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
log(zi,t−1) 1.58*** 1.58*** 1.61*** 1.56*** 1.56*** 1.55***
(0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15)
log(ki,t−1) -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.13** -0.12** -0.12** -0.09**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
log(bi,t−1) -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.02** -0.02** -0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
log(zi,t−1)× Crisist -0.07 -0.07 -0.28** -0.07 -0.07 -0.21*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11)
log(ki,t−1)× Crisist -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
log(bi,t−1)× Crisist 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Interest Paymenti,t -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
NObservation 35,187 35,187 34,463 35,187 35,187 34,463
R2 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65
Firm Fixed Effect (FE) yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country and Year FE yes n/a n/a yes n/a n/a
Country×Year FE no yes n/a no yes n/a
Country×Sector×Year FE no no yes no no yes
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the 4-digit sector level. ***, **, * denote
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. z is total factor productivity estimated by
the Wooldridge (2009) method. k is tangible fixed assets. b is the sum of loans and long-term debt.
Leverage is measured as a debt-to-value-added ratio (b/y), where value added y is measured as operating
revenue minus materials cost. Interest payments are measured as the ratio of interest paid to value
added. The Crisist dummy equals 1 in or after 2008 and 0 otherwise. The HighLevi dummy equals 1
if average leverage before 2008 of a given firm is higher than the aggregate median before 2008 and 0
otherwise. The sample covers the period 2004-2012 in six Eurozone countries (Italy, Portugal, Spain,
Belgium, Finland, and France).
Table A.8: Robustness Check: Firm Tax Payment Regression
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Source: BIS, Bloomberg, Gilchrist and Mojon (2017)
Notes: The figure shows the averages of debt-to-GDP ratios and sovereign spreads of 9 Eurozone countries
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain). Debt is core debt
(BIS), which consists of the following financial instruments as defined in the System of National Accounts
(SNA): debt securities, loans, and currency and deposits. Core debt excludes special drawing rights, insur-
ance, pensions, standardized guarantee schemes, and other accounts payable. Sovereign spreads (Bloomberg)
are measured as the difference between the 10-year government bond yield of each country and that of Ger-
many. Both government bond yields are denominated in euro and are daily averages by quarters. The cor-
porate spread of Euro area non-financial corporate bonds (Euro area Bund NFC) is obtained from Gilchrist
and Mojon (2017).




















































Source: Author’s calculation based on ORBIS-AMADEUS and BIS
Notes: The figure shows the averages of debt-to-value-added ratios (ORBIS-AMADEUS) and debt-to-GDP
ratios (BIS) for six Eurozone countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Finland, and France). For the
ORBIS-AMADEUS data, debt is financial debt measured as the sum of loans and long-term debt, which
excludes other accounts payable. Leverage is calculated as the average leverage of six Eurozone countries,
where each country’s leverage is calculated as the sum of individual firms’ debt over the sum of value added,
where value added is operating revenue minus materials cost. For BIS statistics, debt is core debt (BIS),
which consists of the following financial instruments as defined in the System of National Accounts (SNA):
debt securities, loans, and currency and deposits. Core debt excludes special drawing rights, insurance,
pensions, standardized guarantee schemes, and other accounts payable.
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Horizon (quarter)
To a One St.Dev. Increase in the Corporate Debt-to-GDP ratio
Response of Sovereign Spread
(c) Corporate Debt
Source: Author’s calculation
Notes: I run the following Jordà (2005)-style local projections regression:
Spreadc,t+h = βy,hGrowthc,t + βgov,hGovt Debt/GDPc,t
+ βcorp,hCorp Debt/GDPc,t + δc + γt + εc,t+h
for each horizon h = 0, 1, 2..., where δc and γt are country and time fixed effects. The figures plot regression
coefficients for (a) GDP growth (βy,h), (b) sovereign debt (βgov,h), and (c) corporate debt (βcorp,h) that are
multiplied by a one standard shock to GDP growth, sovereign debt, and corporate debt, respectively. The
shaded area presents 95 percent confidence intervals, calculated using Driscoll and Kraay (1998b) standard
errors (robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering on date and kernel-robust to common correlated distur-
bances) with a lag length of 4 quarters. The regression sample consists of observations for nine Eurozone
countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) during the
period 1999q1–2012q4.
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Spain Italy Portugal Belgium Finland France
Debt Growth (%)
Top 50 Firms Top 1% Excluding Top 50
Top 1%-10% Bottom 90%
(c) Debt Growth
Source: Author’s calculation based on ORBIS-AMADEUS
Notes: Debt is financial debt measured as the sum of loans and long-term debt, which excludes other accounts
payable. Leverage reported in panel (a) is calculated as the average over six Eurozone countries (Finland,
France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, and Portugal), where each country’s leverage is calculated as the weighted
average of individual firms’ debt-to-value-added ratio within each size class, where value added is operating
revenue minus materials cost, and weights are sales of each firm in a given year. In panel (b), I measure the
debt share by each size class in a given country as the sum of financial debt within each size class over the
sum of financial debt of all firms in a given country. I plot the average debt share of six Eurozone countries
for each size class. To obtain debt growth rates in panel (c), I deflate debt using 2-digit sector gross output
prices (EU KLEMS) and calculate growth rates — measured as (debtt – debtt−1)/(0.5×(debtt + debtt−1))
— for each firm. Debt growth rates of each size class are weighted averages within each size class during the
period 2000–2015, where weights are sales of each firm in a given year t− 1. These time-varying weights are
consistent with the weights used later in constructing the granular residual, which reflect the time-varying
contribution of large firms. Size classes are determined by percentiles of sales.


























High Leverage Low Leverage
Tax Payment/Value Added (%)
Source: Author’s calculation based on ORBIS-AMADEUS
Notes: I plot averages of firm tax payment across firms within each leverage group in a given year using a
sample of six Eurozone countries (Italy, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, Finland, and France). Firm tax payment
for each firm i is the ratio of tax payment to value added (operating revenue – materials cost). Leverage is
the ratio of financial debt to value added in which financial debt b is the sum of loans and long-term debt.
A firm belongs to the high leverage group if average firm leverage before 2008 of a given firm is higher than
the aggregate median before 2008. I use a full sample during the period 2000–2007 in six Eurozone countries
to calculate average firm leverage of each firm and aggregate median leverage.
Figure 1.5: Firm Tax Payment by Leverage Group
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Notes: The figure shows decision rules in the competitive equilibrium of the quantitative model. Productivity
z and capital k are set to the minimum level so that substantial firm default risk exists, and government
debt B is set to the median level. Decision rules are averaged over the distribution of taste shocks.
Figure 1.6: Decision Rules
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Notes: The figure shows government default probabilities and the spread function in the competitive equilib-
rium of the quantitative model. Productivity z and capital k are set to the minimum level so that substantial
firm default risk exists.
Figure 1.7: Government Default Probability and Spread Function
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Notes: For model-simulated time series, I simulate an economy (competitive equilibrium) for a million periods
and drop the first 500 periods. I identify a period t as a sovereign debt crisis if government spreads at time
t increase by more than three standard deviations of government spreads across all periods. Next, I obtain
the paths of variables within each event window ranging from t − 5 to t + 5, and I calculate the deviation
of each variable from its average within each event window. Time t is marked with the shaded area which
corresponds to the year of 2012. I plot the average of the demeaned variables across event windows. See the
notes of Figure 1.9 for more details. Data counterparts are linearly detrended series during the period of
2007-2017. See Data Appendix for more details.
Figure 1.8: Event Study: Sovereign Debt Crisis
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Notes: I simulate each economy with different policies, using the same path of productivity and the timing
of the crisis events as shown in Figure 1.8. Crisis time t is marked with the shaded area which corresponds
to the year of 2012. I plot the average of the demeaned variables across event windows. Output, invest-
ment, consumption, corporate income tax revenue, government expenditure, productivity are demeaned and
normalized by their steady state values and are expressed in percentage deviations. Corporate debt and
government debt are initially normalized by output and are demeaned later. Corporate spreads and govern-
ment spreads are demeaned and are in basis points. The fraction of defaulting firms is demeaned and is in
percentage. The debt tax rate τ bt , the ratio of lump-sum taxes to output −Tt/Yt, and investment credits τkt
are plotted as their original levels in percentage.
Figure 1.9: Event Study: Policy Analysis
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Notes: A permanent increase in consumption by implementing different debt policies is
calculated. For each policy, the average welfare gains from 100,000 simulations of 200
periods after dropping first 100 periods for each simulation are presented. The debt
tax rate is given by τ bt = max[τ̄
b + βτ (bt/Yt − b̄/Ȳ ), 0]. The target corporate leverage
ratio b̄/Ȳ is set to 0.91. In Panel A, βτ is set to zero, and only the constant debt tax
rate τ̄ b changes. In Panel B, τ̄ b is set to 6%, and the debt tax slope βτ changes.
Figure 1.10: Welfare Gains From Simple Debt Tax Policies
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Total Debt Inflows (Left Axis)
Private Debt Inflows (Left Axis)
VIX (Right Axis)
b  Emerging Market Economies
Notes: (a) Advanced Economies. (b) Emerging Market Economies. We calculate debt
inflows to GDP ratios as the average over the country group in a given year. Figures
constructed using data from Avdjiev et al. (2018).






















































































Real Loan Rate Nominal Loan Rate log(VIX)
Notes: Figure adapted with permission from Giovanni et al. (2017).
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1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Year
Bank Debt Inflows (Left Axis)
Bank External Leverage in All Currency (Right Axis)
b  Emerging Market Economies
Correlation = 0.5824
Notes: (a) Advanced Economies. (b) Emerging Market Economies. We calculate aggregate
debt inflows into the bank sector in a given year as the sum of deflated debt inflows (billions
1996 USD) over the country group in a given year. We calculate external leverage of the bank
sector in a given year as the sum of the bank sector’s external liabilities over the country
group in a given year divided by the counterpart of external assets. Figures constructed
using data from Avdjiev et al. (2018).
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1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Year
Bank Debt Inflows (Left Axis)
Bank Credit to Private Non-financial Sector / GDP (Right Axis)
b  Emerging Market Economies
Correlation = 0.2643
Notes: (a) Advanced Economies. (b) Emerging Market Economies. We calculate aggregate
debt inflows into the bank sector in a given year as the sum of deflated debt inflows (billions
1996 USD) over the country group in a given year. We use the average of bank credit to
the private non-financial sector to GDP ratios over the country group in a given year as the
measure of the private non-financial sector’s leverage. Figures constructed using data from
Avdjiev et al. (2018) and BIS Credit Statistics.
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Year
Bank External Liabilities Foreign Currency share
Bank External Assets Foreign Currency share
c  Advanced Economies Excluding the U.S.
Notes: (a) Advanced Economies. (b) Emerging Market Economies. (c) Advanced Economies
Excluding the U.S. We calculate the share of foreign currency liabilities as the sum of the
liabilities in foreign currency across countries divided by the sum of total liabilities across
countries. The share of foreign currency assets is calculated in the same fashion. Figures
constructed using data from BIS Locational Banking Statistics.
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d  Emerging Market Economies (Postcrisis)
y =  0.05 -0.25 x, t-stat (x) = -0.502
Notes: (a) Advanced Economies (Precrisis). (b) Emerging Market Economies (Precrisis).
(c) Advanced Economies (Postcrisis). (d) Emerging Market Economies (Postcrisis). The
change in bank external leverage ratio is the difference between bank external-liabilities-to-
assets ratio in 2007 and the one in 2000 for the pre-crisis period. The exchange rate is the
price of the US dollar in local currency. The change in the log exchange rate is the difference
between the log exchange rate in 2007 and the one in 2000. We use 2009–2014 changes for
the post-crisis period. We drop country observations if a change in bank external leverage
ratio is larger than 3 or smaller than -3 in a given country. Figures constructed using data
from IMF International Financial Statistics and Avdjiev et al. (2018).
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Bank External Leverage (Left Axis)
Bank External Liabilities (Right Axis)
Bank External Assets (Right Axis)
b  Emerging Market Economies
Notes: (a) Advanced Economies. (b) Emerging Market Economies. We calculate external
leverage of the bank sector in a given year as the sum of the bank sector’s external liabilities
over the country group in a given year divided by the counterpart of external assets. Figures
constructed using data from Avdjiev et al. (2018).
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1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Year
Corporate Debt Inflows (Left Axis)
Corporate External Leverage in All Currency (Right Axis)
b  Emerging Market Economies
Correlation = 0.1710
Notes: (a) Advanced Economies. (b) Emerging Market Economies. We calculate aggregate
debt inflows into the corporate sector in a given year as the sum of deflated debt inflows
(billions 1996 USD) over the country group in a given year. We calculate external leverage
of the corporate sector in a given year as the sum of the corporate sector’s external liabilities
over the country group in a given year divided by the counterpart of external assets. Figures
constructed using data from Avdjiev et al. (2018).
Figure 2.9: Corporate Debt Inflows and Corporate External Leverage in All Currencies
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Notes: This map is taken from Pamuk (1987).
Figure 3.1: Ottoman Borders: 1830–1913
143
Ottoman Empire Imports and Exports 
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Ottoman Empire Exports Ottoman Empire Exports to France, UK, Germany
Default (1876)
Notes: This data is taken from Pamuk (1987). All variables are measured in thousand sterling.








































Notes: This data is taken from Pamuk (1987). All variables are measured in thousand
sterling and averaged over each period.









































































































































Actual FDI Imputed FDI
FDI/GDP (%)
(c) Germany
Notes: Raw data is taken from Pamuk (1987). We impute missing data on FDI-to-GDP ratios, using
the regression of log FDI-to-GDP ratios on log Ottoman government-debt-flow-to-GDP ratios with
country fixed effects and country-specific time trends. This regression explains substantial variation in
historical FDI-to-GDP ratios with an R-squared of 0.4114. Remaining missing values are interpolated
using the average of the values in years t − 1 and t + 1. If the value in t + 1 is not feasible, the value
in t+ 2 is used. When the value in t− 1 is missing, we fill the value in t with the value in t+ 1.
Figure 3.4: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from Source Countries to the Ottoman Empire






































































































































Actual Exports Imputed Exports
Exports/GDP (%)
(c) Germany
Notes: Raw data is taken from Pamuk (1987). We impute missing data on Export-to-GDP ratios,
using the regression of log Export-to-GDP ratios on log GDP per capita of each source country and log
Ottoman GDP per capita with country fixed effects and country-specific time trends. This regression
gives an R-squared of 0.8405. Remaining missing values are interpolated using the average of the values
in years t− 1 and t+ 1. If the value in t+ 1 is not feasible, the value in t+ 2 is used. When the value
in t− 1 is missing, we fill the value in t with the value in t+ 1.
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+ γWit + εit+h
where αi indicates country dummies, and αit controls for country-specific trends. The left-hand side
variable is gross FDI inflows from the source countries (denoted as i), which are France, Germany and
the U.K., into the Ottoman Empire in time t + h; Exports are Ottoman exports into these countries
in time t. The set of control variables Wit includes three lagged variables of each of FDI-to-GDP
ratios, export-to-GDP ratio, and the Empire’s GDP per capita. Estimates βh are plotted as a solid
line connecting the estimate in each horizon h. The shaded area shows 95% confidence interval with
Driscoll and Kraay (1998a) standard error (lag length 3).
Figure 3.6: Dynamic Responses of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from Source Countries














Notes: The figure shows the location of the statistical regions (SRE). TR1-Istanbul, TR2-West Mar-
mara, TR3-Aegean, TR4-East Marmara, TR5-West Anatolia, TR6-Mediterranean, TR7-Central Ana-
tolia, TR8-West Black Sea, TR9-East Black Sea, TRA-North East Anatolia, TRB-Central East Anato-
lia, TRC-South East Anatolia. Names of the statistical regions and their tags accord to Prime Ministry
Republic of Turkey and Turkish Statistical Institute (2005), page 413 “Classification of statistical re-
gions (SRE)”. Long-term rainfall data is available for TR2 statistical region (Griggs et al., 2007), TR3
region (Touchan et al., 2003), TR5 region (Akkemik and Aras, 2007), TR6 region Touchan et al. (2007),
and TR8 region (Akkemik et al., 2007)
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Rainfall
Notes: The scatterplot and the solid line correspond to the first-stage regression in Table 3.9 column
2 with the partial effect of rainfall on exports being equal to 0.46 with the standard error of 0.17.
The log export-to-GDP ratio and rainfall variables are purged out of control variables in the first-stage
regression.































































































































































TR3 TR8 TR5 TR2 TR6
Notes: For definition of the statistical regions, refer to Section 3.6.1.














































Govt Debt-to-GDP Non-fin Corp Debt-to-GDP
Sovereign Spread












































Govt Debt-to-GDP Non-fin Corp Debt-to-GDP
Sovereign Spread













































Govt Debt-to-GDP Non-fin Corp Debt-to-GDP
Sovereign Spread














































Govt Debt-to-GDP Non-fin Corp Debt-to-GDP
Sovereign Spread















































Govt Debt-to-GDP Non-fin Corp Debt-to-GDP
Sovereign Spread
Spread (basis points)Debt-to-GDP ratio (%)
Spain
Source: BIS, Bloomberg
Notes: See Figure A.1 for notes.












































Govt Debt-to-GDP Non-fin Corp Debt-to-GDP
Sovereign Spread















































Govt Debt-to-GDP Non-fin Corp Debt-to-GDP
Sovereign Spread














































Govt Debt-to-GDP Non-fin Corp Debt-to-GDP
Sovereign Spread












































Govt Debt-to-GDP Non-fin Corp Debt-to-GDP
Sovereign Spread












































Govt Debt-to-GDP Non-fin Corp Debt-to-GDP
Sovereign Spread
Spread (basis points)Debt-to-GDP ratio (%)
Netherlands
Source: BIS, Bloomberg
Notes: The figure shows debt-to-GDP ratios and sovereign spreads for each country. Debt is core debt (BIS)
which consists of the following financial instruments as defined in the System of National Accounts (SNA):
debt securities, loans, and currency and deposits. Core debt excludes special drawing rights, insurance,
pension, standardized guarantee schemes, and other accounts payable. Sovereign spreads (Bloomberg) are
measured as the difference between the 10-year government bond yield of each country and that of Germany.
Both government bond yields are denominated in euro and daily averages of the period.































Idiosyncratic Productivity Growth (%)
Source: Author’s calculation based on ORBIS-AMADEUS
Notes: To construct idiosyncratic shocks, I estimate the following firm-level productivity growth (gi,t) de-
composition:
gi,t = βs,qηt + ui,t
where ηt is an aggregate shock, and ui,t is an idiosyncratic shock to firm i at time t. I plot estimated
residuals ûi,t for top 50 large firms in each Eurozone country (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Finland, and
France) together. I assume that (i) the responsiveness (βs,q) of firm-level productivity growth (gi,t) with
regard to an aggregate shock (ηt) is identical within a 4-digit sector s and a firm size quntile q, and that
(ii) aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks are separable in the growth decomposition. Under this assumption,
regressing firm-level productivity growth on sector × size × year fixed effects gives residuals (ûi,t) that are
consistent estimators for idiosyncratic shocks (ui,t). These residuals are calculated using top 50 largest firms
in each 4-digit sector and winsorized at 20 and -20 percent following Gabaix (2011).
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Idiosyncratic Shocks to Top 50 Firms (%)
Source: Author’s calculation based on BIS and ORBIS-AMADEUS
Notes: The figure plots the weigthed idiosyncratic shocks to top 50 firms in each country against corporate
debt-to-GDP ratios for six Eurozone countries using the first-stage regression in Table 1.4, column (4). These
variables are purged of GDP growth, government debt-to-GDP ratio, lagged bank leverage, lagged granular
residual, and country- and year- fixed effects. Labels denote the two-digit letter country code combined with
two-digit years in the 2000s. IT: Italy, PT: Portugal, ES: Spain, BE: Belgium, FI: Finland, FR: France.
Figure A.4: First-stage Regression Plot
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Data Appendix for Chapter 1
1. Firm-level Data Cleaning
ORBIS-AMADEUS data is constructed following Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2019) unless
stated otherwise.
 I limit the sample to the period of 1999 to 2015 and exclude the financial sector
(NACE code 64–66) and the mining and oil-related sector (NACE code 05–09). I only
use unconsolidated balance sheets, as many firms do not report consolidated balance
sheets.
 I drop firm-year observations if any of the following variables are missing or negative
in a given year for each firm: total assets, operating revenue (turnover), sales, number
of employees, costs of employees, material costs, and financial debt. Also, I drop
entire firm observations if any of the following variables are negative for each firm:
total assets, sales, tangible fixed assets, and number of employees. If the number of
employees exceeds 2 millions for any year observations in a given firm, I drop entire
observations of this firm.
 To further mitigate measurement errors arising from reporting mistakes and associated
outliers, I perform the following procedure. First, I calculate growth rates of a variable
x at time t as (xit − xit−1)/(0.5 × (xit + xit−1)) for each firm i and year t. Next, if
the growth rate at time t is greater than 150% and the growth rate at time t + 1 is
smaller than -150%, the value xt is replaced with a simple average (xt−1 + xt+1)/2. I
repeat this procedure three times for the following variables: total assets, operating
revenue (turnover), sales, number of employees, costs of employees, material costs, and
financial debt. I also winsorize these variables at the bottom 1st percentile. Moreover,
I manually check whether variables have obvious mistakes and correct data accordingly.
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For example, if a firm’s sales are $100 for three years, increase to $10,000 and go back
to $100 in subsequent years, I replace the value of $10,000 with $100.
 To obtain estimates for production function parameters used for total factor produc-
tivity (TFP) calculation, I follow Gopinath et al. (2017a) that impose stricter criteria
in data cleaning and drop many observations, as quality of data needs to be much
higher for TFP estimation. Final firm-level TFP is constructed by plugging cleaned
data described above into the production function estimated using cleaned data as in
Gopinath et al. (2017a).
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2. Alternative Measure of Idiosyncratic Shocks
Beside estimating equation 1.5 in a similar vein with Gabaix and Koijen (2020), an
alternative way of estimating firm-level idiosyncratic shocks is as follows. An econometrican
regresses firm-level total factor productivity zi,t for each firm i and year t on its lagged value
using the following equation:
log(zi,t) = µ+ ρlog(zi,t−1) + ui,t (9)
Residuals ûi,t estimated from the above equation are innovations to productivity and
could be called idiosyncratic shocks. However, the problem of this procedure is that the
OLS estimator of ρ is biased due to the nature of autoregressive process, and thus the
estimates ûi,t are also biased. Even if residuals are measured precisely, the granular residuals
constructed using the above procedure are less likely to be relevant instruments for corporate
leverage. The reason is that firms are more likely to make financing decisions, mainly based
on productivity changes instead of unexpected innovations to productivity. Notice that




To obtain detrended series for event study in Figure 1.8, I regress the following variables
of each six Eurozone countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Finland, and France) on a
common linear trend and get residuals, using the sample of the period 2007-2017. In the
figure, I plot the cross-country average of each series over time.
 Output: log of annual gross domestic product (chain linked volumes, Eurostat)
 Investment: log of annual gross fixed capital formation (chain linked volumes, Eurostat)
 Consumption: log of the sum of the annual final consumption expenditure of households
and general government (chain linked volumes, Eurostat), which is consistent with
the model assumption that household utility depends on the sum of dividends, labor
income, and government expenditure
 Government expenditure: log of the sum of the annual final consumption expenditure
of general government (chain linked volumes, Eurostat)
 Tax revenue: log of total receipts from taxes and social contributions (Eurostat) where
real tax revenue is calculated as nominal revenue divided by the GDP deflator (obtained
from Eurostat)
 Productivity: log of total factor productivity of the total economy obtained from Eu-
ropean Commission AMECO Database
 Corporate debt: annual average of quarterly total credit to non-financial corporations
to GDP ratios (BIS total credit statistics)
 Government debt: annual average of quarterly total credit to the government sector
at market value to GDP ratios (BIS total credit statistics)
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 Corporate spread: annual average of monthly corporate spreads of Euro area non-
financial corporate bonds (Euro area Bund NFC), using spread data obtained from
Gilchrist and Mojon (2017)
 Government spread: annual average of the difference between a country’s 10-year gov-
ernment bond rate and the 10-year German government bond rate where both bond
rates are denominated in euro (daily, Bloomberg)
 Firm default rate: annual average of monthly speculative-grade non-financial corporate
default rates of Europe obtained from “Moody’s 1Q 2020 Asia-Pacific Default Report -
Non-financial High-Yield Corporate Default Rates Data” (only the aggregate European
default rate from 2008 to 2020 is publicly available in this report)
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Appendix A of Chapter 1. Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the time after firms choose kt+1 together with bt+1 given Bt+1 and before
productivity zt+1 realizes. I show that the cumulative probability of the government revenue
TRt+1 being equal the level of TR with low firm debt b
l
t+1 is smaller than the one with high
firm debt bht+1, which means H(TR|blt+1) ≤ H(TR|bht+1) for every TR. By the proposition
6.D.1 of Mas-Colell et al.(1995),19 this statement is true if and only if the distrubution






for every nondecreasing function U : R→ R.





F (zt+1, kt+1) ≤ 0 (11)
for every zt+1, where
∂µ(Xt)
∂bt
≥ 0 by the proposition 2.
This implies that TR(zt+1, b
l
t+1) = TR(zt+1, b
h
t+1) + ε(zt+1, b
h




Thus, I have H(TR|blt+1) ≤ H(TR|bht+1) for every TR:
H(TR|blt+1) = P [TR(zt+1, blt+1) ≤ TR] = P [TR(zt+1, bht+1) + ε(zt+1, bht+1) ≤ TR] (12)
= P [TR(zt+1, b
h
t+1) ≤ TR− ε(zt+1, bht+1)] = H(TR− ε|bht+1) ≤ H(TR|bht+1)
Q.E.D.
19Mas-Colell, Andreu, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1995
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Appendix B of Chapter 1. Proof of Proposition 2
I show Q(zt,kt+1,bt+1,Bt+1)
bt+1
≤ 0. From the government’s optimization problem 1.22, the
government default probability is given by
Pr[D(Xt+1) = 1] =
∫
ξt+1
D(Xt+1, ξt+1)dΞ(ξt+1) = (13)
Pr[ξt+1 < V
g(0;Xt+1)− V g(Bt+1;Xt+1) = ξ̄t+1] = Ξ[ξ̄t+1]
where Ξ is the cumulative distribution function of i.i.d. government default costs.
If the threshold government default cost shock ξ̄ increases in firm debt b such that
∂ξ̄t+1
∂bt+1
≥ 0, then the goverment default probability increases in firm debt ∂Pr[D(Xt+1)=1]
∂bt+1
≥ 0,
and in turn the government debt price Q decreases in firm debt according to the debt pricing
equation:

















≥ 0, first, I show that the government’s value V g(Bt+1;Xt+1) is decreasing












u′(Ct) ≤ 0 (15)
where I use ∂µ(Xt)
∂bt
≥ 0, φ(et) ≥ 0, λt ≥ 0, and u′(Ct) > 0. ∂µ(Xt)∂bt ≥ 0 follows from the
relationship that the firms’ value function is decreasing in firm debt as follows:
∂V f (kt, bt;Xt)
∂bt
= −φe(et) = −λt ≤ 0 (16)
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where I use the firms’ optimality condition (1.18) and λt ≥ 0. Then, combined with
(1.15), I have ∂ν̄
d(Xt)
∂bt




≥ 0 and ∂µ(Xt)
∂bt
≥ 0.


















in the equation (15) do not change with Bt, when firm values
V f (k, b;X) are independent of government debt B. Thus, the above inequality holds.
Q.E.D.
Appendix C of Chapter 1. Proof of Proposition 3
The complete problem of the constrained social planner is as follows:





V g(z′, k′, b′, B′), V g(z′, k′, b′, 0)− ξ′
〉
subject to
C = [1− µ(z, k, b)]
(
F (z, k) + (1− δ)k − k′ − b+ q(z, k′, b′)b′ − κ(e− ē)2
)
+Q(z, k′, b′, B′)B′ −B (SP1)







µ(z′, k′, b′) =
∫ νdmax
ν̄d(z′,k′,b′)
dΩ(ν ′di ) (SP3)






D(z′, k′, b′, B′, ξ′)dΠ(z′|z)dΞ(ξ′)
1 + r
(SP4)
Let’s define a complete Ramsey problem. The Ramsey problem with debt taxes (τ b),
transfers to firms (T ), and investment credits (τ k) solves the following:
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V g(z′, k′, b′, B′), V g(z′, k′, b′, 0)− ξ′
〉
subject to e = (1− τ y)F (z, k) (RP1)
+ (1− δ)k − (1− τ k)k′ − b+
(










1− µ(z, k, b)
)
[τ yF (z, k)− τ kk′ + τ bb′ − T ] (RP3)
+Q(z, k′, b′, B′)B′
s = 1 (RP4)
λ = φe(e) (RP5)




































µ(z′, k′, b′) =
∫ νdmax
ν̄d(z′,k′,b′)
dΩ(ν ′di ) (RP9)






D(z′, k′, b′, B′, ξ′)dΠ(z′|z)dΞ(ξ′)
1 + r
(RP10)






[1− µ(z′, k′, b′)]φ(e′) + p(X ′, X ′′)
]
dΠ(z′|z)dΞ(ξ′)





First, I prove that the allocations in the Ramsey problem satisfy the equations in the
constrained social planner problem. Notice that the objective functions of these two prob-
lems are identical. Combining equations (RP1), (RP2), (RP3), and (RP4) leads to the social
planner’s resource constraint (SP1) with the definition of net dividends φ(e) = e−κ(e− ē)2.
Variables {λ, τ k, τ b,m} can be set so that allocations satisfying the implementability con-
straints (RP5), (RP6), and (RP7) given the stochastic discount factor (RP12) are identical
to allocations in the social planner problem. Implementability constraints (RP8), (RP9),
and (RP10) are common to the problems of Ramsey and social planners. The remaining
constraint (RP11) is satisfied by choosing p so that allocations in two problems are identical.
Next, I show that the allocations in the constrained social planner problem satisfy the
equations in the Ramsey problem. The constrained-efficient allocations {e, k, b, B,D} are
set by the social planner, and C is determined by the resource constraint (SP1) and other
implementability constraints. Variables {λ, τ k, τ b,m} can be chosen to satisfy constraints
(RP5), (RP6), and (RP7) given (RP12) after plugging constrained-efficient allocations into
these constraints. Given {τ y, τ k, τ b} and constrained-efficient allocations, (RP1) is satisfied
by choosing a proper T . Given the stock market clearing condition (RP4) and the con-
strained efficient allocations including C, the government expenditure G can be chosen to
satisfy (RP2). As constraints (SP1), (RP1), (RP2), and (RP4) are satisfied, combining these
constraints gives the government bugdet contraint (RP3). The equation (RP11) is slack as p
can be set freely given the constrained-efficient allocations. All remaining implementability
constraints (RP8), (RP9), and (RP10) in the Ramsey problem are identical to those of the
social planner problem.
The set of policies {τ b, T, τ k, B′, D′, G} are functions of key state variables X ={
z, k, b, B
}
, as they are solutions to the recursive equilibrium. policies are time-consistent
since equilibrium policy functions are time-invariant. Q.E.D.
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Appendix D of Chapter 1. Computational Details
To obtain the equilibria of the model, I adopt a discrete choice model with taste shocks
following Dvorkin et al. (forthcoming). For the quantitative model, I add and modify the
relevant ingredients of this model as described in section 1.5.1.
D1. Competitive Equilibrium
Consider the firm’s maximization problem (1.11). I add taste shocks to the firm’s value
functions as follows:
V f (z, k, b) =Eε max
k′,b′
[
Jf (z, k, b, k′, b′) + ε(k′,b′)
]
(18)
where Jf (z, k, b, k′, b′) = φ(e) + β
∫
W f (z′, k′, b′)dΠ(z′|z)
e = (1− τ y)(1− θ)F (z, k) + (1− δ)k − k′ − b+ q(z, k′, b′)b′ −Ψ(k, k′)
φ(e) = e−κ(e− ē)2
W f (z′, k′, b′) = Eε′ max
d′i
〈




where taste shocks ε are i.i.d and distributed Gumbel (Extreme Value Type 1) with
the variance of σε. I use σε = 0.001.
20 Each taste shock is associated with the discrete choice
of control variables. Average firms’ defaulting value is given by µνd which corresponds to the
mean parameter of firms’ i.i.d. enforcement shocks νdi . These enforcement shocks are treated
as i.i.d. taste shocks εi,default − εi,repay in actual computation for notational convenience.
The number of grid points for the combination of firm capital and debt choices (k′, b′) is 275.
Then, firms draw a vector of random variable ε(k′,b′) from the Gumbel distribution that
assigns different values to each choice of (k′, b′), and it will choose (k′∗, b′∗) which maximizes
the ex post value. As is analogous to Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012) who add small
20As σε approaches zero, solutions become close to the original problem without taste shocks, but the
algorithm becomes unstable.
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shocks to output, taste shocks perturb value functions to improve the convergence property
of the value function iteration method. To put it differently, taste shocks allow firms and
the government to implement mixed strategies. With mixed strategies, it is easier for the
algorithm to find a solution than pure strategies, since a mixed Nash Equilibrium always
exists with a finite set of actions according to the Nash Theorem.
It can be shown that ex ante choice probabilities that firms will choose k′∗ and b′∗
conditional on state variables (z, k, b) are
P (k′∗, b′∗|z, k, b) = exp[J
f (z, k, b, k′∗, b′∗)/σε]∑
k′,b′ exp[J
f (z, k, b, k′, b′)/σε]
(19)
The firm value function is given by
V f (z, k, b) = σεlog
〈∑
k′,b′
exp[Jf (z, k, b, k′, b′)/σε]
〉
(20)
Other value functions and choice probabilities can be obtained in a similar fashion.
Firms’ default probability is given by





exp[V f (z, k, b)/σε] + exp[µνd/σε]
(21)
and the associated corporate bond price is
q(z, k′, b′) =
1− (1−Rf )
∫
P (d′ = 1|z′, k′, b′)dΠ(z′|z)
1 + r
(22)
Another firm value function is given by
W f (z, k, b) = σεlog
〈
exp[V f (z, k, b)/σε] + exp[µνd/σε]
〉
(23)
Combined with relevant constraints (1.12), (1.13), (1.23), (1.24), and (1.25), the gov-
ernment problem (1.22) can be written compactly as
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V g(z, k, b, B) = Eε max
B′
[
Jg(z, k, b, B,B′) + εB′
]
(24)
where Jg(z, k, b, B,B′) =∑
k′,b′











C = (1− µ(z, k, b))
[
(1− θ)F (z, k) + (1− δ)k − k′ − b+ q(z, k′, b′)b′
−κ(e− ē)2 −Ψ(k, k′)
]
+Q(z, k′, b′, B′)B′ −B + θF (z, k)
Ex ante choice probabilities that the government will choose B′∗ conditional on state
variables (z, k, b, B) are
P (B′∗|z, k, b, B) = exp[J
g(z, k, b, B,B′∗)/σε]∑
B′ exp[J
g(z, k, b, B,B′)/σε]
(25)
The government value function is given by
V g(z, k, b, B) = σεlog
〈∑
B′
exp[Jg(z, k, b, B,B′)/σε]
〉
(26)
The cumulative distribution function (CDF) Ξ of government default costs ξ is a normal
CDF with mean µξ and standard deviation σξ. Then, the government default probability is
given by
P (D = 1|z, k, b, B) = P
(
V g(z, k, b, B) ≤ V g(z, k, b, 0)− ξ
)
(27)
=Ξ[V g(z, k, b, 0)− V g(z, k, b, B)]
The government bond price can be expressed using the choice probability of the gov-
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ernment default as below:
Q(z, k′, b′, B′) =
∫
M(z′, z)[1− (1−Rg)P (D = 1|z′, k′, b′, B′)]dΠ(z′|z) (28)
I get value functions, choice probabilities, and bond price functions by implementing
the standard value function iteration method on discrete grid points.21
1. Guess the firm value functions V f and the firm bond price function q over the bounded
grid points on z, k and b. I use the Tauchen method to discretize z with 5 grid points,
and (11, 25) grid points are used for (k′, b′).
2. Given these guesses, update associated firm value functions using (18), (20) and (23),
choice probabilities for firm capital k′ and debt b′ (19) and the probability of firm
default d (20), and the firm bond price function (22).
3. Continue until distances between values in the previous iteration and those in the
current iteration (using the maximum distance evaluated at each grid point) goes
below 10−7 for V f and q.
4. Guess the government value function V g and the government bond price function Q
over the bounded grid points on z, k, b and B. I use 25 grid points on B′.
5. Given the firm’s choice probabilities (19) obtained in the firms’ problem and new
guesses, update associated government value functions using (24) and (26), choice
probabilites for government borrowing B′ (25) and the probability of government de-
fault (27), and the government bond price function (28).
6. Continue until distances between values in the previous iteration and those in the
current iteration (using the maximum distance evaluated at each grid point) goes
below 10−7 for V g and Q.
21I solve the model using Julia version 1.4.0 with the QuantEcon package version 0.5.0 and 16 threads
parallelization on the University of Maryland Economics cluster. Exponential terms are calculated using the
Arbnumeric package that ensures accuracy and thread-safe parallelization without high memory usage.
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D2. Constrained Efficient Equilibrium
The constrained social planner problem (1.36) can be written as
V g(z, k, b, B) = Eε max
k′,b′,B′
Jg(z, k, b, B, k′, b′, B′) + εB′ (29)
where Jg(z, k, b, B, k′, b′, B′) =
u(C) + βgEz′|z,ξ′ max
D′
〈
V g(z′, k′, b′, B′), V g(z′, k′, b′, 0)− ξ′
〉
C = (1− µ(z, k, b))
[
(1− θ)F (z, k) + (1− δ)k − k′ − b+ q(z, k′, b′)b′
−κ(e− ē)2 −Ψ(k, k′)
]
+Q(z, k′, b′, B′)B′ −B + θF (z, k)
subject to
corporate default decision from (18), corporate and government bond prices (22) and (28)
It can be shown that ex ante choice probabilities that the planner will choose B′∗
conditional on state variables (z, k, b) and choices of k′ and b′ are
P (B′∗|z, k, b, k′, b′) = exp[J
g(z, k, b, k′, b′, B′∗)/σε]∑
B′ exp[J
g(z, k, b, k′, b′, B′)/σε]
(30)
The government value function is given by
V g(z, k, b, B) = σεlog
〈∑
B′
exp[Jg(z, k, b, k′∗, b′∗, B′)/σε]
〉
(31)
where k′∗ and b′∗ are maximizers of the expected value function Eε[Jg(z, k, b, B, k′, b′, B′)+
εB′ ]. Solutions to this problem are obtained as in the competitive equilibrium.
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Data Construction for Chapter 2
This section describes the construction of aggregate time-series data. We use dataset
constructed by Avdjiev et al. (2018) (henceforth, AHKS) to obtain external assets and
liabilities and external debt inflows, in which all measures break down into sectors (banks,
corporates, and public sector), and the public sector consists of the government and the
central bank. The counterparty sector and the currency type do not break down in AHKS.
AHKS mainly follow the 6th Edition Balance of Payments Manual (BPM6) in constructing
data. According to the BPM6, all liabilities and assets are measured at market values when it
is possible. However, if it is not possible, nominal values are used. We use the sample period
of 1996–2014 mainly due to data availability of the AHKS dataset. We collect all available
data across countries and follow the AHKS country classification for choosing advanced and
emerging market economies.
In Figure 2.4, 2.5, 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9, we plot sectoral inflows, external assets and
liabilities, and associated leverage (assets to liabilities ratio) measures, using AHKS database.
To obtain aggregate debt inflows into each sector, first, we deflate debt inflows (billions USD)
using the US consumer price index in 1996. Second, we calculate aggregate debt inflows into
each sector in a given year as the sum of deflated debt inflows (billions 1996 USD) over
the country group in a given year. To obtain aggregate external leverage by sector, we use
external assets and liabilities. External positions are converted into US dollars by AHKS.
We calculate external leverage of each sector in a given year as the sum of each sector’s
external liabilities over the country group in a given year divided by the sum of each sector’s
external assets over the country group in a given year.
In Figure 2.5, we use the average of bank credit to the private non-financial sector
to GDP ratios over the country group in a given year as the measure of the private non-
financial sector’s leverage. Bank credit to GDP ratios are obtained from BIS credit statistics.
Bank credit includes credit extended by domestic banks to the private non-financial sector.
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The financial instruments covered comprise currency and deposits (which are mostly zero
in the case of credit to the private non-financial sector), loans, and debt securities. The
statistics follow the framework of the System of National Accounts 2008, which mandates
that outstanding credit instruments be valued at market values when market prices are
observable.
In Figure 2.6, we measure the foreign currency share of domestic banks’ external
liabilities and assets, using BIS locational banking statistics (LBS). We calculate the share
of foreign currency liabilities as the sum of the liabilities in foreign currency across countries
divided by the sum of total liabilities across countries. The share of foreign currency assets
is calculated in the same fashion.
We illustrate how to download banks’ stock measures of assets and liabilities from BIS
LBS. Liabilities and assets include all balance sheet positions. Liabilities include interbank
loans received, deposits from banks or nonbanks, and holdings of securities. Assets also
include interbank deposits, loans, and advances to banks or nonbanks, and holdings of se-
curities. We download data in the item called “A5, Location of reporting banks,” which
provides positions of reporting banks located in each country. Table 2.2 shows the list of
downloaded data. By the reporting conventions, claims are market values, while liabilities
are nominal values in most cases.
172
Bibliography
Acharya, Viral, Itamar Drechsler, and Philipp Schnabl, “A Pyrrhic Victory? Bank Bailouts and
Sovereign Credit Risk,” The Journal of Finance, 2014, 69 (6), 2689–2739.
Adrian, Tobias and Hyun Song Shin, “Liquidity, Monetary Policy, and Financial Cycles,” February
2008. Current Issues in Economics and Finance 14(1), Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
and , “Money, Liquidity, and Monetary Policy,” American Economic Review: Papers and
Proceedings, 2009, 99 (2), 600–605.
and , “Liquidity and Leverage,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, 2010, 19 (3), 418–437.
and , “Liquidity and Leverage,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, 2010, 19 (3), 418–437.
Aguiar, Mark and Gita Gopinath, “Defaultable Debt, Interest Rates and the Current Account,”
Journal of International Economics, 2006, 69 (1), 64–83.
and Manuel Amador, “Growth in the Shadow of Expropriation,” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 2011, 126 (2), 651–697.
and , “Fiscal Policy in Debt Constrained Economies,” Journal of Economic Theory, 2016,
161, 37–75.
, Satyajit Chatterjee, Harold Cole, and Zachary Stangebye, “Quantitative Models of Sovereign
Debt Crises,” Handbook of Macroeconomics, 2016, 2, 1697–1755.
Alfaro, Laura, Gonzalo Asis, Anusha Chari, and Ugo Panizza, “Corporate Debt, Firm Size and
Financial Fragility in Emerging Markets,” Journal of International Economics, 2019, 118, 1–19.
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Kalemli-Özcan, Şebnem, Bent Sorensen, and Sevcan Yesiltas, “Leverage Across Firms, Banks, and
Countries,” Journal of International Economics, November 2012, 88 (2), 284–298.
Kalemli-Ozcan, Sebnem, Bent Sorensen, Carolina Villegas-Sanchez, Vadym Volosovych, and Sevcan
Yesiltas, “How to Construct Nationally Representative Firm Level Data from the Orbis Global
Database: New Facts and Aggregate Implications,” NBER Working Paper No. 21558 December
2019.
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